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Abstract
This thesis develops techniques and ideas on proof search. Proof search is used 
with one of two meanings. Proof search can be thought of either as the search for 
a yes/no answer to a query (theorem proving), or as the search for all proofs of a 
formula (proof enumeration). This thesis is an investigation into issues in proof 
search in both these senses for some non-classical logics.
Gentzen systems are well suited for use in proof search in both senses. The rules 
of Gentzen sequent calculi ar e such that implementations can be directed by the top 
level syntax of sequents, unlike other logical calculi such as natural deduction. All 
the calculi for proof search in this thesis are Gentzen sequent calculi.
In Chapter 2, permutation of inference rules for Intuitionistic Linear Logic is stud­
ied. A focusing calculus, ILLF, in the style of Andreoli ([And92]) is developed. 
This calculus allows only one proof in each equivalence class of proofs equivalent 
up to permutations of inferences. The issue here is both theorem proving and proof 
enumeration.
For certain logics, normal natural deductions provide a proof-theoretic semantics. 
Proof enumeration is then the enumeration of all these deductions. Herbelin’s cut- 
free LIT ([Her95], here called MJ) is a Gentzen system for intuitionistic logic al­
lowing derivations that correspond in a 1-1 way to the normal natural deductions 
of intuitionistic logic. This calculus is therefore well suited to proof enumeration. 
Such calculi are called ‘permutation-free’ calculi. In Chapter 3, MJ is extended to a 
calculus for an intuitionistic modal logic (due to Curry) called Lax Logic. We call 
this calculus PFLAX. The proof theory of MJ is extended to PFLAX.
Chapter 4 presents work on theorem proving for propositional logics using a history 
mechanism for loop-checking. This mechanism is a refinement of one developed 
by Heuerding et al ([HSZ96]). It is applied to two calculi for intuitionistic logic 
and also to two modal logics: Lax Logic and intuitionistic S4. The calculi for 
intuitionistic logic are compared both theoretically and experimentally with other 
decision procedures for the logic.
Chapter 5 is a short investigation of embedding intuitionistic logic in Intuitionistic 
Linear Logic. A new embedding of intuitionistic logic in Intuitionistic Linear Logic 
is given. For the hereditary Harrop fragment of intuitionistic logic, this embedding 
induces the calculus MJ for intuitionistic logic.
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In Chapter 6 a ‘permutation-ffee’ calculus is given for Intuitionistic Linear Logic. 
Again, its proof-theoretic properties are investigated. The calculus is proved to be 
sound and complete with respect to a proof-theoretic semantics and (weak) cut- 
elimination is proved.
Logic programming can be thought of as proof enumeration in constructive logics. 
All the proof enumeration calculi in this thesis have been developed with logic 
programming in mind. We discuss at the appropriate points the relationship between 
the calculi developed here and logic programming.
Appendix A contains presentations of the logical calculi used and Appendix B con­
tains the sets of benchmaik formulae used in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background
This thesis develops a series of sequent calculus systems for some non-classical 
logics with computationally motivated properties. The calculi we develop here will 
be of two kinds: calculi for proving theorems, and calculi for enumerating proofs. 
The first kind of calculus solves problems -  a yes/no answer to a query is given. 
The second kind of calculus tells in what ways something can be done -  all useful 
solutions to a problem are given.
In this introduction we give background on intuitionistic logic and in particular the 
‘permutation-free’ sequent calculus MJ. We also give background on linear logic 
and on logic programming. This serves as motivation for the calculi subsequently 
developed in this thesis, as well as giving some technical reference material.
1.1 The Permutation-free calculus MJ
Natural deduction ([Gen69], [Pra65]) is thought of as the ‘real’ proof system for in­
tuitionistic logic. A normal form can be given for every proof in the natural deduc­
tion system -  this normal form is standardly defined as a natural deduction to which 
no reduction rules, either eliminating introduction/elimination pairs or commuting 
inferences, are applicable. The normalisation process is confluent and strongly ter­
minating. The normal form consists of a chain of elimination steps followed by a 
chain of introductions. Each minor premiss is again the conclusion of a normal nat­
ural deduction. Normal natural deductions are often thought of as the ‘real’ proofs 
of the logic.
Natural deduction has a pragmatic drawback. In searching backwaids for the proof 
of a formula, it is not always obvious which rule to apply. For instance in
P t - P D g  F h P  
r i - Q  ^
it is not obvious from the conclusion that we should apply (De). Even when this
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rule has been decided upon, what P  should be is hard to decide. The elimination 
rules do not introduce a connective. Cut-free Gentzen sequent calculus systems 
([Gen69]) are much better from this point of view. When a principal formula has 
been chosen, the rules which can be applied to it are restricted. When the rule has 
also been chosen, the rule application is deterministic. The application of logical 
rules is directed by the syntax of the principal formula. Stmctural rules can be 
built into the sequent system. In such a system, when a principal formula has been 
chosen, the next rule application is determined exactly by the syntax of that formula. 
All logical rules of the sequent calculus are introduction rules (on the left or on the 
right).
There are well known translations ([Pra65]) between normal natural deductions and 
cut-free sequent proofs. Therefore we can search for proofs in sequent calculus 
systems and then translate the resulting proofs to normal natural deductions. The 
drawback here is that many sequent proofs translate to the same normal natural 
deduction. Hence when one is trying to enumerate all proofs of a formula, the same 
proof is found again and again.
This gives one motivation for the ‘permutation-free’ sequent calculus MJ for intu­
itionistic logic. This is a sequent calculus system for intuitionistic logic (enabling 
syntax directed proof search) whose proofs can be translated in a 1-1 way with the 
normal natural deductions for intuitionistic logic. MJ has the advantages of a se­
quent calculus system, whilst reflecting the structure of normal natural deductions.
The calculus originates with Herbelin ([Her95], [Her96]) and has also been inves­
tigated and developed by Dyckhoff and Pinto ([DP96], [DP98a]). Herbelin calls 
his calculus LJT, but here we follow Dyckhoff & Pinto in calling it MJ, as a cal­
culus intermediate between natural deduction (NJ) and sequent calculus (LJ). (This 
nomenclature also avoids a clash with the calculus here called G4, but elsewhere 
also called LJT, [Dyc92]). MJ has two kinds of sequent. One looks like the usual 
kind of sequent; however, only right rules and contraction are applicable to this kind 
of sequent in backwards proof search. By backwards proof search we mean proof 
search starting from the root. The other kind of sequent has a formula (on the left) 
in a privileged position called the stoup (following [Gir91]). The formula in the 
stoup is always principal in the conclusion of an inference rule. Left rules are only 
applicable to stoup sequents. We display MJ in Figure 1.1.
We summarise the relationships between the systems in the following diagram:
L J - ------------------------ W J
M J
Here LJ is the usual Gentzen system for intuitionistic logic (called G3 throughout 
the rest of this thesis) and NJ is the normal natural deduction calculus for intuition­
istic calculus. There is an injection from the proofs of MJ into the proofs of LJ.
C h a p t e r  1. In t r o d u c t io n  a n d  B a c k g r o u n d
r  - A p
(ax)
r  A p (J-c) ^
R
r ,  p  => p (C)
r , p = > g
t ^ p d q
r = > p  r Q R
r  A p (3c)
r = > p v g
r = ^ p  r = > g  , __—
r  ^  p  A g  r  A  p
(V«U
r  A p r  A p
r  A p  
r , p = > p  r , g = > p
r = > P v g  
r  P[^//a;]
(V-Ra)
r  => \fx .p  
r  => P[f/æ]
(v%)t
r  z?
7 ^
r  A p
(Vc)
(Vc)
r  => 3rr.P 
t  y  not free in F, P, R
T ,P [ y /x ] ^ R
(Bn) r ^ R (3c)f
Figure 1.1: The sequent calculus system MJ
The proofs of MJ can be seen as normal forms for proofs in LJ ([DP98b], [Min96]). 
Inferences in LJ can be permuted (see Chapter 2) to give different LJ proofs. Proofs 
in LJ that can be identified up to (semantically sound) permutations of inferences 
are those that translate to the same MJ proof (see [DP97], [DP98b]). Hence MJ is 
described as a ‘permutation-free’ sequent calculus -  no semantically sound permu­
tations of one MJ proof into another are possible. Another way to find the normal 
form of an LJ proof is to translate the LJ proof to a natural deduction, then translate 
it back again. The resulting proof will be a normal proof of LJ. These have the form 
of MJ proofs.
A major theme of this thesis is the extension of these calculi with permutation- 
free properties to other non-classical logics with normal natural deductions as their 
proof-theoretic semantics. To this end we study Lax Logic (where the extension 
is simple) and Intuitionistic Linear Logic (where the extension involves some new 
notions and a lot of complicated technical detail).
1.1.1 Technical Background
The technical details of the basic results on MJ are needed throughout this thesis, 
hence are included here in the introduction. We discuss cut (and its elimination) 
for MJ, we give term assignment systems for the intuitionistic calculi and we state 
some of the main theorems and important lemmas.
MJ has two judgement forms and as a result has four cut rules; these can be seen
C h a p t e r  1. In t r o d u c t io n  a n d  B a c k g r o u n d
M l )
[cutz)
Figure 1.2: Cut rules for MJ
in Figure 1.2. We could give six cut rules, but these four suffice, the others being 
admissible in MJ plus the four rules given. In fact, if one adds the admissible rule 
of weakening as a primitive inference rule to MJ, the other cut rules are derivable.
The following theorem is proved in a variety of ways in [Her95] and [DP98a]. 
Theorem 1.1 The rules (cuti), {cut2 ), (cuts), {cut4 } are admissible in MJ.
We have the usual term assignment system for natural deduction via the Curry- 
Howard isomorphism ([How80]). We can give a restricted version of this for normal 
natural deductions, a term calculus in which only normal terms are grammatically 
correct. There are two kinds of proof terms, N, for normal proof terms (natural 
deductions) and A, for normal non-abstraction terms. We give this grammar and a 
presentation of a calculus for normal natural deductions with proof terms (Figure
1.3). Here V are the variables (proofs), U are the variables (individuals), T are the 
terms (in proof).
N::=
on(A) I AKW I e/g(A) | pr(W, W) | g(W) | ;(W) |wM(A, KW, KW)
XU.N I prq{T, N ) \ee{A, U.V.N)
A::=
va riy )  I ap{A,N) | fst{A )  | snd{A) \ apn{A,T)
We can also give a term system for derivations in MJ. We give the grammar for 
this, including terms for proofs which are not cut-free. There are two kinds of proof 
terms corresponding to the two kinds of sequent. V are variables (proofs). U are 
variables (individuals) and T are the terms. Note that the cut terms are parameterised 
by the cut formula.
M::=
{V; M s) I XV.M I pair{M, M) | inl{M) | inr{M) | XU M  | pairq{T, M) 
cut^(M, M s) I cut^(M, V.M)
C h a p t e r  1. In t r o d u c t io n  a n d  B a c k g r o u n d
r ,  æ : P  > var{x) :P  F W>an(A) : P
r  |» A  : ±
r  oe>e/ç(A) : P (-i-e)
r ,  a; : P  I » iV  : Q  , . F > A : P  D Q  F D^iV : P  . .(3 i)   r  ^  An . ^ ------- (3s)F V> \x.N  : P  D Q  ^ ^  F > ap{A, N) : Q
F [»jVi : P  F [>£>7V2 : Q
F t^p r{N i, N 2 ) : P  AQ (A i)
F o  A : P  AQ , . F o A : P a Q , .
F O : P  F >  gW(A) : Q
(V J  (v>)r M>«(N) -.PVQ^- '^' r K>j(AT) ; P V Q 
r > /4 : P V Q r, 3=1 : P H>jVi : P T, 3:2 : Q M>% : R  
r  !X>wn{A,xi.Ni,X2-N2) : P (Vs)
r  t ^ N  : P[u/x] T > A ^ P  (V,)
F \» X u .N  : \fx.P  F O a p n (A , f) : P\t/x]
F l>oiV : P [f/a :] F O A : 3a;.P  F^x \ P [ u /x ] t^ N  \ R
A ..^A T\ . T>----------  (3e)tF \»prq[t, N) : 3a;.P F I » e e (A ,n .a ; .W ) : R
t  u not free in F, R
Figure 1.3: NNJ: Normal Natural Deduction Calculus for intuitionistic logic, with 
proof term annotation
C h a p t e r  1. In t r o d u c t io n  a n d  B a c k g r o u n d  6
Ms::=
[ ] I ae I (M :: M s) | p{Ms) | q{Ms) \when{V.M, V.M) 
apq{T,Ms) | spl{U.V.M) | cuti{M sj M s) | cut^iM ^V.M s)
Figure 1.4 shows these terms typed by sequents.
We now note an important point. Calculi with multisets and calculi with term as­
signments are not the same. With respect to enumerating proofs, the systems are not 
equivalent. To take a very simple example, consider the sequent P ,P = ^ P .  With 
the context a multiset of formulae, this has one MJ proof:
— p—
(C)p , p ^ p  ( )
whereas when the context has labelled formulae, there aie two proofs:
-------------------— ------ (aæ)     (ax)
xi ' . P, X2' . P— > [ ] : P  x i : P, X2 ' . P— > [] : P
Xi : P,X2 : P  => {xi;[]) : P  x i \ P,X2 P  => (%; [ ]) : P
In this thesis, unless stated otherwise, we use calculi with proof terms for proof 
enumeration (whether the terms have been included or not).
We give translations between the proof terms for normal natural deductions and 
those for MJ proofs. Along with proofs of the soundness (Lemma 1.3) and adequacy 
(Lemma 1.4) of the term annotations, this gives us a proof not only of the soundness 
and completeness of MJ (Corollary 1.1), but also (via Lemmas 1.1 and 1.2) that 
proofs of MJ correspond in a 1-1 to the normal natural deductions for intuitionistic 
logic. We give the translations here, and state the lemmas and theorems, all of which 
can be found in [DP96], [DP98a], [Her95], [Her96].
Sequent Calculus -> Natural Deduction:
6>: M->N
9(x\M s) =  9'{var{x), Ms)
^(Aa;.M) =  Aa;.^(M)
9(pair{Miy M 2 )) = pr(0(M i), 9(M2))
(9(W(M)) =  z(^(M))
^(27tr(M)) =  j(g(M ))
^(Ai/.M) =  A?/.(6!(M))
9{pairq{T, M )) =  prq{T, 9{M))
C h a p t e r  1. In t r o d u c t io n  a n d  B a c k g r o u n d
r JL ae : P (-Lc) r ,x  : P  — y M s  : R  T^x : P  {x; M s) : R3 Ï Ï 3 : ' " ’ r
r ,x  : P  => M  : Q . .
r  \ x .M  : P d Q r ^ ( M : :  Ms) : R
r  =4* Ml ; P  r  M 2 :Q
(C)
r=j-M;P r Q M s : R
r  => pair (Ml, M 2 ) : P  AQ (All)
M s  : R
r  ^  p(M s) : R  
r = ^ M  : P
(Aci)
(V-Ri)
M s  : P
r  ^  g(Ms) : P  
T ^ M - . Q
i n l { M ) - . P y Q ' ' " ^ "  r  inr{M) : P  V Q 
r ,  aji : P  Ml : R  F,X2 ‘ Q M 2 : R
(^£ 2)
(v % )
r  w/ien(a;i.Mi,a;2.M2) : R 
M  : P[p/x
(V f)
r  => Ap.M : Vrc.P 
r = > M :  P[t/x]
r  => pairq(t, M) : 3x.P
(V%)t r  M s : Rr  apq{t, M s) : R  
T,P[y/x] => M  : P  
spl{y,x.M ) ■. R
(Vr)
(3r)t
r-^Msi - .p  r A  Ms2 : p
r - ^ c u t f { M s u M s 2 ) : R  
r = » M : P  V, x :  P  M s-.R
cut2(M ,x.M s) : P
(cwfi)
(cut2)
r=4>M:P r Ms : P
r  => cut^ (M, Ms) : P  
Ml : P  r , a ; : P = > M 2 : P
cut^(M i,x.M 2) : P
(cuts) 
(cut 4)
t  y not free in F, P
Figure 1.4: The sequent calculus system MJ with term assignments
C h a p t e r  1. In t r o d u c t io n  a n d  B a c k g r o u n d
9' : A x  Ms —)• N
9'{A,[]) = an(A)
(M :: Ms)) =  g(M)), Ms)
9'(A, ae) =  efq[A)
^%A,p(Ms)) =  ^% /st(A),M s)
^%A,g(Ms)) =  l9%sW(A),Ms)
9'(A, when(xi.M i, X2 .M2 )) — wn{A, Xi.9(Mi),X2.9{M2))
9'(A, apq{T, M s)) = 9'{apn{A, T ) , Ms)
9'{A,spl{u.x.M)) = ee[A,u.x.9{M))
Natural Deduction to Sequent Calculus:
-0 : N —> M
ip{an{A)) = y { A , [ ] )
'ip(Xx.N) — Xx.ip{N)
^(e/g(A )) =  y  {A, ae)
'ip{pr{Ni, N 2 )) =pa^r('0(iVi),'0(iV2))
^(%(W)) =  W(V'(W))
'ip{j{N)) = inr{'ip{N))
'ip{wn{A, Xi.Ni, X2 .N2 )) = y{A ,w hen{xi.ip{N i),X 2 .'ip(N2 ))) 
'ij^{Xu.N) =  XuyÇN) 
ip{prq{T, N)) — pairq{T, ip{N)) 
i){ee{A,u,x.N) — y  [A, spl(u.x.'ijj{N)))
y  : A x  Ms —>■ M
y{var{x), Ms) =  {x; Ms)
A), Ms) =  ('^ (AT) :: Ms))
ij)'[f st[A), M s) =  y (A ,p {M s))  
ip'{snd{A),Ms) =  y  (A, q{M s)) 
y{apn(A , T), M s) = ip'{A, apq{T, Ms))
C h a p t e r  1. In t r o d u c t io n  a n d  B a c k g r o u n d
Lemma 1.1
i) i>{e(M)) =  M
ii) il>{e'(A,Ms)) = i>'{A,Ms)
Lemma 1.2
i) e{i>(N)) = N
ii) e{i>'{A,Ms)) = $'{A,Ms)
Lemma 1 .3  (S o u n d n e s s ) The following rules are admissible: 
r = ^ M : P  r i > y l : P  M s: R
Vw>e( M) :P V v > 9 \A ,M s ) :R
Lemma 1.4 (A d e q u a c y ) The following rules are admissible:
r M>jV :P  T \ > A : P  V ^  Ms  : R
V ^ i l ) { N ) : P  r ^ i ) ' { A , M s ) : R
Corollary 1.1 The calculus MJ is sound and complete.
Finally, by study of the cut-elimination reductions and the associated term reduc­
tions (neither of which have been included here), the following theorem can be 
proved (again from [DP96], [DP98a]):
Theorem 1.2 (S t r o n g  N o r m a l is a t io n ) Every cut-elimination strategy termi­
nates (in a cut-free proof).
1.1.2 Advantages of MJ
As discussed above, the proofs of MJ represent a normal form for proofs in a more 
usual sequent system: all proofs can be permuted to one with the form of an MJ 
proof. The proofs of this systems are also in 1-1 correspondence with the normal 
natural deductions of intuitionistic logic.
MJ’s focusing (see [And92]) on the stoup formula (that is, its avoidance of permuta­
tions) makes the calculus more direct for finding proofs of a formula. As discussed 
below, MJ can be seen as a logic programming language. Again, this is related to 
its proof search properties.
There are both practical and theoretical reasons to be interested in MJ and other 
‘permutation-free’ calculi. MJ provides a refinement of the notion of sequent, bring­
ing the sequent calculus closer to its proof-theoretic semantics of normal natural
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deductions. Indeed the structure of a normal natural deduction can be seen in the 
structure of an MJ proof.
One of the main themes of this thesis is the use of the ideas and techniques de­
veloped for MJ with other constructive logics, namely Lax Logic (Chapter 3) and 
Intuitionistic Linear Logic (see Chapter 6). We also use MJ as the basis for proving 
intuitionistic formulae (as opposed to enumerating all proofs), and argue that for 
this purpose too, MJ is a better calculus than some more usual formulations (Chap­
ter 4). In Chapter 5 we will discuss embedding intuitionistic logic in linear logic, 
with especial attention to MJ.
1.2 Theorem Proving
Whilst for many purposes one may be interested in enumerating all proofs of a 
formula, for others a simple provable/unprovable answer will do. In this case we 
are interested in the quickest way of getting this answer (and in its correctness). 
Propositional logics are usually decidable (although propositional linear logic is a 
notable exception to this, see [LMSS92]) and therefore we are interested in finding 
these decision procedures, in particulai" we would like quick decision procedures.
The contraction rule is a major obstacle to finding decision procedures for non- 
classical logics. Duplication of a formula means that on backwards proof search the 
sequents become more complicated, not less. We have no obvious way of seeing 
that we should terminate the search. Leaving contraction out usually leaves an 
incomplete calculus. One can either try and find a calculus that duplicates resources 
in a more subtle way (leading to G4 for intuitionistic logic) or study the nature of 
non-terminating backwards search to see where one can stop the search.
In Chapter 4 we develop a technique for detecting loops using a history mechanism, 
building on work of Heuerding et al ([HSZ96], [Heu98]). We apply it to some 
non-classical logics, giving useful decision procedures.
1.3 Linear Logic
Girard’s linear logic ([Gir87]) is a powerful ‘constructive’ logic. It is a substruc­
tural (resource sensitive) logic -  weakening and contraction are not generally valid. 
The logic takes the usual logical connectives and breaks them into multiplicative 
(context splitting) and additive (context sharing) versions. Hence we have two con­
junctions (tensor ‘<8>’ and with *&’); two disjunctions (par and plus ‘0 ’); and it 
is possible to give two implications (lollipop ‘-o ’. Additive implication, ‘^ ’ can 
be defined, but is rarely included). We also have four logical constants, multiplica­
tive: ‘/ ’, ‘_L’, additive: ‘T ’, ‘O’. A logic without any structural rules at all is very 
weak. The main novelty of linear logic is that the structural rules are reintroduced.
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P ^ P (ax)
V ^ P  A , P = ^ R
I
r,A 
r = ^ R
(cut)
r , i = ^ R i h )
r= > T  
r , p = ^ Q
(T?e)
r = ^ p - o Q  
r=^p A
r,o=>R
A ,Q
(Oc)
R
r,A
r = ^ p  r = > Q  
r= ^ p & :Q
r = ^ p
(®%)
r, A, P—oQ => R 
r,p,Q ^  R
i~^£)
(&%)
P 0 Q  r , f ( g i Q=^ A;
r,p=^R , r,g
r = > f  e Q (®%i)
r , p & Q = ^ i î  
(@ R j
(&a ) Rr, p&g ^  R
r,P=^P T,Q ^  Rr ^  P e g  
! r = ^ p
r, p e g p (®c)
!r =>!P
r = > p
r , ! P = > p
iP)
(W)
r , p = > p (D )r, !P R
r, IP, IP =^R r ,!P => p (C)
Figure 1.5: Sequent Calculus system for ILL
but for marked formulae (the exponential formulae) only. For this purpose two extra 
logical connectives are needed: ofcourse (or bang, allowing weakening and contrac­
tion on the left) and whynot (query, allowing weakening and contraction on the 
right) ‘?’. Full classical linear logic (CLL) is completely symmetric, and is often 
presented as a single-sided sequent calculus. Both single-sided and two-sided pre­
sentations of linear logic can be found in the Appendix A. There are several good 
introductions to linear logic: amongst them are Girard’s original paper ([Gir87]), 
[Gir95], [Ale93] and [Tro92].
In this thesis we are mainly interested in Intuitionistic Linear Logic (ILL). This sys­
tem is the single succèdent restriction of the two-sided presentation of linear logic. 
This leads to a logic without the ^  and ? connectives, as well as the logical constant 
_L. Another way of looking at ILL is as a deconstruction of intuitionistic logic, a 
refinement of the understanding of intuitionistic connectives (hence the nomencla­
ture). Intuitionistic logic has no structural rules on the right, and both weakening 
and contraction on the left. ILL restricts structural rules to certain marked formulae 
on the left. The logical connectives are then split into additive and multiplicative 
connectives as before. The sequent calculus system (which we refer to simply as 
ILL) can be seen in Figure 1.5. (Note that, as observed by Schellinx in [Sch94], 
CLL is not a conservative extension of ILL. The system of Full Intuitionistic Lin­
ear Logic (FILL) is therefore of interest -  CLL is a conservative extension of this 
system. See [dPH93]).
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Figure 1.6: NILL: Sequent Style Natural Deduction Calculus for ILL
We aie interested in ILL because of its relationship to intuitionistic logic (as well 
as with logic programming). We can use similar machinery for studying ILL to 
that used for intuitionistic logic, whereas, despite being constructive, CLL has to be 
understood in new ways. For example, CLL has as semantics: proof nets or coher­
ence spaces or certain categories or perhaps games. For ILL we can (amongst other 
semantics) study natural deduction, which for intuitionistic logic has a long history 
and is well understood. The natural deduction calculus we primarily consider is 
that of Benton, Bierman, de Paiva and Hyland from ([BBdPH92], [BBdPH93b], 
[BBdPH93a], [Bie94]). This calculus can be seen in a sequent style in Figure 1.6. 
We call this calculus NILL. There are several other natural deduction systems for 
ILL in the literature. Some are perfectly satisfactory alternatives to the one we con­
sider; others less so. We leave discussion of these alternative systems, as well as 
commentary on NILL, until Chapter 6.
We will be interested in the normal forms of natural deductions in ILL. A notion of 
{(5, c)-normal form can be defined for the natural deductions of ILL. It is these {(5, 
c)-normal deductions that are investigated further in Chapter 6.
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1.4 Logic Programming
The final piece of background included in this introduction is the link between 
permutation-free sequent calculi and logic programming.
One view of logic programming is that it is about backwards proof search (as in 
proof enumeration) in constructive logics. This view is laid out by Miller et al. in 
[MNPS91] (see also [Har94]). We describe goal-directed proof search in the Horn 
formula and hereditary Harrop formula fragments of first-order intuitionistic logic, 
as given in [MNPS91]. We also present calculi for goal-directed proof search in 
these fragments.
1.4.1 Uniform Proofs and Abstract Logic Programming Lan­
guages
We give the definitions of uniform proof and of abstract logic programming lan­
guage from [MNPS91].
Definition 1.1 A uniform proof of a single succèdent sequent in a fragment o f in­
tuitionistic logic is a sequent calculus proof in which every occurrence of a sequent 
with a non-atomic goal is the conclusion of a right rule.
Definition 1.2 An abstract logic programming language is a triple (D, G, \~)
(where D is the set o f valid context formulae and G is the set o f valid goal formulae 
and h is the consequence relation), such that for any subset D' o f D and any element 
G' ofG, D' h G' iff there is a uniform proof o f G' from D'.
1.4.2 Horn formulae
Horn formulae (D) are given by the following grammar (where G stands for Horn 
goal formula and D for Horn definite formula);
G::=
T \ A \ G A G \ G y G \ 3 V . G
D::=
a \ g d  a \ d a d \ w .d
It is known that h/jr, Ds  => G iff hex Ds G. Moreover, the Horn definite for­
mulae are classically equivalent to the ‘Horn clauses’ of theorem proving (modulo 
issues to do with quantifiers).
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Figure 1.7: The system X for a fragment of intuitionistic logic
1.4.3 Hereditary Harrop formulae
Hereditary Harrop formulae are given by the following grammar (where G stands 
for hereditary Harrop goal formula and D for hereditary Harrop definite formula):
G::=
D::=
T | A | P d G | G a G | G v G|  VV.G I 3V.G
A I G 3 D I D A D I  W .D
Note that the Horn formulae defined in the previous section aie hereditary Harrop 
definite formulae. We give a calculus (the backchaining calculus, J )  for hereditary 
Harrop logic (and hence one that can be restricted to one for Horn formulae) which 
gives exactly the uniform proofs. The soundness and completeness of this calculus 
tells us that hereditary Harrop goal formulae, hereditary Harrop definite formulae 
and the intuitionistic consequence relation form an abstract logic programming lan­
guage. The backchaining calculus for intuitionistic logic can be seen in Figure 1.7. 
This is taken from [HM94]. We need the following definition:
Definition 1.3 Where P  is a D formula, we define \P\tobe the smallest set o f pairs 
such that:
A | f |
2. if<  A ,P i A P 2 > €  |P | then < A , Pi >e \ P \ a n d < A , P 2 >G |P |
3. i f< A ,^ x .P ' >G |P | then for all closed terms t, < A^P'\t/x]  > 6  |P |
4. A, G D P ' > e  |P | tAen < A U {G}, P ' >E |P |
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It has been noted by Dyckhoff & Pinto ([DP94], [Dyc98]) that the proofs produced 
by goal-directed proof search in the backchaining calculus correspond to normal 
natural deductions in the fragment of intuitionistic logic being studied. Note that 
this correspondence is only for certain restricted fragments of the logic.
1.4.4 M J and Logic Programming
The backchaining calculus results from the development of the view of logic pro­
gramming as the backwards search for a proof of a formula in a constructive logic. 
The hereditary Harrop formula fragment of intuitionistic logic can be seen as the 
maximal fragment of intuitionistic logic for which goal directed proof search is 
complete ([Har94]).
Logic programming is not just about what is provable, but about how something is 
proved -  proof enumeration, not just theorem proving. If one holds the view that 
the proofs that should be enumerated are normal natural deductions, then one would 
like a suitable system for enumerating these proofs. As discussed above, MJ is such 
a system.
If one restricts MJ to the hereditary Harrop formula fragment, one can see that this 
semantically motivated calculus matches the pragmatically motivated backchaining 
calculus. As MJ extends the backchaining calculus to a calculus for the whole 
of first-order intuitionistic logic, it might be thought of as a logic programming 
language. MJ can then be thought of as suggesting a natural extension to the notion 
of abstract logic programming language, one bringing it away from the syntactic 
notion of goal-directed proof search and instead basing it on semantics. MJ is then 
an extension of the backchaining calculus to a calculus for a logic programming 
language with disjunction and the existential quantifier on the left, that is, the whole 
of intuitionistic logic.
In [FMW97] a backchaining calculus for a fragment of an intuitionistic modal logic, 
Lax Logic, is given as an abstract language for constraint logic programming. As 
Lax Logic is a simple extension of intuitionistic logic, this seems an appropriate 
case to apply permutation-free techniques to.
In [HM94] the ideas of abstract logic programming language, uniform proof and 
backchaining calculi are applied to a fragment of ILL. This results in the calcu­
lus/programming language Lolli. Linear logic programming languages provide a 
more refined language than the usual ones, increasing the expressivity of logic pro­
gramming languages. In Chapter 6 we develop an MJ like calculus for ILL with 
the aim of giving a natural extension to Lolli in the same way that MJ extends the 
backchaining calculus. A more detailed discussion and overview of Lolli, as well 
as all details, are left to Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Permutations
This chapter is an investigation of the permutability properties of the rules of the 
two-sided Gentzen system for Intuitionistic Linear Logic (see Figure 1.5). We give 
background on the permutability of the rules for intuitionistic logic and single-sided 
linear logic, as well as definitions of permutation of inferences and of inference 
rules. We tabulate the permutations in ILL and give a calculus, ILLF, for the logic 
adapted from Andreoli’s work on focusing proofs ([And92]). ILLF finds only one 
proof in each equivalence class of proofs equivalent up to permutations.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Intuitionistic Logic
Kleene studies the permutability properties of sequent calculi in [Kle52b]. Kleene 
considers the permutability properties of classical and intuitionistic first-order logic. 
He defines a notion of permutability of inferences / i  and I2 , where I 2 is immediately 
below (as in closer to the root) I\ in the proof tree. The results of this investigation 
(for the prepositional connectives) can be seen in Table 2.1. (Note that this table 
would be slightly different under the definition of permutation we give in section
2.1.3).
A similar table can be found in [DP97], [DP98b]. Mints also studies permutability 
of inferences in intuitionistic logic ([Min96]). These papers give a more detailed 
account of permutability of proofs in intuitionistic logic. Curry studies permutations 
for classical logic in [Cur52b].
The calculus MJ can be studied as a calculus avoiding permutations. The derivations 
in this system can be seen as canonical forms for intuitionistic proofs with respect 
to permutation of inferences. Every proof in the usual sequent formulation (03) of 
the logic can, by permutation of inferences, be (weakly) normalised to the structure 
of an MJ proof (see [DP98b]). Strong normalisation of permutation of proofs is
16
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h
A% Ar V£
n X n P n P
Dc P p P P P P
/2 n p n P n P
A r P p P P P Pn p n P n P
VjC X X X P X P
Key:
p stands for permutable 
X stands for non-permutable 
n stands for not possible.
Table 2.1: Permutability of inference rules in prepositional intuitionistic logic, G3
investigated in [DP98b], [Sch98]. It should be noted that MJ doesn’t avoid all per­
mutations -  some of those involving (V^) can still be performed on the image of MJ 
derivations inside G3. However, Dyckhoff & Pinto claim that these permutations 
are not semantically sound. There are no corresponding equivalences of proof in 
natural deduction for intuitionistic logic. Hence these permutations are not interest­
ing (an alternative point of view would be that this suggests that natural deduction 
is a poor semantics outside of hereditary Harrop logic, [GLT89]). Indeed, the table 
of the permutability of inference rules in a sequent system is dependent on exactly 
which sequent system for the logic we look at. Kleene and Dyckhoff & Pinto study 
the system G3, an additive system, and allow liberal use of structural rules to ensure 
the permuted proofs are valid. However, one could easily consider a multiplica­
tive intuitionistic calculus (such as G6), where the structural rules would be more 
important. In this calculus the table of the permutability of inferences would be sig­
nificantly different. For example, the (V^) rule no longer permutes down past (D/:). 
The permutabilities in G6 can be seen in Table 2.2. Permutation of inference rules 
in a sequent system seems to be a syntactic notion -  its relationship to semantics is 
not a straightforward issue.
2.1.2 Linear Logic
Permutation of inferences in linear logic has also been studied, notably by Beilin 
([Bel93]) and by Galmiche & Perrier ([GP94]). These studies consider full clas­
sical linear logic with a one-sided sequent presentation. In Tables 2.3 and 2.4 we 
present the results of Beilin and Galmiche & Perrier respectively (restricting to the 
prepositional fragment).
We are interested in the permutation properties of Intuitionistic Linear Logic, pre­
sented as a two-sided sequent calculus with implication as a connective.
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h
W c D% Dr A;;. Ar Vrw P p P P P P P Pc P p P X X P P X
P p n X n P n PDr P p P p P P P X
h P p n p n P n XAr P p P X X P P X
v% P p n p n P n p
Vr P p X X X P X p
Key:
p stands for permutable 
X stands for non-permutable 
n stands for not possible
Table 2.2: Permutability of inference rules in prepositional intuitionistic logic, G6
h
W C 0 & © p D
W P P P p p p p pC P P X p p p p p
P P P p p p X p
P P X p p p X p
h & X X X p p X X X
m P P p p p p X pF P P X X X X X XD P P p p p p p p
Key:
p stands for permutable 
X stands for non-permutable
Table 2.3: Permutability of inference rules in prepositional linear logic, Beilin
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hw c >9 & 0 P Dw p p P P P P P Pc p p X P P P P P
p p P P P P X P
p p X P P P X P
h & X X* X X* X* X X X
0 P P p P P P X Pp P P n n n n n XD P P P P P P P p
Key:
p stands for permutable 
X stands for non-permutable 
n stands for not possible
X* stands for permutable, depending on the definition of permutability
Table 2.4: Permutability of inference rules in propositional linear logic, Galmiche 
& Perrier
2.1.3 Permutation
In this section we define what we mean by a permutation, taking our terminology 
from Kleene ([Kle52b]), Galmiche & Perrier ([GP94]) and Troelstra & Schwichten- 
berg ([TS96]). We define permutation of inferences (as specific rule instances), and 
permutation of inference rules. We give a table of the permutabilities of inference 
rules in ILL, and a discussion of its content.
Definition 2.1 The principal/ormM/a of an inference I  is the formula in the conclu­
sion in which the logical symbol is introduced, or which is the result o f a contraction 
or a weakening.
Definition 2.2 The active formulae of an inference I  are those formulae in the 
premiss(es) from which the principal formula derives.
Definition 2.3 The side formulae of an inference I  are those formulae that are 
unchanged from premiss(es) to conclusion (that is, those that are not principal or 
active).
Having given terms of reference to the formulae in an inference, we give some 
definitions of positional relationships of inferences in a proof.
Definition 2.4 Inference I 2 is an immediate ancestor of inference f  (and I\ is an 
immediate descendant of I 2 ) if the conclusion of Ii is a premiss o f I2 . (Notice 
that an inference has only one immediate ancestor, but may have many immediate 
descendants.)
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Definition 2,5 Inferences Ii and I 2 are in permutation position i f f  is an imme­
diate descendant o f f  and if the principal formula o f f  is not active in f .
Definition 2.6 Let inferences f  and f  be in permutation position. Let inference f  
be an instance of rule R\ with premisses V \ and conclusion C\. Let inference f  be 
an instance of rule R 2 with premisses V 2 U {Ci} and conclusion C2 . Inference f  
permutes over inference f  if there is a deduction o f C2 from V 1 UV2 , with instances 
of rules R\ and R 2 as the only primitive rule instances used, C2 the conclusion of the 
only instance of rule R\ and with one or more instances of rule R 2 (or admissible 
rules) also used. I f instances of Ri and R 2 are the only inferences, then we say that 
f  strictly permutes over f .
Definition 2.7 Rule Ri permutes over (strictly permutes over) rule R 2 if for ev­
ery occurrence of these rules as inferences f ,  f  in permutation position, f  per­
mutes over I 2 ( f  strictly permutes over f ) .
Definition 2.8 I f  in proof Hi, we permute an inference f  over an inference f ,  to 
get proof II2, then we call Ei the permutation object and IÏ2 the permutation 
result
We have made a distinction between permutation and strict permutation. Inferences 
strictly permute if the peimutation is simply a case of swapping the order two infer­
ences, whereas they simply permute if an admissible rule (an inversion, or a struc­
tural rule) is needed. An example of a permutation where Ri permutes over R 2 , 
but doesn’t strictly permute is the following permutation in G3 (where weakening 
is needed): T , A d B , B , C = > D  ,
F , A d B = ^ A  t , a d b , b =>c d d ) '^ 1^  (Dcj
permutes to
T , A d B = ^ C d D 
r ,  A D => A
r ,ADB,G=4> A  ^ T , A d B , B , C ^ D
r , A D B , C = ^ D  , ,p R jT , A d  B  =>C D
When the admissible rule is an inversion, it is less obvious that we should allow 
such a permutation. We introduced the distinction since it explains the differences 
in the tables of permutation of inference for single-sided classical linear logic owing 
to Beilin and Galmiche & Perrier that we gave earlier.
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2.2 Permutations and Intuitionistic Linear Logic
2.2.1 Invertibility
As described below, invertibility of inference rules is related to permutability. In 
this section we give some results about the invertibility of the inference rules of 
two-sided ILL. Some of these results can be found in [Tro92]. We give illustrative 
proofs and counterexamples as well as the invertibilities themselves.
Proposition 2.1 The following primitive inference rules o f ILL are invertible: (0 /%), 
(®c)> (-o%), (&%), (C), (jP), {Ic)‘ The following primitive inference rules o f JLL 
are not invertible: (-o^), (kc),  (0%), (0%), (W),  (D).
P r o o f : We prove the invertibilities by showing that the inverse rules are admis­
sible in ILL. This may be done in either of two ways. Firstly we may proceed by 
induction on the height of the derivation of the premiss. For example, we show that:
V , P ® Q ^ R  .
T , P , Q = ^ R  >
is admissible in ILL by case analysis of the last rule of the derivation of the premiss. 
For each possible rule we either get the conclusion or we can perform the rule at a 
lesser height, and we get the result by induction. We omit the long and repetitive 
detail. This proof can be useful because of its independence from cut elimination.
Unlike the following much shorter proof using the admissibility of cut:
P ^  P  Q ^  Q , .
P , Q = ^ P ® Q  r , P ® Q ^ R ,
r , P , Q ^ R
The admissibility of all the inverse rules can be shown in similar ways.
We give a counter-example to the invertibility of &£, that is, we show that the 
following rule is not admissible in DLL:
r ,  P k Q  ^  R  /o 
r , P = ^ R  ^
A simple counter-example is:
A k B  =» AfcB 
A  =» A k B
Similar counter-examples can be provided for the other non-invertible rules. ■
It is possible that for the context splitting rules we could have defined a weak notion 
of invertibility. For example, for (0 %) we might have said that if F => P  (3 Q is
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provable, then there exists a splitting of F into Fi and F2 such that Ti P  and 
F2 => Q are both provable. However, the possibility of contraction prevents any 
such notion. The following example illustrates this.
The sequent ! A A 0  A is provable in ILL:
^  A
(0 %)! A, ! A A 0  A
!A=> A 0 A
However, neither the pair of sequents (!A A and A) nor the pair of sequents 
(=> A and ! A => A) are provable.
The proof of the admissibility of the inverse rules makes it clear why invertibility is 
related to permutability. The proof uses the interchangeability of the inference with 
the other rules of the calculus, the fact that the rule is permutable with all others. 
We get invertibility when we have permutability. We prove a general theorem for 
all sequent calculi.
Theorem 2.1 For sequent calculus Q, if rule R strictly permutes over all rules in 
Q, and the active formulae can be combined, using the connectives o f the logic, to 
make the principal formula, then rule R is invertible.
P r o o f : Consider rule R  with principal formula P  and active formulae Pi in the ith 
premiss ("Pi is a set):
then this has inverses:
S\ ...
q qRinvi ^  jqinvn
Consider the ith such rule:
Consider any derivation of 5  in We show that we have a derivation of Si. There 
are four cases to consider. When we refer to P, we refer to an occurrence of P  
traceable to its occurrence in the root.
1. P  is the principal formula for some occurrence of mle R. Since R  strictly 
permutes over all the inference rules of Ç, we can permute it to the root, 
hence we have derivation ending:
Si ... Sj ... Sfi
s  ^
Hence we have a derivation of Si.
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2. P  is never principal, but is the side formula of some leaf node (or nodes) of 
the derivation. By replacing P  by the Vi in each sequent in which it appears, 
we have a derivation of Si.
3. P  is never principal in a logical rule, but is principal in a structural rule. 
Similar to previous case.
4. P  is never principal in a logical rule, but is principal in an axiom. This case 
only applies when G allows non-atomic axioms. In this case the rule for the 
top connective on the other side needs to be applied where the axiom was.
Having proved this theorem, we illustrate the proof with an example. Suppose that 
the following rule permutes over all others in G6 .
T , P , Q ^ Rr, p A Q => p
Consider any derivation of the sequent F, P  A Q => P. Again, when we refer to an 
occurrence of a formula we mean an occurrence that can be traced its occurrence at 
the root. The cases are:
1. P  A Q is principal for some inference. Then since (A^) permutes over all 
rules of the calculus, it can be permuted to the root. Hence
F) P, Q P  , \
F , P A Q = > P
We have a proof of F, P, Q => P.
2. P  A Q is never principal, and is the side formula of some leaf node. Then
"P/ D  /O C C
F, P  A Q => P  becomes F, P, Q => P
We have a proof of F, P, Q => P.
3. P  A Q is never principal in a logical rule, but is principal in a structural rule. 
Consider weakening:
(W) (W)^  r - , p , Q ^ s
T , P  A Q R  becomes F ,P , Q P
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We have a proof of F, P, Q =4- P. Consider contraction:
: r , P , P , Q , Q ^ P
F \ P A Q , P A Q = > 6  ^ F \ P , P , Q = ^ S
r , P A Q = > P  F%P,Q=4>P
F, P  A Q ^  P  becomes F, P, Q P
4. P  A Q is never principal in a logical rule, but is principal in an axiom. Then:
_______________________________________________V ' , P , Q ^ Q
T ' , P A Q = ^ P a Q ' '   ^ r , P , Q ^ P A Q
F, P  A Q =» P  becomes F ,P , Q => P
We have a proof of F, P, Q P.
2.2.2 Permutability Table for ILL
In section 2.1.3 we gave definitions of permutability of inferences and rules. Table 
2.5 gives the permutability of the rules of ILL, indicating whether two rules permute 
(and if so under what definition), or are never in permutation position, or do not 
permute.
Study of this table suggests that some inferences are more suitable for permuting 
backwards (toward the leaves) and others forwards to the root. Following [GP94] 
we call the rules suitable for backward permutation, those suitable for forward 
permutation, T^. T; =  {(0 £), (©£), (-o%), (&%), (/£)}. =  {(-o£), (0 %),
(&£), (0 %), (FF), (P ), (C)}. Notice that, as one would expect, the inference rules 
that are suitable for forward permutation are those that are invertible, and those 
suitable for backward permutation are the non-invertible rules. The only exception 
to this is contraction, which is invertible, but is moved backward since the more 
formulae there are in a sequent, the harder it is to control. Also note that (P), also 
invertible, is not included in either of these sets. Study of the table doesn’t suggest 
an obvious answer to how we should try and move this inference. In fact, we leave 
it as a pivot about which the structure of proofs revolve.
Having studied the permutation of inference rules in classical linear logic, Galmiche 
& Perrier define a normal form for sequent derivations. We give a version of this 
definition for two-sided ILL. The aim being to avoid redundancies in proofs, we 
first observe that cut elimination holds for ILL (see [Bie94]) and so we do not have 
to consider a system with cut. We also try to avoid weakening/contraction pairs.
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1
0 £ 0 £ —0 £ k c 07? 07? “ 7^? k n C W D p Ic
0 £ P P X P X P P P P P P X p
0 £ i i X X X X i i i X X X i
P P p P p p P P P P P X P
k c P P p P p p P P P P P X P
0% P P p P n n n n P P P n P
07?. P P p P n n n n P P P n P
h —^7? P P X P n n n n P P P n Pk-ji i i X X n n n n i X X n i
C P P X p X P P P P p p P PW P P p p P P P P P p p P PD P P p p P P P P P p p P PP n n n n n n n n P p X n n
Ic P P P P P P P P P p p X P
Key:
p stands for strictly pennutable 
X stands for non-peimutable 
n stands for not possible 
i stands for permutable (using invertibility)
Table 2.5: Permutability of inference rules in propositional ILL
such as:
\ P ^ P ^ P
Definition 2.9 Proof Ii in ILL is under weakening and contraction reduction if
for any instance o f rule (C), the active formulae are not principal formulae o f an 
immediate descendant inference (W).
Note that following definition (from Galmiche & Peirier) of nonnal proof is unre­
lated to the notion of nonnal natural deduction used elsewhere in this thesis.
Definition 2,10 Proof H in ILL is normal if it is cut-free, under weakening and 
contraction reduction and:
1. any sequent o f form  !F =>!P is the conclusion of a (P)
2 . else if  sequent S  contains formulae introduced by an inference rule in then 
S is the conclusion o f an inference rule in
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3. else if sequent S  contains formulae introduced by an inference rule in T-^\ 
{(VF), (G)}, then each premiss is either the conclusion o f a (P) or the ac­
tive formula (if it is not atomic) is the principal formula in the immediate 
descendant.
4. else if sequent S  has a principal formula \P, then either
(a) S  is the conclusion o f a (W^ ) which is the result o f a chain o f weakenings 
from an axiom
(b) S  is the conclusion o f a (G) and the immediate descendant is a (D) 
introducing one of the active formulae of the (G) or a chain of contrac­
tions from a context splitting rule.
Later we compare the sequent proofs in this normal form with proofs in the calculus 
given in the next section.
2.3 Focusing Proofs
In this section we describe the notion of a ‘focusing proof’ introduced in [And92] 
and apply it to the two-sided sequent calculus for ILL. In his paper, Andreoli gives a 
single-sided focusing calculus for classical linear logic. Here we use the same ideas 
to get a focusing calculus for two-sided ILL. We compare this with the permutability 
table for ILL and with the definition of a normal sequent proof from Galmiche & 
Perrier.
The motivation for focusing proofs is the same as for many of the calculi mentioned 
in this thesis -  to have a calculus that avoids finding proofs that are, in some sense, 
essentially the same. Andreoli’s work is developed syntactically from the sequent 
calculus presentation of linear logic, rather than the semantic approach taken later 
in this thesis. Sequent proofs are studied, and redundancies, such as permutations 
and trivial loops, are identified. A calculus that (as far as possible) avoids these 
is given. The resulting calculus is one suitable for theorem proving -  finding a 
proof efficiently. By taking a purely syntactic view of proof, and considering the 
focusing proofs as normal forms with respect to permutations, ILLF can also be seen 
as a proof enumeration calculus. This is the view taken by Andreoli in [And92]. 
However, focusing calculi lack the semantic rationale that proof enumeration calculi 
should have.
We take the following definitions from Andreoli ([And92]).
Definition 2.11 Two proofs are said to be P-equivalent if each can be transformed 
to the other by simple permutation of inference figures and elimination or introduc­
tion o f weakening/contraction pairs.
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We give a calculus for ILL similar to that of Andreoli’s for classical linear logic 
which finds only one proof in each P-equivalence class.
We give two definitions:
Definition 2.12 A connective is asynchronous if, when a principal formula with 
this connective as the top connective has been selected, there is only one applicable 
instance o f an inference rule.
Definition 2.13 A connective is synchronous if, when a principal formula with 
this connective as the top connective has been selected, there is more than one 
applicable instance o f an inference rule.
For two-sided ILL we need to distinguish between the positive and negative occur­
rences of connectives (their occurrence on the right and on the left). We find that 
the asynchronous connectives are: -o+, &+, 0 ~, 0 “ . The synchronous connec­
tives are: -o “ , 0 +, 0 +. The negative occurrences will be principal formulae
of left rules and the positive occurrences will be principal formulae of right rules. It 
is observed that the rules for the asynchronous connectives are invertible and in the 
set Ti and that the rules for the synchronous connectives are not invertible and are 
in the set 7^. We haven’t mentioned ! as it doesn’t fit as neatly into this pattern and 
will be treated differently from the other connectives in the calculus we give.
We give a calculus which we will call ILLF. This has similai' properties to Andreoli’s 
focusing calculus for classical linear logic (called S 3). Firstly the problem of where 
to apply the structural rules is lessened. We add an extra field to the standard cal­
culus in which we put only exponential formulae. Weakening can be permuted up 
towards the axioms, hence we can drop the weakening rule and in its place change 
the axiom rule so that any number of exponential formulae are allowed in the con­
text. Contraction doesn’t permute over context splitting rules, but if we duplicate 
all the exponential formulae in the new field at the application of one of these rules, 
then we will have duplicated the necessary formulae. Hence no explicit contraction 
rule is necessary. We may perform unnecessary contractions, but this is unproblem­
atic with the new axiom rule. Note that there is a small cost to this -  the possibility 
of dereliction of formulae that would not otherwise be in the context is introduced. 
Which rules can be applied is also restricted. We try to apply (backwaid) the asyn­
chronous, invertible, rules first. To this end we split the context into further fields: 
a list of formulae and a multiset of synchronous formulae. The list places an (ar­
bitrary) order on the way the asynchronous formulae are considered. We also have 
two kinds of goal (for synchronous and asynchronous goals). ILLF is displayed in 
Figure 2.1.
The calculus ILLF has four forms of sequent. These direct proof search by forcing 
asynchronous formulae (those with invertible rules) to be broken up first, and then 
by focusing on a formula (the active formula of a premiss is principal in the next 
backward inference) for as long as possible.
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E ; r i r
E; r  K L P - o g  K
E ; r K L
E ; r i T L
E ; r i r L = ^ P K  E ; r f r P = > g i ï  
E ; r i ( p = > p & g f ^
(T%)
(kn)
S; r  -jY 1 / => p
E ; P i ( P , P , g
('fl'T^ ) if P  not asynchronous 
PjJ. (0 £)E; r  il L , P < S > Q ^ R ^  
E ; r f r L , P = ^ > P J |  E ; r K L , g = ^ P ( L  
E ; r i Y P , P e g = ^ P 4 l ' (©c)
E , P ; r K L ^ P l ] .  
E ; r f ( L ,  ! P = ^ P j ) (^)
E ; r f r L , 0 =>P-tl. 
E ; r , P K P = > P 4 j .
E ; r i ( L = ^ P J |  
E;T frP, J ^ P - H
(Oc)
(//:)
E ; r f r L , P = ^ P J J . (Pop) P  not asynchronous 
E ; r 4) . P = > P 4).
E; r  P  4L E; r ,  P  P  JJ.
E , P ; r 4 L P = ^ P 4 4
(Push)
E, P;  r  P  4L 
E;r4L=>Pl4 E;A4L=^gi r
(D)
E ; r , A 4j.=>P 0 gf^ (07?)
E; r j j . =^ gf r
(/7?)
E;r4j ,=:>P0giY
E;1Ï=
E ; r 4).=>P0 g i (
P i t
(G7?z)
E;4L=4^!Pi(
E; r  ii=> R  14
(P)
E;P4L=>PfL (4Lci ) P  not synchronous
S ; i A : 4 - A #
S ; r j ) .P =^ i î^ ) . (&£i)
E;F,A4L P~oQ =>P4L 
E ; r 4 L g = > P 4 4
(-On)
E;r4LP&Q=i>P4L
E ; r 4r  P= ^P4 L 
E ; r i 4 P = > P 4 L
E;F4L P&g=^P4{
(4L£g ) P  not synchronous
(& nj
Figure 2.1: The focusing calculus ILLF for Intuitionistic Linear Logic
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Initial sequents have form E; P f[^  L => P  fj*. The only rules with such a sequent as 
the conclusion are those for asynchronous connectives on the right and which 
is only applicable when the goal is not asynchronous. Hence the goal formula is 
forced to be broken up until not asynchronous, then the form of the sequent is 
changed to E; P fj' L P  i).
When the sequent has form E; P 'ff 1/ P 1) and the list, L, is non-empty, the only 
mles applicable are those for the asynchronous connectives on the left, (Pop) and 
(5). The latter two rules are only applicable with principal formulae which are not 
asynchronous. That is, all asynchronous formulae on the left are broken up in a 
fixed order and other formulae are put to one side to be dealt with later. When there 
are no more asynchronous formulae on the left (that is, when L  is the empty list) we 
reach the major choice point in the calculus. Using one of (jf%), (Push)  and (D), 
a formula is selected and focused on.
If (4L%) is used, the goal is selected and sequent changed to form E; P 41=4- P  fj'. 
Only the rules for synchronous connectives on the right, (P) and (41'£i) are applica­
ble to a sequent of this form. That is, the goal is broken up until a sequent with a 
non-synchronous right hand side is reached.
If (S) or (D) is used, a formula on the left is selected and the sequent changed to the 
form E; r  4L P  P  44- Only the rules for synchronous formulae on the left, (arc) 
and (4L£j are applicable to a sequent of this form. That is, the selected formula is 
broken up until the formula in the special position is not synchronous.
2.3.1 Soundness and Completeness
The calculus ILLF is the result of entirely syntactic observations and results on the 
permutability and invertibility of inference rules. To prove the required results, a 
lot of lemmas about the admissibility of various rules in ILLF are needed. This 
makes the full detail of the proof very long, although there is nothing too involved 
in these details. Here we state the lemmas, proving only one as an illustration of the 
standard techniques used in the proofs. We then prove the theorem which, once we 
have the lemmas, is routine.
We prove the result via the equivalence of both ILL and ILLF to an intermediate 
calculus, ILL^. This calculus has two fields which absorb the structural mles of 
ILL. The calculus ILL^ can be seen in Figure 2.2. Note that E could have been 
given as a set, but for our purposes it is easier for it to be a multiset. (Intuitionistic) 
Linear Logic is often presented with the context split into non-linear (or classical) 
and linear field. A calculus similar to ILL^ can be found in, for example, [HM94]. 
Treating linear and non-linear formulae separately is taken to its extremes in Gi­
rard’s Logic of Unity ([Gir93]).
We prove the equivalence of ILL and ILL^. This requires a couple of standard 
results.
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{ax) (T%)2 ; r  ^  T '  ' S ; r , 0 = ^ i î
E;r=S>iJ
(0 ^)
T,;=> I  
2 ; r , f  =>Q
E - r , i = ^ R i^c)
, \ S ; P = > P  I ] ] A , Q = ^ R ,  .
( ■ ^ 7?.) V». T  A D  rx/O —s. DS;r=4.P-^Q  ^ 2;r, ,f-oQ=> ji:
2 ; r = > f  S ; r = > Q
2 ;T=i>f&:Q
2 ; r , f  => A
S; r ,  P&Q => R
E ; T = > P  E ; A = > Q  
E; r ,  A => P  0  Q (®%)
(&:%)
E; r ,  Q P  
E; r ,  P k Q  R
E; r ,  P, Q => PE;P,P®Q=^P
(^£ 2)
E : P = > P (®%i) E; r  QE ; r = 4 ^ P @ Q  E ; r = # x P e Q
E; r ,  P  => P  E; r ,  Q => P
(G^z)
E; r ,  P  © Q P (®r)
E,P;P=>P E , P ; P , P = > Pv*^ / V» D. r» —V D \ ^ )E;P, ! P = > P
E ;= i.P
E;=i.!P
E,P;r=>P
iP)
Figure 2.2: The calculus ILL^ for Intuitionistic Linear Logic
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Definition 2.14 The height of a derivation is the number of nodes on the longest 
branch.
Lemma 2.1 The following rules are admissible in ILL^;
P r o o f : The admissibility of both rules can be shown by standard induction ai'gu- 
ments. ■
Lemma 2.2 The sequent !S, F => P  is provable in ELL iff the sequent E; F => P  za' 
provable in ILL^.
P r o o f : We illustrate the proof of this theorem for the -o, 1 fragment of ILL. The 
extended proof is similar.
First we show that if E; F P  is provable in ILL^ then !E, F P  is provable in 
ILL.
The proof is by induction on the height of derivations.
1. {ax)T,\A=^ A
then
! S , A ^ A
2 . In DLL  ^we have
E; F P —oQ 
by induction hypothesis we have:
! E , F , P= >Q
! E , F = ^ P - o Q
3. In ILL^ we have
i~^n)
E; F => P E;A, Q=^P . .
E;F,A,P-oQ=>P
by induction hypothesis we have:
!E, F=>P  !E, A, Q P  , .
!E,!E,F, A, P -o Q = ^ P  
!E ,r ,A ,P -o Q = ^ i ï
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4. In ILL^ we have
E;P, ! P = ^ P  
by induction hypothesis we have:
! E , ! P , r = > P
as required.
5. In ILL^ we have E , P ; r , P = ^ P
E , P ; P = ^ P
by induction hypothesis we have:
!E, ! P , r , F = » P  
! S , ! P , ! P , r ^ P  
! E , ! P , r ^ P
6 . In ILL^ we have
by induction hypothesis we have:
! E = > P
!S =>!P (p)
Now we show that if !E, F =» P  (where F contains no banged formulae) is provable 
in ILL then E; F => P  is provable in ILL^.
The proof is by induction on the height of derivations.
1. In ILL we have (ax)A = ^ A
then
;A=^ A
2. In ILL we have
r
! E , F = > P- oQ  
by induction hypothesis we have:
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3. In ILL we have
! E i , r = ^ P  !S2 ,A, Q = > P .  .
!Ei,!E2 , r , A , P ^ Q = ^ P
by induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.1 we have:
(M^*) ^  iW*)E i , E 2 ;F P _______ Ei , E 2 ; A,Q =» R  . .
E i , E 2 ; F , A , P ^ Q = 4 > P
4. In ILL we have
!S,!P,r=>iî 
by induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.1 we have:
E ; F = > P
E , P ; F = > P
5. In ILL we have
(M
!E, !P , !P ,F=^P 
!E, ! P , F = ^ P
by induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.1 we have:
E, P, P; F R
E , P ; F = ^ P
6 . In ILL we have
(C)
P, F ^  P  , . 
! E , !P , F= ^P
by induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.1 we have:
E , P ; F , P = ^ P
E , P ; F = > P
7. In ILL we have ! E = > P 
!E =^!P
by induction hypothesis we have:
E; => P
E;=^!P
[p)
(p)
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The following lemmas are needed in order to prove the equivalence of ILL^ and 
ILLF. Note that the rules given have an f|' in the succèdent, but that in most cases the 
rule with this arrow reversed is also admissible. This is noted in the statement of the 
appropriate lemmas. The proofs are all by induction on the height of derivations (in 
fact we often simultaneously prove the admissibility of several rules with different 
positions of arrows). We illustrate the proofs by giving a restricted proof of the first 
lemma, but omit all other proofs.
Lemma 2.3 The following rule is admissible in ILLF.*
 r  1Ï L p  fi' . ,
S , A ; r f r L = 4 ^ P t   ^ ’
(In fact, we prove this result for any legitimate combination of the arrows).
P r o o f : We illustrate the proof for the -o, ! fragment of the logic.
The proof is by induction on the height of derivations.
1 - (-o%)
by induction hypothesis we have:
S; r  ft L, P  => Q 1)
2 . i tn )
E , A ; r i 4 f  =>0 1 ï .
S , A ;r t L= » P- K> Qi l -  
E ; r f r P = ^ P #
E; r  ft P  => P  ft 
by induction hypothesis we have: 
E ; Fl f  P = > P l f
(ft%) P  not asynchronous
(PP*)
3. (S)
E , A ; r f r i ^ P #  .E , A ; r # P = » P i  ^  asynchronous j
E, P; r  ft L P
E; r  ft L, !P P  JJ. 
by induction hypothesis we have:
E , P ; r f f P = ^ P 4 l '
(S)
(W*)E , A , P ; r j P = » P 4 ^
E, A; r  t  P, !P =^ . P  JJ.
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4. {Pop)
S ; r , P t P ^ P ^
E; r - f l -P ,P=^P l l .
by induction hypothesis we have:
E ; r , P f t L = ^ P l j .S,A;r,P ^ L ^ P ^  Î S  E,A;ri^P,P=^P^
5- (#%) S; r 41-^  -R t  ,|| \
E; r  p  #
by induction hypothesis we have:
S,A;rt=i>P-lL
6 . {Push)
S ; r , P i y = ^ . p ^   ^ “ ®"'' 
by induction hypothesis we have:
E ; r # P = > P #  S,A;r^P=»P# E,A;r,Pi)-=>P4^   ^ “ ®"''
7. (P)
E , P ; r ^ P = 4 > P 4 lS,P;rH-=4.P4^
by induction hypothesis we have:
E , P ; n | P = ^ P i f (M/*)E , A , P ; r f | . P ^ P - i i
E , A , P ; r t = ^ P 4 l '
8. (P)
E ; 1ï = ^ P f t  , . 
E;fl=^!Pfr
by induction hypothesis we have:
S; ■f|'=S> P t {W*)S, A; t=» P 1Ï /p\ S, A; JJ.=»!P fh ^
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9. E; r  R  ft
E; r  R  ft
by induction hypothesis we have:
E;P  ft=> P f t
( & i )
(W^)
1 0 . {ax) 
then
1 1 . ( -0 £)
E, A; r  ft=> R  ft . 
E,A;^4j '=>Pf^
sTM ^rit
E;r41. :^Pfr  E;3'JJ.Q=^PJJ.
E ; r , ^ # P ^ Q = > P f  
by induction hypothesis we have:
{-°c)
S ; r  4 |.= i .P t  (Tf*)
12.
E , A ; r j ^ ^ P l l -  ' E , A ; » # Q = ^ P #
S , A ; r , g / J ^ P - o Q = 4 . P #
E ; r t P = ^ P J J .  ^  .^ :'p (& z) P  not synchronous
by induction hypothesis we have: 
E ; r f t P = > P f t (PK*)E , A ; r i ^ P ^ P l J . „ ,  , ^  ^E , A ; r ^ P = ^ P f  P  not synchronous
Lemma 2.4 The following rule is admissible in ILLF.*
E; r ,  P  ft L, M  => P  ft r> , 1E ; r ^ - P , P . M ^ P f t  P'X’t amchronous
(Note that this lemma still holds with the succèdent arrow reversed).
Lemma 2.5 The following rule is admissible in ILLF.*
E; F -fy L, P, Q, M =» P  ft 
E;Ff i*P,P( 8 ) Q , M = > P f t
(Note that this lemma still holds with the succèdent arrow reversed).
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Lemma 2.6 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E; F ft Zr, P, M  =4^  P  ft E; F ft L, Q, M  =4^  P  ft 
E; F P, P  © g , M =4^  P  ft
(Note that this lemma still holds with the succèdent arrow reversed).
Lemma 2.7 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E, P; F L, M  =4^  P  ft 
E ; F f t P ,  ! P , M = > P f t
(Note that this lemma still holds with the succèdent arrow reversed).
Lemma 2.8 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E ; F f t L , M ^ P f t  
E; F ft L, / ,  M => P  ft
(Note that this lemma still holds with the succèdent arrow reversed).
Lemma 2.9 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E ; F f t M = > P f t
E; F ft P =4^  P  ft where L = M
where L = M  means that L and M  are different lists o f the same elements. That is, 
this is an exchange rule. (Note that this lemma also holds with the succèdent arrow 
reversed).
Lemma 2.10 Proving “E; F ,P  P  implies E; F ft P =4^  P  ft provable'' is equiv­
alent to proving "E; P =4> P  provable implies E; ft P =4^  P  if
P r o o f : This direction is trivial, simply put T = </).
Let L’ be any ordering of F. We can then prove E; ft P, P ' =4> P  ft. By Lemma 
2 .4  we can prove E; F ft P  ^  P  ft. ■
Lemma 2.11 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E; F ft P, P  ® Q, M => P  ft 
E;FftP ,P ,Q ,M = 4^ Pft
(Note that this rule with the succèdent arrow reversed is also admissible).
Lemma 2.12 The following rules are admissible in ILLF;
E ; F f t P , P © g , M ^ P f t  E ; F f t P , P © g , M = > P f t
E ; F f t P , P , M = > P f t  E ; F l t P , Q , M ^ P f t
(Note that these rules with the succèdent arrows reversed are also admissible).
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Lemma 2.13 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E ; F f t P ,  !P,M  => P f t  
E ,P ; F f t P ,M = > P f t
(Note that this rule with the succèdent arrow reversed is also admissible).
Lemma 2.14 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E ; r i f P , Z , M = > P f t
E; F P, M P  it
(Note that this rule with the succèdent arrow reversed is also admissible).
Lemma 2.15 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E ; F f t P , P , M ^ P f t  „  ^
(Note that this rule with the succèdent arrow reversed is also admissible).
Lemma 2.16 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E; F ft P =4- P-oQ  ft 
E ; F f t P , P = > g i t
Lemma 2.17 The following rules are admissible in ILLF;
E; F ft P => P&Q ft E; F ft P =4- P&Q ft 
E;Fl f  P = > P f t  E ; F f t P = ^ Q l t
Lemma 2.18 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E; F i t L=4> Pf t  „  ^A r—. r> II P not asynchronousE; F ft P => P  ft
Lemma 2.19 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E ; F , P f t P = » P f t
E ; F ,P & g f tP = > P f t
(Note that this rule with the other appropriate combination o f arrows is also admis­
sible).
Lemma 2.20 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E;F,  g  ft P =4> P  ft 
E; F, P & g  ft P =4  ^P  ft
(Note that this rule with the other appropriate combination o f arrows is also admis­
sible).
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Lemma 2.21 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
s ; r i i > : ^ p f r  e -,F2,q 1[L=>
(Note that this rule with the other appropriate combination o f arrows is also admis­
sible).
Lemma 2.22 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
^ , P - r , P j t L = ^ R i l
L , P ; r i r L = » P f r
(Note that this rule with the other appropriate combination of arrows is also admis­
sible).
Lemma 2.23 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
S; F i P  S ;F 2 ,fl^  Q ^  P  
E; Fi, F2 , P  —oQ 1^ =  ^R  .(L
Lemma 2.24 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E ; r i | ' P = > P J j .
E;F,P&Q
Lemma 2.25 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E;F ,P&Q
Lemma 2.26 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E,P;^i^L,P,M=i>Pf^
E , P ; r ' 0' P , M = > P l t
(Note that this rule with the other appropriate combinations o f arrows is also ad­
missible).
Lemma 2.27 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E;ri^=>Pf^
Lemma 2.28 The following rule is admissible in ILLF;
E ; r i Y 4  0 ,M = » P f r  
Now we have all the results we need to complete the equivalence proof.
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Lemma 2.29 Sequent T,]V^L P  is provable in JLLP iff sequent S; F f|' L P  fî* 
is provable in ILLF.
Proof: The proof is again by induction on the height of derivations.
We need to show that:
-  If E; F ft' -F=^Pf|^is provable in ILLF then E; F, L =4 > P  is provable in ILL^.
-  If E; F fl' L =4> P  -it- is provable in ILLF then E; F, P => P is  provable in TTJp.
-  If E; F ^  P  => P  Ij. is provable in ILLF then E;F, P  => P  is provable in 
ILL^.
For this direction we illustrate the proof for the -o, ! fragment of the logic.
1. In ILLF we have
S; r  fr L ^  p ^ Q  fr
by induction hypothesis we have:
E; F, P, P  => Q
Ej FJ P P  —oQ
2. In ILLF we have
(-07^)
E ;F 1V P ^ P U  
E ; F i y P = > P l t  
by induction hypothesis we have:
E ; F , P = > P
as required.
3. In ILLF we have: E, P; F fj- P ^  P  JJ. 
E ; F f r P , ! P - ^ P l |
by induction hypothesis we have:
E , P ; F , P = > P
E;F,P,  I P ^ R (S)
4. In ILLF we have
E; F, P  ft' P P  JJ.  ^ ^
Ë 'T f L  P  ^  P  ^  asynchronous
by induction hypothesis we get:
E; F , P , P = > P
as required.
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5. In ILLF we have S; r  R  'O' , \
by induction hypothesis we get:
E ; F = ^ P
as required.
6 . In ILLF we have
by induction hypothesis we get:
E ; F , P = > P
as required.
7. In ILLF we have
E , P ; r f r = ^ p j |  
by induction hypothesis we get:
E , P ; P , P ^ P  
E , P ; F  =>P
8 . In ILLF we have
{D)
E;-ff=4>Pt /ps
by induction hypothesis we have:
E; => P
E;=^!P
9. In ILLF we have
(p)
E; r  P  if . .(JJ'Ci ) P  not synchronousE; r  P  if 
by induction hypothesis we get:
E ; P ^ P
10. In ILLF we have
E; if A => A
then
(&%)
E;vl=4x A (ax)
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11. In ILLF we have
by induction hypothesis we have:
E ; P = ^ P  E ; A , Q = > P  
E ; F , A , P - o Q = ^ P (-Or)
12. In ILLF we have
s ; r f r  p = ^ p f t (if/:) P  not synchi'onousE; Fi f  P ^ P i f  
by induction hypothesis we have:
E ; F , P = > P
as required.
For this direction we give the entire proof rather than a fragment of it, as this 
is the non-trivial part.
By Lemma 2.10 it is enough to show that E ;L  => P  provable in ILL^ implies 
E;if P => P  if provable in ILLF.
1. In ILL^ we have E ; P , P => ( 5  f \
E ; L = ^ P - o Q
by induction hypothesis we have:
E ; i f P , P = > Q f ^
E i i f P z ^ P - ^ Q i l -
2. In ILL^ we have
(-o%)
E ; P = » P  E;P  => Q . .
E ; P ^ P & Q
by induction hypothesis we have
E;if P => P  if Ejfl P Q if
E ; f r P = > P & Q i f
3. In ILL^ we have
(&:%)
E ; P = > T
in ILLF
E;if P => T if
(T%) 
(T%)
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4. In ILL^ we have i : ;L ,P,Q=>R
E; L, P  0  Q P  
by induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.5 we have:
P, Q P  i)'
E ; i f P , P 0 Q = ^ P i f
5. In BLL  ^we have
E; P, P  => P  E; P; Q => P (®r)E ; P , P e Q = ^ P
by induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.6 we have:
E;if P, P  => P  if E; if P, =» P  if 
E;if P , P © Q = ^ P i f
6 . In ELL  ^we have E , P ; P  =» P  , .E; P, !P=>P
by induction hypothesis and Lemma 2,7 we have
E, P; If P P  if 
E;if P, ! P = > P i f
7. In ELL  ^we have
E; P, /  R  
by induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.8 we have
E ; i f P ^ P i f  
E;if P , / ^ P i f
8 . In ILL^ we have
(Or)E ; P , 0 = » P
by Lemma 2.28 we have:
E;if P ,0 ^  P if
9. In ELL  ^we have E; Pi ^  P  E; P 2 => Q , \
E ; P i , P 2 =:>P0 Q
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by induction hypothesis we have:
S;-fl-Li =;• P  t  E; f|- P 2 =» <3 •fl' /«s
„ S'; £ ' Q t  ) IV / V/. Tf II —V DA V VE'; L'l P  t  ' ' E'; 4  # = * P i
S';P',P' t=»P®Q# 
E ; f L i , L 2 = 4 - P ® Q^ ^  7  ,
E ; t i i , P 2 = > P ® Q t
(®%)
Where (1) a series of applications of Lemmas 2.3, 2.1L2.15, (2) a series of 
applications of Lemmas 2.3, 2.11-2.15, (3) Lemma 2.27, (4) Lemma 2.27, 
(5) a series of applications of (Pop), (0 /:), (©/:), (Ic), (S). Also we may 
need to build extra bits of proof for additive rules.
10. In ILL^ we have E , P ; L , P  :=» P  E,P;P=i>P
by induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.25 we get:
E,P;ifP,P=>Pjf
E, P; if P => P  if
E ; = ^ /
E; P P
11. In ILL^ we have
then
12. In ILL^ we have
E; P => P  © Q 
by induction hypothesis we have
E;if P =» P  
E ';P ' i f z ^ Pj f  
E'; P'  P  if
(®%i)
(1)
(2)
(®%i)E ' ; P  W P e Q i f  / „  .E';P' i f = ^ P © Q l f  E;ifP=>P©Q4f 
E ; f r P = > P © Q f ( '
where (1 ) a series of application of Lemmas 11-15, (2 ) Lemma 2.26, (3) a 
series of applications of (Pop), (0 ^), (©^), (Ic), (S). Also we may need to 
build extra bits of proof for additive rules
C h a p t e r  2. Pe r m u t a t io n s  45
13. (©7^ 2) similar to (©T^J.
14. In ILL^ we have
E;=>!P
by induction hypothesis we have
S; P  lf
(p)
15. In ILL^ we have [ax)E; A => A 
by induction hypothesis we have
E; If A => A ft- 
E; A if=^ A If 
E;if A => A 
E; if A => A fr
[ax]
[Push]
(Pop)
(#%)
16. In ILL^ we have
E;Pi=>P E;P2,Q=>P ( ^ r )E; Pi, p2> P ~^Q P
by induction hypothesis we have
^2,Q => P  if 
E ; 1 f P i = > P f f  E ; 1 f P 2 , g , P 3 ^ 5 f r  :
iy;P4 i f=>P^ E'; 1%:, EX. ^ 0  => fflfv^ / v>/. Tt r/ A /n c II W/
(6)
if L/i^L2 , P3 , P ~oQ \(f%)il Lj ,  P2, P3, P - p g  =4" P  if 
E ; i f P i , P 2 , P - o g = ^ P i f
where (1) a series of application of Lemmas 2.16,2.17, (2) a series of applica­
tions of Lemmas 2.3, 2.11-2.15, (3) Lemma 2.18, (4) a series of applications 
of Lemmas 2.3, 2.11-2.15, (5) Lemma 2.26, (6 ) Lemma 2.23 (7) a series of 
applications of (Pop), (0 £), (©/:), (//:), (S). Also we may need to build 
extra bits of proof for additive rules, (8 ) a series of applications of ( - 0 %), 
(&7J.). Also we may need to build extra bits of proof for additive mles.
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17. In ILL^ we have
E; Li, P h Q  => R  
by induction hypothesis we have
E;lf L i , P  ^  P j f  
E ; f r P i , P , P 2 =^>gif
E ' ; P ; , P ^ l f P = > P l f  ,
E';L[,L'^,PkQ 
E ; f f P i , P 2 , p & g = j . p i f
E ; f f P i , P 2 , P & g = > P l ï
E ; f ^ P i , P & g = > P l f
where (1) a series of applications of Lemmas 2.16,2.17, (2) a series of appli­
cations of Lemmas 2.11-2.15, (3) Lemma 2.18, (4) Lemma 2.24, (5) a series 
of applications of (Pop), (0 ^), (©e), (Ic), (S). Also we may need to build 
extra bits of proof for additive rules, (6 ) a series of applications of (-o%), 
(&%). Also we may need to build extra bits of proof for additive rules.
18. (&£2)- Similar to (&£i).
Theorem 2.2 The calculi ILL and ILLF are equivalent: the sequent !E, F, L P  
is provable in ILL iff the sequent E; F If L P  w provable in ILLF. Hence ILLF 
is sound and complete with respect to provability in ILL.
P roof: Immediate from Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.29. ■
2.4 ILLF and Permutations
The motivation for focusing calculi is the reduction of redundancy in proof search. 
Calculi good for delivering a yes/no answer to a query have as much determinism 
as possible, and on backtracking will not investigate an essentially similar path. A 
calculus where trivial permutation of inferences is not possible is good for this.
ILLF has a lot of determinism and avoids permutations. Occurrences of ( - 07^) and 
(&7t) are forced to occur as soon as possible, hence cannot be permuted. Occur­
rences of (®£), (©£), and (Ic) are forced to occur together, and the list stmcture 
forces this treatment to be in fixed sequence, thus preventing (in a somewhat arbi­
trary manner) the permutation of these inferences with each other, as well as with 
other mles. The major choice point is where it is decided which synchronous for­
mula to consider, or whether to derelict. Once a formula had been decided upon, it is
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principal, as are the active formulae in the premisses (unless atomic) -  the formula 
is focused upon (further restriction could be placed on (^£g) to prevent its use with a 
focused atom). Promotion occurs as soon as possible. In fact in ILLF as presented, 
there is a choice between promotion and dereliction in ILLF. A side condition could 
be placed on (D), restricting its application to when (P) is not possible. Indeed it 
could be further restricted so that it is only applicable when the formulae in F are 
atomic. Due to the separate field for the exponential formulae, we do not have to 
worry about permutations of (C) and (EF).
ILLF finds proofs up to permutations. Compare ILLF with the table of permuta- 
tion of inference rules (Table 2.5). It is observed that inferences which it says are 
permutable cannot occur in permutation position in ILLF (or the proofs of ILLF 
mapped into proofs in ILL). For each ordering of the list, the calculus finds only 
one proof in each P-equivalence class.
Finally we compare the proofs of ILLF with the definition of a normal sequent proof 
(Definition 2.10). As discussed above, because of the formulation of (D), sequents 
of form \r =>\P might not be the result of promotion, but we could restrict ILLF so 
that they are. The other clauses of the definition are satisfied, or irrelevant, so it can 
be said that ILLF only finds proofs in normal form with respect to permutations.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has studied ILL proofs in a purely syntactic way. Having investigated 
permutations of inferences and inference rules, as well as the invertibility of rules, 
we gave a calculus avoiding permutations. This calculus, ILLF, gives a reduced 
proof search space and hence is suitable for theorem proving. It could also be 
viewed as a proof enumeration calculus as it can be argued that normal proofs with 
respect to permutation of inferences in a sequent calculus are the proofs of interest. 
We prefer to have a semantic motivation for proof enumeration calculi. This results 
in the calculus SILL given in Chapter 6.
Chapter 3 
A Permutation-free Sequent Calculus 
for Lax Logic
This chapter is a study in the application of permutation-free techniques. The meth­
ods that develop MJ (see Chapter 1, [Her95], [DP96], [DP98a]) are used to find a 
‘permutation-free’ calculus for an intuitionistic modal logic. The results and their 
proofs are simple extensions of those for MJ, their inclusion here being to illustrate 
the wide applicability of permutation-free techniques and for reference purposes.
The logic we look at, now called Lax Logic, dates back to Curry ([Cur52a]). Interest 
in Lax Logic has recently been renewed. We give a very short introduction to Lax 
Logic and its applications, then build the machinery to develop the permutation-free 
calculus PPL AX. Much of the work contained in this chapter can also be found in 
[How98].
3.1 Lax Logic
Lax Logic is an intuitionistic modal logic with a single modality (o, somehow). This 
modality is unusual in that it has properties both of necessity and of possibility. The 
modality can be thought of as expressing correctness up to a constraint, abstracting 
away from the detail (hence the choice of name, Lax Logic). A formula oP can be 
read as “for some constraint c, formula P  holds under c”. The modality is axioma- 
tised by three axioms:
o R \  S  D oS
oM  : o o S  D oS
oF : (S D T) D (0 6 ' D oT)
The logic can also be presented as a natural deduction calculus (displayed in sequent 
style in Figure 3.1) and as a sequent calculus (Figure 3.6). Lax logic has recently 
been investigated by Fairtlough, Mendier & Walton ([Men93], [FM94], [FM97], 
[FMW97], [FW97]) and by Benton, Bierman and de Paiva ([BBdP98]).
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Curry ([Cur52a]) introduced the logic to illustrate cut-elimination in the presence 
of modalities. The logic was rediscovered by Mendier, who developed the logic 
for abstract reasoning about constraints in hardware verification ([Men93]). The 
timing constraints that need to be satisfied in a circuit can be abstracted away as 
instances of the modality and reasoned about separately from the logical analysis 
of the circuit. In [Men93], [FM94], [FM97], the proof theory and semantics of Lax 
Logic are developed, giving Gentzen calculi, natural deduction calculi and Kripke 
semantics for the logic as well as giving details of the logic’s use as a tool for 
hardware verification.
Lax Logic has also been observed ([BBdP98]) as the type system for Moggi’s com­
putational lambda-calculus (see [Mog89]). In [BBdP98] the correspondence be­
tween the natural deduction presentation of Lax Logic (there called computational 
logic) and the computational lambda calculus is given, along with some proof the­
oretic results on the logic.
In [FMW97] the ability of Lax Logic to give an abstract expression of constraints 
is utilised to give a semantics to constraint logic programming languages. The 
constraints to be satisfied can be abstracted away as modalities and the query can be 
reasoned about logically. The constraints can then be analysed separately. The logic 
is used to give proofs of queries. These proofs give the constraints to be satisfied. 
The work in this chapter gives a calculus suitable searching for these proofs.
The calculi in this chapter are presented as first order, but we only give proofs of 
results for the prepositional implicational and modal fragment (for brevity).
3.2 Natural Deduction
We give the natural deduction calculus for Lax Logic. This is taken directly from 
[BBdP98] (with quantifiers and falsum added) and can be seen in Figure 3.1.
We look at the normalisation steps. Again these are taken from [BBdP98], with the 
extra cases for L  and 3 added. The reduction rules for the intuitionistic connectives 
are completely standard. We do not include them here, concentrating instead on 
those involving the modality. We give these reductions in tree style rather than in 
sequent style.
First the -reduction:
: M  :
oQ f
oQ oQ
Now we give the commuting conversions (or c-reductions) involving the modality:
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. ['PI , , [ f ]  [Q1: I [<9] i :
.  iM s'>
M  [9 1
P  V g  oR oR [•R](V;)
 --------
[P] [P] [9] [P]
pL V w
oS  (
(ax) (T) (±)r,PhP '' ' ri-T ' ' ri-p
r,PhQ , rhPDQ rt-p ,
(D x j  - r u n   P ^ )r h p D g r h g
F H P  r h g  r h P A g  r h P A g
r p j P A g  I PHj p
(v „ )  p ^ i 2 ^ ( v „ )rhPvg'"'^^ rhPvg  
rhPvg  r,pt-p r,ghp ri-p (\/c)
PFP / \ rhop r,Phog 
f F ^  (°z)  t F F q ----(°»)
r R[«/^ l (u H r h vx.p ,y \ r h Væ.p r h p[t/x] [
r h p[i/x] , r I- 3x .p  r, P[u/x] H p
T F I F p  ------------ fK R ------------
t  u not free in F, R
Figure 3.1: NLL: Sequent style presentation of natural deduction for Lax Logic
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[p]
[P[ulA\ [Piu/x]] [Q]
: ; [Q] : :
3x.P  °Q : : oQ oR
°Q °R  \ Bx.P oR /qoR oR FîJ
Definition 3.1 A natural deduction is said to be in (/?, c)-normal form when no 
^-reductions and no c-reductions are applicable.
We give a presentation of a restricted version of natural deduction for Lax Logic. In 
this calculus, the only deductions are those that are in (/), c)-normal form. This cal­
culus has two kinds of ‘sequents’, differentiated by their consequence relations, > 
and IX>. Rules are applicable only when the premisses have a certain consequence 
relation. The conclusions have a fixed consequence relation. Thus those deductions 
that are valid are of a restricted form. This calculus, which we shall call NLAX, is 
given in Figure 3.2.
Proposition 3.1 The calculus NLAX only allows deductions to which no (3-reductions 
and no c-reductions are applicable. Moreover, it allows all (/), c)-normal deduc­
tions.
Proof: By inspection one can see that deductions to which one could apply a 
reduction are not allowed in NLAX because they would involve a rule application 
with a premiss with the wrong consequence relation.
It can be seen that by use of the (M) rule, all other deductions are possible. ■
3.3 Term Assignment
In this section we give a term assignment system for NLAX. In [Mog89] Moggi 
gave a A-calculus, which he called the computational X-calculus. This calculus 
naturally matches Lax Logic, as can be seen in Figure 3.3. The only exception to 
this match is our inclusion of the rules for (Lg) and the quantifiers. We leave these 
rules out of Figure 3.3. More about the computational A-calculus and Lax Logic 
(there called computational logic) can be found in [BBdP98].
We give this term system again in a syntax we prefer -  an abstract syntax with 
explicit constructors. We give a translation of Moggi’s terms to ours, and then give
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r,P>P (ax) r>pr M>p (M )
r w > T (T ) ( F )
r,P[»g , r>PDg ri»p , .
p x j   r  £1-----------  P e )P D O P D g r>g
roE>p r i » g  r > P A Q  , . v > p / \ q . .(Azj (AeJ —rTTTT" W a)r U>P A Q r > Q
r M>p (Vji)ri»p vg ri>e>Pvg
r>Pvg  r,PM>p r,g«>p
T \ » R
(VzJ
(V.)
PM>p / \ r > o p  r , P u > o Q  ^  ,
(Pz) -----------n  :  A.----  (°e )r i>e> o p 
r  [»P[t//æ] (Vi)t
r »  o g 
r > Vrc.P
r \ » \ / x , p   ^ r > p[f/æ] (Ve)
r K>p[Vx] _ . r i> Bzjp r, p[u/x] u > r  „  rw>3a:.P I rpoP
t  u not free in F, R
Figure 3.2: NLAX: Sequent style presentation for normal natural deduction for 
Lax Logic
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[ax) „ ,  _  (T)T^x\ P\ ~x: P^ ’ r h * : T
T , x : P \ - e : Q  , . T ) - e \ P  D Q T \ ~ f : P  .[Dx) --------- r T r T T T n ---------r  h Arc.e : P d Q  ^ P h e /  : Q
r h e i P  r h / : g . .  r  P  e : P  A g  , X r h e : P A g ,  .
r I- (e, /) : P  A g  ^ r I- /af(e) : P   ^ P I- gW(e) : g ^
(V . ,)r  h inl{e) : P  V g   ^ P I- inr{e) : P  V g
P P e : P  V g  P , a ? : P h / : P  T , y \ Q h g : R  
P h case e o f  inl{x) -4- /  | inr{y) -4  p : P (\/e)
P h e : P  / \ P h e : oP P ,x : P  h /  : p g  , . 
P h val{e) : oP ^ T let x <= e in  f  : oQ
Figure 3,3; Sequent style presentation of natural deduction for Lax Logic, with 
Moggi’s computational A terms.
yet another presentation of natural deduction for Lax Logic, this time annotated 
with proof terms in our prefered syntax, in Figure 3.4.
Translation: Moggi’s terms proof terms in our prefeiTed syntax
X var{x)
* *
Xx.e Xx.e
e f Gp(e, / )
( e , / ) Pr(e, / )
fst{e) /sf(e )
snd{e) snd{e)
inl[e) %(e)
inr{e)
case e o f  inl{x) -4  /  | inr{y) -4  g
val(e) smhi{e)
let X 4= e in  f smhe{e,x.f)
We are interested in the ‘real’ proofs for Lax Logic -  the normal natural deduc­
tions. We now restrict the terms that can be built, in order that they match our 
restricted natural deduction calculus NLAX, giving us proof objects. (That is, no 
reductions will be applicable at the term level; the term reductions match the j3~ 
and c-reductions for types given earlier). The proof terms come in two syntactic 
categories, A and N. V is the category of variables (proofs), U is the category of
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variables (individuals), and T the category of terms. The extra constructor an{A) 
matches the (M) rule of NLAX.
A::=
N::=
var{V) I ap{A,N)  | fst{A)  | snd{A) | apn{A,T)
* I efq{A) I an(A) | XV.N | pr{N,N)  | i{N) | j{N)  
wn{A, V.N, V.N) | smhi{N)  | smhe{A, KN) 
AC/.AT I M (T , N) I ee(A, P.KAT)
(ax)r , x : P h var(x) : P
(T) r  o ( F )r  h * : T '  '  r  h e/g{e) : P  
V ,x - .P \ - e - .Q  T V - e - . P o Q  r i - / : P , _ ,r> 1— f  \ . nr  h Arr.e : P  D Q  ^ P h ap(e, f )  : Q
P h e : P  P h /  : Q . . P h e : P  A Q , . P h /  : P  A Q , .P I- /) : P A g  ^ P P /gf(e) : P  ^ P P gW(/) : g ^
(V„)PPz(e)  : P v g  '  P P  j(e) : P v g
PPe:Pvg r , x : P \ - f : R  T , y : Q ] ~ g : R  . .
P P wn(e,x.f ,y.g) : R  ^
P P e : P  / \ P P e : o P  r , x : P \ ~ f : o Q\ ^y r> I— ^  ^f  \ .P P smhi(e) ; oP P P smhe(e, æ./) : oQ
T ^ e : P [ u / x ]  ^  h e : V ..P  ^
P P Xu.e : Væ.P P P apn(e,t) : P[t/x]
P P e : P[t/x]  ^ P P e : 3x.P T ,x  ; P[u/x] P /  : Pr* I . D (^ejtP P prg(t, e) ; 3a;.P P P ee(e, u.x.f)  : R
t  u not free in P, R
Figure 3.4: Sequent style presentation of natural deduction for Lax Logic
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In Figure 3.5 we give one final presentation of a natural deduction calculus for Lax 
Logic, this time NLAX together with proof annotations.
3.4 Sequent Calculus
The stated aim of this chapter is to present a sequent calculus for Lax Logic whose 
proofs naturally correspond in a 1-1 way to normal natural deductions for Lax Logic 
-  i.e. the proofs of NLAX. In this section we give such a sequent calculus, but first 
we remind the reader of the sequent calculus as presented in [FM97] and [BBdP98]. 
This can be seen in Figure 3.6.
In fact, our presentation is slightly different from both those cited. The calculus in 
[BBdP98] has no structural rules, that is, the contexts are sets. [FM97] have both 
weakening and contraction on both the left and the right, plus exchange. Here the 
only structural rule we consider (or need) is contraction on the left. The contexts in 
our presentation are labelled sets. We leave all discussion of cut until later.
We now present a new sequent calculus which we call PFLAX (‘permutation- 
free’ Lax Logic). Like MJ this calculus has two forms of judgement, F => P  and
r  R.  The calculus is displayed in Figure 3.7.
The stoup is a form of focusing: the formula in the stoup is always principal in the 
premiss unless it is a disjunction or a somehow formula. One might ask why we do 
not formulate the (o^) rule as follows
To answer this, we point out that the resulting calculus would not match normal nat­
ural deductions in the manner we would like. Also, consider proofs of the sequent 
o o  (P  A Q )  => o{Q A P).
3.5 Term Assignment for Sequent Calculus
We give a term assignment system for PFLAX. This we get by extending that given 
for intuitionistic logic in [Her95], [DP96], [DP98a]. The term calculus has two 
syntactic categories, M and Ms. V is the category of variables (proofs), U is the 
category of variables (individuals) and T is the category of terms .
M::=
* I (L; Ms)  I XV.M | pair{M, M)  | inl{M) | inr{M)  
smhr(M)  | XU.M | pairq{T, M)
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(arc) r > A : Pr ,  rc : P  > var{x) : P   ^  ^ F \A>an{A) : P
V\> A :  L
(M )
r  I »*  : T
r , %: j P t>t>iV : Q
(T) r  l»e/ç(A ) : P (-Lc)
r  l»Arc.A : P  D Q  ^ F > ap(A, A) : g
r u>Ni : p r 00A2 : g
r  lx>pr(Ai, #2) : P  A g (Az)
r > A : P A g  r > /gf(A) : P
r  U>N : P (Vzi)
T > A : P A Q  
r  O snd(A) : g
r  i» A  : g (VZ2)F[)>%(A) :Pvg F[)D>j(A) :Pvg
F > A : P  V g  r ,Zi  : P  IX>Ai : P  F, Z2 : g  l>t>A2 : R
r  [>D>wft(A, zi.A i, Z2 .A2) ; P  
r  t>e>A : P  \ P > A : oP P, z : P  [X>A : og
(Ve)
(°z)P \A>smhi{N) : oP
P [ » A  : P[w/z] 
P M>Aa.A : Vz.P (Vi)t
P [>e>sm/ie(A,z.A) : og  
P > A ; Vz.P
(°s)
P > apn(A, f) : P[t/x] (v«)
P l» A  : P[t/x]
P l>t>prg(/, A) : 3z.P
t  u not free in P, P
(3z) P > A : 3z.P  P, X  : P[u/x] [ » A  : P  P l>£>ee(A, w.z.A) : P a ) t
Figure 3.5: NLAX with proof annotations
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r = > T
V,P Q
{ax)
(T)
r,p,p==>R
r , p = ^ R (c)
(^)
r ^ P z ) Q
r , J L : ^ P  
r,f  DQ=>#
r = > p  r=>g
T ^ P A Q
r , p = ^ R  r, p A g p i^Ci) r,g=»p r, p A g => p
r=»pr=>pvg (v%i) r =>g \ r,p =>p r , g = ^ p . . r~WT77TZr~D  (V£jr=#>pvg r,pvg=>p
r = ^ p  r => op (°%) r , p = » o Pr, op => op (°£)
r ^ P[y/o;] r , P [ t / x ] ^ R
w t  r , V z . p = » pr #. vx .p
r ^ p[t/x] r =» Bx.p (3%) r, P[y/x] R  r , 3 x . P ^ R (3 r)t
t  y not free in F, P
Figure 3.6: LAX: Sequent Calculus for Lax Logic
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r  F  D Q
a :
(VTii) r  p  V Q
oP oR
Vœ.P
Bx.P
t  y not free in P, R
Figure 3.7: The Sequent Calculus PFLAX
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Ms::=
[ ] I ae I (M Ms)  | p{Ms) | q{Ms) | when{V,M, V.M) 
smhliy.M)  I apq{T,Ms) | spl{U.V.M)
These terms can easily be typed by PFLAX, as seen in Figure 3.8.
3.6 Results
Having presented the calculi for Lax Logic, we now prove that they have the proper­
ties we claim. We prove soundness and adequacy for PFLAX, and the equivalence 
of the term calculi. These results prove the desired correspondence.
The full details of these proofs are rather repetitive: therefore we only give the 
proofs for the D, o fragment of Lax Logic. The remainder of the calculus is intu­
itionistic logic as presented in [DP96]. The details of the proofs extended to the rest 
of the calculus can be found there.
We start by giving pairs of functions that define translations between the term as­
signment systems for natural deduction and sequent calculus.
Sequent Calculus to Natural Deduction:
0 : M ~ ^ N
6{x; Ms)  =  9'{var{x), Ms)
9{smhr(M)) = smhi{9{M))
0' : A X Ms —>• N
9'{A, [ ]) =  an{A)
(M :: Ms)) =  Mg)
9'{A, smhl{x.Ms)) = smhe{A,x.9{M))
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  ---------  (ax) r , x :  P  M s :  R  , .
r - ^ [ ] : P  r , x : P ^ { x ; M s ) : R ^ ’
(T) r i — 7 ^r  : T  r  — > ae : R
V , x : P ^ M : Q  T ^  M  : P  T A  M s.: R
r  =S> Xx.M : P d Q r  ^  (M :: Ms)  : R
r  ^  Ml : P  T ^  Mi : Q 
r  pair{Mi, Mg) : F  A Q ^
T ^ M s : R  (A ,J
r  ^  p(Ms) : F r  ^  ç(Ms) : R
(V „)r  ^  m/(M ) : F  V Q P # -  inr(M ) : F  V Q
r, æi : F  Ml : F  T, xg : Q => Mg : F ,,, ,
PVO / \ *^ /r  —4 when{xi.Mi, X2 .M2 ) : P  
r ^ M : F  r ^ x : P = ^ M : o R
r  smhr{M) : oP L smhl{x.M) : o p
r  ^  M  : F[«/x] r ' ^ ' M a z F
T =4- A«.M : Vx.F T ^  apq{t, Ms) : R
r = » M :  F[t/x] , r,  F[u/x] M  : R
[àu)  _  3æ.P w , ^r  po%rg(T, M) : 3x,P  ^ L ^  spl{u.x.M) : P
t  w not free in F, P
Figure 3.8: The Sequent Calculus PFLAX, with Term Assignment
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Natural Deduction to Sequent Calculus:
; N -> M
iIj{Xx .N) — Xx.'ip{N)
ip{smhe{A,x.N)) = i})'{A, smhl{x.ij){N)))
'ij){smhi{N)) =  smhr{'ijj{N))
: A X Ms M
ip’{var{x)^Ms) =  {x;Ms)
'ij)'{ap[A, N), Ms) = i>'{A, {ip(N) :: Ms))
We prove two lemmas showing the equivalence of the term calculi.
Lemma 3.1
i) V( (^M)) = M 
Ü) =  '(A'W.Mg)
Proof: The proof is by simultaneous induction on the structure of M  and Ms.  
Case 1. The M term is {x\ Ms)
il){9{x\Ms)) = 'il){9'{var{x)^Ms)) def ^
= 'ij)'{var(x)^Ms) indii)
= (a:; Ms)  def 'ip'
Case 2.The M term is Arc.M
'ip{9{Xx.M)) = 'ip{Xx.9{M)) def ^
= Arc.'0(0(M)) defy!)
= Arc.M ind i)
Case 3. The M term is smhr{M)
il){9{smhr{M))) = 'tp{smhi{9{M))) def 0
= smhr{^{9{M)))  def 'ip
= smhr{M)  ind i)
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Case 4.The Ms term is [ ]
'ip{9'{A,[])) = 'ip{an{A)) def 9
= 'ip'{A,[]) defi/j'
Case 5.The Ms term is (M :: Ms)
def^'
= ip'{ap{A,9{M)),Ms) indii)
= if/{A,{'ip{9{M)) :: Ms))  def ip'
= ip'{A^ {M :: Ms))  ind i)
Case 6. The M term is smhl{x.M)
ip{9'{A,smhl{x.M))) = ip{smhe{A,x.9{M))) def 9'
= ip'{A,smhl{x.ip{9{M)))) def ip
= ip{A,smhl{x.M))  indi)
■
Lemma 3.2
i) 9{ip{N)) =  N
ii) 9{iP'{A,Ms)) = 9'{A, Ms)
Proof: By simultaneous induction on the structure of N  and A.
Case 1 .The N term is an(A)
9{ip{an{A)) = 9{ip'{A,[])) def ip 
= []) indii)
= an (A) def 9'
Case 2. The N term is Xx.N
9{ip{Xx.N)) = 9{Xx.ip{N)) def Ip 
= Xx.9{ip{N)) def 9 
= Xx.N ind i)
Case 3. The N term is smhi{N)
9{ip{smhi{N))) = 9{smhr(ip{N))) def ip
= smhi(9{ip{N))) def 0
= smhi{N)  ind i)
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Case 4. The N term is smhe{A, x.N)
9{ip{smhe{A^x.N))) = 9{'ip'{A,smhl{x.ij){N)))) defi/j
= 9'{A,smhl{x.ip{N))) indii)
= smhe{A,x.9{ip{N))) def 9'
= smhe{A, x.N)  ind i)
Case 5. The A term is var{x)
9{ip'{var{x),Ms)) = 9{x\Ms) def ip'
= 9'{var(x),Ms) def 9
Case 6. The A term is ap(A, N)
9{ip'{ap{A,N)^Ms)) = 9{ip'{A,{ip{N) :: Ms))) def ip'
= 9'{A,{ip{N) :: Ms)) indii)
= ^'(op(A,^(^(W ))),Mg) def^'
= 9'{ap{A^N),Ms) indi)
We now prove soundness and adequacy theorems.
Theorem 3.1 (Soundness) The following rules are admissible:
r  M  : P  \ r  > A : P  F —^  M s  : P  .
F M>g(M) : P   ^ F I>t>0'(A, Ms)  ; P  ^
Proof: By simultaneous induction on the structure of M  and Ms.
Case 1. The M term is {x\ Ms)  
We have a derivation ending in:
F, rc : P  M s  : P  , .7-BT ,x  '. P  ^  {x\ Ms)  : P
and we know that
F, re : P  > var(x) : P
is deducible.
So we have:
F,re : P  > var{x) : P  F,re : P  M s : R  ... 
r t» 0 ' { v a r { x ) ,M s ) : R
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and w e know that
B\var{x)^Ms) — 9{x\ Ms)
Case 2. The M term is Arc.M
We have a derivation ending in
V^x \ P  M  \ Qr \ x .M  : P d Q
whence
(3%)
r ,  rc : P  => M  : Qr,i:PH>6l(M) r a>\x.e{M) : P d Q
and we know that
Xx.9[M) — 9{Xx.M) 
Case 3. The M term is smhr{M)
We have a derivation ending as follows
r = ^ M : P
r  => smhr{M)  : oP
whence r = > M : P  .)
r  : P
r  I>t>sm/ii(^(M)) : oP ^
and we know that
smhi{9{M)) — 9{smhr{M))
Case 4. The Ms term is [ ]
We have a deduction and a derivation:
 %---------  (az)r t > A : P  r - A [ ] ; P
From the deduction, we obtain:
r >  A : P
r  0{>an(A) : P
and since
(M )
an(A) — [ ])
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we have what we require.
Case 5. The Ms term is (M :: Ms)
We have a derivation ending in
r = ^ M : P  r M s  : R
whence
r  ^  (M :: Ms) : R
V = > M : P
r \ > A : P D Q  r  \»e{M )  : Pr > ap(A, e{M))  : Q V Ms-. R  ,
r V>e'(ap{A, e(M)), Ms)  : R
and we know that
g(M)), Mg) =  (M :: Mg))
Case 6. The Ms term is smhl{x.Ms)
We have a derivation ending
r, rc : P => M : oQ
r  smhl{x.M)  : oQ
whence r,rc : P => M : oQ 
r  > A : oP r,rc:P[»^(M ) :oQ ^ 
r  t>e>gm/ie(A, rc. (^M)) : oQ
and we know that
smhe{A,x.${M)) = 9'{A, smhl(x.M))
Theorem 3.2 f Adequacy) The following rules are admissible:
V &oN : R  ,s r t > ^ : P  V M s R  ...
r = ^ ^ ( i V ) : P  ' r=>^%A, Mg)  : P
Proof: By simultaneous induction on the structure of A and N
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Case 1. The N term is an{A)
We have a deduction ending
r  > ^  : -P (M)r  K>an(A) : P  
We know that we can derive
F j ü ï ï T 7 ' “ >
hence we have ro^:P r -^[ ] ;P , r []) : P
We know that
i:'{A,[]) =i){an(A))
Case 2. The N term is Arc. A 
We have a deduction ending
r,rc : P  U>N :Q , .r OOArc.W : P  D Q
whence r,rc : P  [» A  : Q ..Vr,rc : P  'ip{N) :Q  
r  => Arc.( (^W) : P  D Q
and we know that
Arc.'0(A) =  ip{Xx.N) 
Case 3. The N term is smhe{A, x.N)
We have a deduction ending in
r  C> A : oP r ,  rc : P  t>f>TV : oQ 
r  M>gmAe(A,rc.W) : oQ
whence
(°e)
r,rc : P  : oQ 
r , r c : P = > ^ ( W ) : o Q
r  > A : oP r  smhl{x.'ip{N)) : oQ , 
r  ^'(A, smhl{x.ip{N))) : oQ
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and w e know that
'tp'{A, smhl{x.'tp{N))) — 'ip{smhe{A,x.N))
Case 4. The N term is smhi{N)
We have a deduction ending in
r  : P
r  t ^ sm h i{N )  : oP
whence r  |» A  : P
(°z)
r ^  (^iV) : P
r  => smhr(ip{N)) : oP
and we know that
smhr{'ip{N)) — ^p{smh^{N)) 
Case 5. The A term is var(x)
We can extend to
r ,  rc : P  Ms  : P  , . 
r , r c : P = > ( r c ; M g ) : P
and since
(rc; Ms) = 'ip'{var{x), Ms)
we have the result.
Case 6. The A term is ap{A, N)
We have a deduction ending in
Tî> A :  P  D Q r  : P  
r  > ap(A, N)  : Q
whence
r : P
(3 .)
r  =» : P  r  Mæ : P
ri>A:PD(3 (V’(iV) Ms) : R
r =» f  (^, (V>(iV) :: Ms)) : P
and we know that
Ip'{A, {ip{N) :: Ms)) =  'ip'{ap{A, A), Ms)
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Theorem 3.3 The normal natural deductions of Lax Logic (the proofs of  NLAXj 
are in 1~1 correspondence to the proofs of  PPL AX.
Proof: Immediate from Theorems 1 and 2 and Lemmas 1 and 2. ■
Corollary 3.1 The calculus PFLAX is sound and complete with respect to prov­
ability in the logic.
3.7 Cut Elimination
Now we move on to a study of cut in PFLAX. In the usual sequent calculus, cut 
may be formulated as follows:
In PFLAX, the two judgement forms lead to the following four cut rules:.
r  A p  r  A p  r = » P  t , p A p
r  A p  r A p
( - i s )  — io-u)
These have associated terms:
M::=
cuti {Ms, Ms)  1 cut2 (M, V.Ms)
Ms::=
cut^{M, Ms)  I cut^{M, V.M)
We can give the cut rules again annotated by the proof terms:
r  A  Msi  ; P  r  A  MS2 : P  , , ,{cuti)
r  cuti{Msi ,Ms2)  : R  
r = > M : P  r , x : P - ^ M s : R
Qr  ■ ^ c u t ^ { M ,x .M s )  : R {cut2)
r  cut^ {M, Ms)  : R  
T Ml : P  T ,x  : P  M 2 I R  
r  => cut^{Mi,x.M2)  : R {cutf)
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We call PFLAX extended with the four cut rules PFLAX^“^ We give reduction rules 
for PFLAX^^ As in the previous section, we restrict ourselves to the D, o fragment 
of the logic, in order to prevent repetition of results that can be found elsewhere 
([DP96]). Here we give reductions without terms, together with the associated term 
reductions.
Case 1. cuti ([ ], Ms) ^  Ms
{ax)
r A p  f A p
r  A p  r  A  p
Case 2. cutf  {{M :: M si), MS2 ) {M :: cut f  (Msi, MS2))
r A p  
r ^ s  r A _ P ( 3 ^ ,
r  A p
Case 3. cut\^{smhl{x.M), Ms)  ^  smhl{x.cutl^{M, Ms))
a e A - - "  .  A # ' - '
Case 4. cut^{M, ]) '^  [ ]
{ax)
r = » p  r . p  A p (c««2)     (ax)r  A  p r  A  p
Case 5 . c« tf(M i,x.(M 2 t: Ms)) ((cut^(Mi,x.M2 )) (cutf (Mi,æ.Ms)))
r,p=>p r , p A p ,  , -------------A ------------- (3 e )
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Case 6. cut2 {Mi,xi.smhl(x 2 .M2 )) smhl{x2 .cut^{Mi, X1 .M2 ))
r f p t / p  r, p, s  op  ,  ^ ^
r=4- p  r . p A o p ,  r , p = > o p ,  ,
 _  T l w
Case 7. cut^{{x; Msi),  MS 2 ) ^  (æ; cuti {M si ,M s 2 ))
r , 5  A p  
r , p = > p  r , s  A p  , , ,
 r , s ^ p -------------
r,  5  A p  r,  s  A p  , ^ , -------------- 3-------------  (cuts)r , s  A p
Case 8. {Xx.Mi, {M2 :: Ms)) 'n  ^cut^{cut^{M2 ^x.Mi),Ms)
r  A> p  
r = > p  r , p ^ g  , .
r  ^  g  (cwt4) Y - ^ R   ^ ,
^  r  p
Case 9. cutf^{smhr{Mi), smhl{x.M2 )) ^  cwff (Mi, rc.M2)
r = > p  / \ r , p ^ o p
Case 10. cut^ (M, []) ^  M
— P   (037)
_  r = ^ p  
Case 11. cut^{M,xi.{x2 ; M s ) ) { x 2 ]cut2 {M,xi.Ms))  
r , p , ^ - ^ p  r , p = i > p
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Case 12. cut^(M, x.{x\ Ms)) cut^(M, cut^{M, x.Ms))
Case 13. cwff (Mi,rri.Arc2 -M2) Arc2 .cwt4 (Mi,a:i.M2)
r , p , s = ^ T  T , s , p ^ T  , , ,
P ^ j   p  Q . r p --------------------  {CUU)r = > p  r , P A > P D T  r  :  \ r , 5 A > T  , ,
t =^s d t  r s 3 T
Case 14. cu tf  {M i,x .sm h r(M 2 )) sm hr{cu t^ {M i,x .M 2 ))
r = » p  r,p=^s , r ^ p  r , p^oS) ^L   r ^ 5  ,  ,
r = » o g  -X.»
Notice that we used the following lemma:
Lemma 3.3 (W eakening) The following rules are admissible in PFLAX;
^  m  <"'>r , p A > p  '  ' r , p ^ p
P r o o f :  Induction on the height of derivations. ■
We summarise the term reductions:
1. c u f f  ([ ], M s) M s
2. c u f f  ((M  :: M si),M s2) (M  :: c u f f  (M s i, MS2))
3. cu t l^{smhl{x.M),  M s)  smhl{x.cutl^{M, Ms))
4 . c u f f  (M ,rr.[ ]) ^  [ ]
5 . c u f f  (M l, rc. (M2 :: M s))  ( (c u ff  (M i, rc.M2)) :: (c u ff  (M i, rc.M s)))
6. c u f f  (M l, xi.smhl{x2>M2)) smhl{x2.cut^ (M i, rci.M2))
7 . c u f f  ((rc; M s i) , MS2) (rc; c u f f  (M si, MS2))
8. cuff^^(A rc.M i, (M2 :: Ms)) ^  c u f^ (c u ff  (M2, rc.M i), M s)
9 . cutl^{smhr{Mi),  smhl{x.M2))  c u f f  (M i,rc.M 2)
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10.
11. cu t^{M,Xi . {x2\Ms))  ^  {x2]cut^{M,Xi .Ms))
12. cuff (M, x.{x; Ms))  cuff (M, cuff (M, x.Ms))
13. cuff (M l, Az2  cuff (Mi, rci.Mg)
14. cuff {Mi,x.smhr{M 2 )) smhr{cut^(Mi, X.M2 ))
Definition 3.2 A simple cut instance is an instance of cut with cut-free premisses.
Definition 3.3 The size of a formula is the number of connectives in that formula 
plus one.
Definition 3.4 The weight of a simple cut instance is the quadruple:
(|A|, cutno., hi, /1 2 )
where:
• \A\ is the size of the cut formula.
•  cutno. is the kind of the cut (i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4)
• hi is the height of the derivation of  the right premiss
• /12 is the height of the derivation of the left premiss
we make the convention that cuf 1 =  cuts < cut2 ~  cut/i.
The quadruple is lexicographically ordered from the left.
Lemma 3.4 The weights defined in Definition 3.4 are well-ordered.
We now prove the theorem.
Theorem 3.4 (Weak Cut elimination) The rules (cufi), (cuf2), (cuf3), (cuf4) 
are admissible in PFLAX.
Proof: We give a weak cut reduction strategy:
-  pick any simple cut instance and reduce
-  recursively reduce any simple cut instances in the result
By induction on the weight of the cut instance, and induction on the number of 
simple cut instances, this strategy terminates.
This can easily be seen by inspection. ■
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3.8 Strong Normalisation
In this section we prove that the cut reduction system strongly normalises, giving 
another proof of cut elimination for PFLAX.
We prove strong normalisation using the recursive path-order from term rewriting 
([Der82], see also [BN98]). This is attractive since it is purely syntactic; reasoning 
is about the structure of the terms themselves rather than about a mapping of terms 
into tuples of natural numbers. More on proving normalisation using term rewriting 
can be found in [Sel98].
Again we restrict ourselves to the D, o fragment of Lax Logic to avoid repetition.
3.8.1 Termination Using the Recursive Path-Order
We define two strict partial orders, one on term constructors (or operators), >, and 
one on terms, X. This second strict partial order, the recursive path-order, is de­
fined in terms of the first. Given that > has some simple properties (transitivity, 
irrefiexivity, well-foundedness -  all true by definition), the recursive path-order the­
orem tells us that is well-founded; that is, there is no infinite decreasing sequence 
0 !i 0 .2  >■ .... Finally we show for any reduction ^ that ^ By the well
foundedness of X, every reduction sequence terminates; the cut reduction rules are 
strongly normalising.
Definition 3.5 The recursive path-order is defined as follows.
Let F be a set of operators, f , g E F .  Let T(F) be the set of terms over F and an 
infinite set of variables, s , t  € T{F). We also write terms as / ( s i ,  ...s„), where 
f{si, .. .,Sn) is built from operator f  applied to terms s i , ..., s„.
Let > be a strict partial order on F. Then >- is defined recursively on T(F) as follows:
S  = f{su . . . ,  Sm) >- g { t u  t n )  =  t
i) S i ^ t  for some i e {1,..., m}  
or ii) f  > g and s >~ tj for every j  G {1,..., n} 
o r m )  /  =  g and[si,...,s.,yi\ [ f i , . . . , f n ]
We have used the following abbreviations: ^  for >- or equivalent up to permutation 
of subterms; for the extension of >- to finite multisets.
Definition 3.6 A relation D on set K  (with ki,K2 ,... E K)  w well-founded iff there 
is no infinite decreasing sequence D /«2 D ....
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Theorem 3.5 ( R e c u r s i v e  P a t h - O r d e r  T h e o r e m )  I f  > is well founded, then 
>- is well-founded.
PROOF: See [Der82], [BN98]. ■
3.8.2 Strong Normalisation for PFLAX
We apply the recursive path-order to the term assignment system of PFLAX.
The operators are the term constructors of PFLAX; that is, the constiuctors ;, A, ::,
[ ], smhl, smhr, together with those for cut. The cut constructors are in fact an 
infinite family of constructors parameterised by the formulae of Lax Logic, i.e. the 
constructors are cut f  where P  ranges over the formulae of Lax Logic.
Op =  {cut f  I % E {1,2,3,4}, P  a formula} U , A, smhl, smhr}
The terms over Op contain the proof terms of PFLAX^“*.
If we write / ( s j , ..., s„), /  is the top term constructor and s i , ..., are the immedi­
ate subterms.
We define a strict partial order on term constructors:
-  i f P  and Q aie formulae then P  > Q if Q is a subformula of P  (i.e. > has the 
subterm property)
-  cut f  > cutf  if P  > Q , i , j  e {1 ,2 ,3,4}
-  cutf,  cut f  > cutf , cutf
-  we put cut f  = cut f  and cutf  =  cutf  (so in fact we have two cut operators 
cutn and cutu)
-  cut f  > ;, A, ::, [ ], smhl, smhr
-  ;, A, smhl, smhr aie ordered equally.
Lemma 3.5 The ordering > on Op is transitive, irrefiexive and well-founded. 
P r o o f :  Transitivity and irrefiexivity obvious.
We have an infinite number of term constructors, so it is possible that we could have 
an infinite decreasing sequence:
cutf  > cutf^ > ....
As either the cut suffix or the size of the cut formula must decrease, the length of 
the sequence is bounded (by twice the size of P). ■
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Corollary 3.2 is well founded for the terms of  PFLAX.
P r o o f :  By the recursive path-ordering theorem. ■
We also need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6 For each cut reduction ol^  a ’, a  a' holds.
P r o o f :  We analyse each of the fourteen cases. In each case we give an argument 
that for every pair of terms of the form involved, the relation holds.
Case 1.
cutf{[] ,Ms) >- Ms  
since M s t: M s
Case 2.
cutf{{M :: M s i ) ,M s 2 ) >- (M :: c u t f {M s i ,M s 2 )) 
since cwtf >:: and 
cutf{(M :: M s i ) ,M s 2 ) >- M  
since (M :: Msi)  ^  M  
c u t f i fM  :: M s i ) ,M s 2 ) >- cutf  {M si, M  S2 ) 
since cut f  =  cutf  and
[(M :: M si ) , M s2] >4- [Msi,Ms2]
Case 3.
cutl^{smhl{x.M), Ms) y  smhl{x.cutŸ*{M,Ms)) 
since cut\^ > smhl and 
cut\^{smhl{x.M),Ms) y  cutl^{M,Ms)  
since cut^^ =  cut^^ and 
[smhl{x.M), Ms] >y [M,Ms]
Case 4.
cutf{M,x.[]) y  [] 
since [ ] b  [ ]
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Case 5.
cutf {Ml, X.{{M2 :: Ms))) y  {{cutf {Mi, x. M 2 )) :: cutf {Mi, x.Ms))  
smcccutf >'.: and
cutf{Mi,x.{M2 :: Ms)) y  cu tf{Mi,x.M2 ) 
since cutf =  cutf and
[M l, (M 2:: M g)] >4- [M l, M2] 
cutf {Ml, X . {M2 :: Ms)) y  cutf {Mi,x.Ms)  
since cutf =  cutf  and
[Ml, (M2 :: Ms)] y*- [Mi, Mg]
Case 6.
cutf{Mi,xi.smhl{x2 .M2 )) y  smhl {x2 .cutf {Mi, xi. M2 )) 
since cutf > smhl and 
cutf {Ml, xi.smhl{x2 .M2 )) y  cutf {Mi, xi. M2 ) 
since cutf =  cutf  and
[Mi,smhl{x2.M2)] >4- [Mi, Mg]
Case 7.
cutf{ {x \Msi) ,Ms 2 ) y  {x',cutf{Msi,Ms2 )) 
since cutf >; and 
cutf{{x \Msi) ,Ms 2 ) y  cu t f {M si ,M s 2 ) 
since cutf = cutf  and
[(æ; M si), Msg] >4- [Msi, Msg]
Case 8.
cutf^^{Xx.Mi, (Mg :: Ms)) y  cut2{cutf{M2,x.Mf),Ms) 
since cut f ^^  > cut^ and
cutf  ^ ' {^Xx.Ml,  (Mg :: Ms)) y  cutf {M2 , x.Mi)  
since cutf^^ > cutf and
cutf^^{Xx.Mi, (M2 :: Ms)) y  M2  
since (Mg :: Ms) y  M 2
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{Xx.Mi, {M2 :: Ms)) y  Mi  
since Xx.Mi y  Mi  
cutf^^{Xx.Mi,  {M2 :: Ms)) y  Ms  
since (Mg :: Ms) y  Ms
Case 9.
cut%^{smhr{Mi),smhl{x.M2 )) y  cu tf (Mi, æ.Mg) 
since cutl^ > cu tf and
cutl^{smhr{Mi),smhl{x.M2)) y  Mi 
since smhr {Mi) y  Mi  
cut^^{smhr{Ml), smhl{x.M 2 )) y  Mg 
since smhl{x.M 2 ) h  Mg
Case 10.
cu tf (M, [ ]) ;- M  
since M  y  M
Case 11.
cut f {M,xi . {x 2 ;Ms)) y  (xg;cutf(M ,a;i.M s)) 
since cu tf >; and
cu tf (M, xi.{x2 \ Ms)) y  cu tf (M, xi .Ms)  
since cu tf =  cu tf and
[M, (rcg;Ms)] [M,Ms]
Case 12.
cu tf (M, x.{x; Ms)) y  cu tf (M, cu tf (M, æ.Ms)) 
since cu tf > cu tf and
cut2 {M,x.{x; Ms)) y  M  
since M  y  M  
cut2 {M,x.{x] Ms)) y  cut f  {M, x.Ms)  
since cut f  = cut f  and
[M, (T;Mg)] [M,Mg]
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Case 13.
cu tf (Ml, æi.Aæg.Mg) X Aæg.cutf (Mi, a^ g.Mg) 
since cu tf > A and
cu tf (Ml, æi.Aæg.Mg) cutf{Mi,X\ .M2 ) 
since cu tf — cu tf and
[MijAa g^.Mg] >y [Ml, Mg]
Case 14.
c u t f  { M l ,  X . s m h r  { M 2 ) )  >- s m h r  { c u t f  { M i ,  x .  M 2 ) )  
since cu tf > s m h r  and
c u t f  {Ml, X. s m h r  {M2 )) >- cu tf (Mi, a;.Mg) 
since cu tf =  c u t f  and
[Ml, gm/ir(Mg)] » -  [Mi, Mg]
■
Theorem 3.6 The cut reduction system for  PFLAX strongly normalises.
Proof: Immediate from Corollary 3.2, Lemma 3.4, Lemma 3.5 and Theorem 3.5.
3.9 Lax Logic and Constraint Logic Programming
In [FMW97] and [Wal97], quantified Lax Logic is used to give a logical analysis of 
constraint logic programming. Lax Logic is used to separate the logical analysis of 
provability and the analysis of constraints. Here we summaiise their approach.
Constraint logic programs consist of clauses, CLP clauses, which are closed formu­
lae of the form:
\fXi...Xn.S D  H
where H  is an atom A{xi, ... ,Xn)  and 5' is a formula according to the following 
grammar:
S::=
T  \ A \  S y  s \s  xs\w.s
These clauses can contain constraints. An example of a constraint logic program 
clause is
Vs.s > 5 D A(s)
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(T%) TT—-T (oTi)r ^ T  '  r ^ o T
r = » p  r ^ Q  r ^ o Q
v^ paq r  =>o(pAQ) (
(V .J  r L t -^ n  (V%)r = > F v Q  '  r = ^ P v Q
r = j . o ( p v Q ) '  r ^ o ( p v Q )
r= ^ p [« /x ] r=^op[t/2 :]
r  =» 3x.P  T  ^  o3x.Pr, p D oA opr,P D oA oA
r , P 3  A = > p  r,p D A => A 
r, p D A => oP
(3 0e) 
(3 „ )  
(3 o„)r, P  D A oA 
Figure 3.9: Proof search calculus for LLP
Queries (goal formulae) are also formulae of S. Queries contain no constraints.
Lax Logic is used to sepaiate the constraints from the logical parts of the programs. 
This is done by a simple procedure: replace all occurrences of constraints in S  by 
T and modalise the head. For example:
Vs.s > 5 D A(s) becomes Vs.T D oA(s)
The constraint can be encoded as a special kind of lambda term.
The result of this abstraction is called a Lax Logic program clause (LLP clause). 
These have the form:
y X i . . . X n . S  D  oH
where S  and H  are as for constraint logic program clauses (except that no con­
straints are allowed in S). Note the constraint program clauses and Lax Logic pro­
gram clauses aie part of the same logic (quantified Lax Logic) and so programs with 
LLP clauses and constraint-free CLP clauses can be reasoned about together.
If we want to answer a query Q from a program containing LLP clauses, then we 
try to prove formula oQ, meaning that Q is proved up to the satisfaction of some, as 
yet unspecified, constraints. This is done using the natural deduction calculus given 
in Figure 3.9.
For any query, we get one or many proofs from the program by using the LLP 
calculus. This gives us different solutions up to the satisfaction of constraints. What 
these constraints are differs for each proof. Using the proof term system for the
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LLP calculus, together with the lambda term (in a different system) encoding the 
abstracted constraints, the actual constraints to be satisfied can be calculated and 
then solved using suitable machinery.
For every query, we are interested in the proofs of this query. As has been discussed 
in the introduction, permutation-free calculi, such as PFLAX, are peculiarly well 
suited for the enumeration of all proofs. PFLAX has an advantage over the LLP 
calculus given, in that it generates exactly the normal foims of proofs, whereas the 
LLP calculus involves transformation of proof terms to normal form. The drawback 
is that PFLAX, even for the fragment of Lax Logic used for constraint logic pro­
gramming, does not allow goal directed proof search. However, despite there being 
no obvious correspondence between LLP and PFLAX, we consider PFLAX to be a 
suitable calculus for proof search in the context of constraint logic programming.
3.10 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented a Gentzen system for Lax Logic whose proofs 
naturally correspond in a 1-1 way to the normal natural deductions. This calcu­
lus is syntax-directed and hence suitable for proof enumeration. The search space 
for PFLAX is smaller than that for the usual Lax Logic sequent calculus. In the 
following chapter this calculus is used as the basis for a theorem proving calculus.
Lax Logic gives a proof-theoretic approach to constraint logic programming (see 
[FMW97], [Wal97]). The modality can be used to abstract away the constraints, 
separating the logical and constraint parts of the analysis. Lax Logic is used to 
prove the modal formula. Permutation-free calculi are natural extensions to logic 
programming thought of as backward proof search on hereditary Harrop formulae; 
the work in this chapter provides an extension of the setting for constraint logic 
programming founded upon Lax Logic. PFLAX is also useful since the proofs it 
generates are in normal form, unlike the LLP calculus for constraint logic program­
ming.
Chapter 4 
Loop-Checking Using a History 
Mechanism
This chapter is an investigation of one technique for propositional theorem proving 
-  the use of a ‘history’ to prevent looping. We develop a new history mechanism 
and apply it to several calculi, utilising work from the first three chapters of this 
thesis. The resulting calculi with loop checking are proved to be sound and com­
plete. Although it seems intuitively obvious that the history calculi are complete, 
the proofs of this are surprisingly involved.
Backward proof search in the usual formulations of many non-classical proposi­
tional sequent calculi is non-terminating. Backward application of the rules can 
easily produce the same sequent again and again. A simple example in the G3 
calculus for propositional intuitionistic logic is (with A  atomic):
( A a A) D A ^ A  (A A A) D A => A
(A A A) d A = > A a A________A, (A A A) D A
(A A A) D A => A
Here the sequent ( A A A) D A A may continue to occur in the proof tree for this 
sequent.
There aie several approaches to decision procedures for logics whose usual sequent 
formulations are not decision procedures themselves. One can attempt to find a se­
quent formulation of the logic that terminates when used for backward proof search. 
An example of this is the contraction-free calculus G4 for propositional intuition­
istic logic, originating with Vorob’ev ([Vor52], [Vor58]), and rediscovered and ex­
pounded by Dyckhoff ([Dyc92]) and by Hudelmaier ([Hud93]). These contraction- 
free calculi are not easily discovered (indeed may not be possible), and so other 
methods can be useful. Another approach is to place conditions on the sequent cal­
culus to ensure termination of search. It is elegant to be able to build the content of 
these conditions into the sequent calculus itself. This is how we develop calculi for
81
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theorem proving in this section. The technique for doing this is quite general and 
can be applied to many calculi. We apply it to the intuitionistic sequent calculi G3 
and MJ, as well as to some modal logics: S4, Lax Logic and intuitionistic S4.
4.1 History Mechanisms
In order to ensure termination of backward proof search, we need to check that the 
same sequent (modulo number of occurrences of formulae of the same type) does 
not appear again on a branch. In the example above we easily see that there is a 
loop: we need a mechanical way to detect such loops.
One way to do this is to add a history to a sequent. The history is the set of all 
sequents to have occurred so far on a branch of a proof tree. After each backwards 
inference the new sequent (without its history) is checked to see whether it is a 
member of this set. If it is we have looping and backtrack. If not the new history is 
the extension of the old history by the old sequent (without the history component), 
and we try to prove the new sequent, and so on. Unfortunately, this method is space 
inefficient as it requires long lists of sequents to be stored by the computer, and all 
of this list has to be checked at each stage. When the sequents are stored, far more 
information than necessary is kept. Efficiency would be improved by cutting down 
the amount of storage and checking to the bare minimum needed to prevent looping.
The basis of the reduced history is the realisation (as in [HSZ96]) that one need 
only store goal formulae in order to loop-check. The contexts of the sequents in this 
section are multisets rather than sets of labelled formulae. For most of the calculi 
dealt with in this chapter, the context cannot decrease; once a formula is in the 
context it will be in the context of all sequents above it in the proof tree. We say 
that the calculus has increasing context. For two sequents to be the same they need 
to have the same context (up to multiple occurrences of formulae of the same type). 
Therefore we may empty the history every time the context is (properly) extended. 
All we need store in the history are goal formulae. If we have a sequent whose goal 
is already in the history, then we have the same goal and the same context as another 
sequent, that is, a loop.
We describe two slightly different approaches to doing this. There is the straight­
forward extension of the calculus described in [HSZ96] (which we call the ‘Swiss 
history’; more on this loop-checking method can be found in [Heu98]). There is 
also related work on histories for intuitionistic logic by Gabbay in [Gab91]. The 
other approach involves storing slightly more formulae in the history, but which for 
some calculi detects loops more quickly. This we describe as the ‘Scottish history’ 
([How96], [How97]); it can in many cases be more efficient than the Swiss method.
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(oa;) p  I _v D. ayT , p = ^ P ] n  T , i . ^ P ' n
0 .2 ) i f f  ET
i f f ^ r  i f P e r
( 3 , )  i f Z ) m , a n d Q ^ r
^  r , ^ P ^ ’£ > y ^  (-/:) i f f ^ « ,  a n d ± ^ r  
T ^ P - , H  r # . Q ; %
(v«.) (V .Jr = > P v Q ; ? {   ^ V = y P w Q ; n
T , P V  Q , P  D](f> r , P \ /  Q,Q =^  D' , f  i f p n d r  T , P V Q = ^  D ] n  It P , Q ^  I
D  is either an atom, ±  or a disjunction.
When the history has been extended we have parenthesised {D, %) for emphasis.
Figure 4.1: G3^ *®* in the Swiss-style
4.1.1 The Swiss History
In this section we describe the application of the Swiss history to the G3 calculus 
for propositional intuitionistic logic. We should first point out that the calculus we 
describe as Swiss is different from the one in [HSZ96]. We are tiying to focus on 
the history mechanism and hence have not included the subsumption checks that 
the calculus in [HSZ96] uses. It has also been extended to cover disjunction.
The Swiss-style calculus G3^*^* is displayed in Figure 4.1. Let us make some gen­
eral points about it (which will apply to the Scottish G3^ *®* too). We give explicit 
rules for negation (which are just special cases of the rules for implication) for the 
sake of completeness of connectives. There are two rules for (3%). These corre­
spond to the two cases where the new formula, P , is or is not in the context. As 
noted above, this is very important for history mechanism. Also notice that the 
number of formulae in the history is at most equal to the length of the formula we 
check for provability.
The loop checking works in a similar way to that of in [HSZ96]. A
sequent is matched against the conclusions of right mles until the goal formula 
is either a propositional variable, falsum, or a disjunction (note that disjunction is
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not covered in [HSZ96], and requires special treatment). This has been ensured 
by the restriction on goal formulae given in the calculus (although the calculus 
would still be terminating without this restriction, it gives a much more efficient 
implementation). A formula from the context is then picked and matched against 
the left rules of the calculus. The history mechanism applies to prevent looping in 
the (D£) rule (and similarly in the (-i^) rule). The left premiss of the rule has the 
same context as the conclusion, but the goal is, in general, different. If the goal, D,  
of the conclusion is not in the history, we store D in the histoiy and continue 
backward proof search on the left premiss. Alternatively, D  might already be in Tl. 
In this case there is a loop, and so this branch is not pursued. We backtrack and look 
for a proof in a different way.
There are other places where the rules are restricted to prevent looping. The left 
rules have side conditions to ensure that the context is increasing. For the (D%) 
rule (which attempts to extend the context) there are two cases corresponding to 
when the context is and when it is not extended. Something similar is happening 
in the left rules. Take (V^) as an example. In both premisses of the rule a formula 
may be added to context. If both contexts really are extended, then we can continue 
building the proof tree. If one or both contexts are not extended then the sequent, 5, 
with the non-extended context, will be the same as some sequent at a lesser height 
in the proof tree ~ there is a loop (which we describe as a trivial loop). This is easy 
to see: since the context and the goal of S  are the same as that of the conclusion, 
the conclusion is the same as the premiss S.
What does a history sequent say? What, in logical terms, is the meaning of a sequent 
with a history field? Take, for example, the sequent S  = T R'j'H. This
says that for every proof of S , i f  P  6 R,  then no sequent of the form V => P'y'H' 
appears in the proof tree of 5.
We now prove the equivalence theorems. This is done in two stages. First we prove 
the equivalence of G3 and G3 with goals of the left rules restricted to atoms, X and 
disjunctions (a calculus we shall refer to as G3^). Then we prove the equivalence 
ofG3^ andG3^*'* .
Definition 4.1 The size of a proof tree is equal to the number o f nodes in it.
We need the following lemmas:
Lemma 4.1 (W eakening) The following rule is admissible in both G3 and G3 .^*
P (W)r , p = ^ R
P r o o f : By induction on the height of the derivation of the premiss. ■
Lemma 4.2 I f  sequent S  is provable in G3, then S  is provable in G3 with the ax­
ioms and the goal of {1) restricted to atomic formulae (and X).
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Proof: By breaking up the axiom formulae and induction on the size of the goal. ■
We prove the following result using the permutation properties of the calculus as 
studied in Chapter 2 (see Table 2.1).
Proposition 4.1 The calculi G3 and G3^ are equivalent That is, a sequent is 
provable in G3 iff it is provable in G3^.
Proof: It is trivial that if sequent S  is provable in G3^ then it is provable in G3. 
We show the converse.
We show that if the goal is an implication or a conjunction, and the next inference 
is (Vr) and in both premisses the goal is principal, then the rules permute, i.e.
p C \ / r p q - i . r , - . p i  13%)r , S V T , S ^  Pz >Q r , S W T , T = ^  P d Q , .----------------  (V£)t , s v t =^p d q
permutes to:
T , S V T , S , P = y Q  r , S w T , T , P ^ Q  
r , 5 v r , p  =>Q , X 
r , S \ / T ^ P D Q
and (where F' =  T, 5  V T)
(Vr:)
T',S=^P r' ,S=^Q,^ , T',T=^P ,
r ' , S ^ P A Q   ^ F ' , T = 4 - P a Q  ,,, j
F , 5 v r ^ P A Q
permutes to:
r , s = ^ p  F ' , T=4 . p , , , x  r' , s=^Q F ' , r = > Q „ , ,F ^ P  —  (vr)
r , 5 ' VT=> PAQ  
We proceed by induction on the height of derivations.
Consider a G3 inference which is not a G3^ inference. This must be an instance of 
a left rule with an implicational or conjunctive goal. By the induction hypothesis 
we have G3^ proofs of the premiss(es). Hence the premisses with implicational or 
conjunctive goals have these goals as the principal formula. From Table 2.1 and the 
permutations given above, we see that we can permute these inferences with the left 
rule we are looking at. The result follows by induction on the size of the goal. ■
Lemma 4.3 (Contraction) The following rule is admissible in G3^*^* .•
r , P , P  R^ R  . X 
T , P = y R ‘R
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P r o o f : By induction on the height of the derivations of the premisses. ■
Theorem 4.1 The calculi G3 and G3^ *®* are equivalent. That is, sequent P G 
is provable in G3 iffV ^  G \^  is provable in G3^ *^ *.
Proof: From Proposition 4.1 we know that it is enough to show that G3^ is equiv­
alent to G3^ *®^ .
It is trivial that any sequent provable in G3^**  ^is provable in G3^. (Simply drop 
the history part of the sequent and use contraction above instances of (d%2))* We 
prove the converse.
Take any proof tree for sequent S  in G3^. By definition this proof tree is finite. 
That is, all branches of the tree end with an occurrence of {ax) or (X), with all 
branches having a finite number of nodes (there is also no infinite branching at any 
node). Using a proof tree for a sequent *9 in G3^ we construct a proof tree for the 
sequent 5; in G3^ *®*. Essentially we take a G3^ proof tree and give a recipe for 
‘snipping out’ the loops: removing the sequents that form the loop. Or, looking at it 
in another way we shall show that failure due to the history mechanism only occurs 
when there is a loop.
Take any G3^ proof tree with n > 0 nodes. We take this proof tree and use the 
following construction to give a G3^ *®* proof tree.
The following construction takes a G3^ proof tree and builds a G3^ *®* proof tree 
from the root up. For simplicity we ignore negation, although this can easily be 
added. In this construction we use ‘hybrid trees’. A hybrid tree is a fragment 
of G3^"* proof tree with all branches that do not have {ax) or (X) leaves ending 
with G3^ proof trees. These G3^ proof trees have roots which can be obtained by 
backwai'ds application of a G3^ rule to the top history sequent (ignoring its history). 
We analyse each case of a topmost history sequent with non-history premiss(es) 
resulting from application of rule {R) in the sequent tree.
-  The root of the G3^ tree. We change (non-history) sequent S  to history se­
quent S\ (j).
-  {R) is one of {ax), (X), (A%), (V%J, (V%J, i.e. a rule which in G3^*^* has 
no side conditions. The premiss(es) are changed by adding the appropriate 
history. They become the history sequents obtained by applying (backwards) 
the G3^ *®* rule to the original conclusion.
For example, if the situation we are analysing is:
r  => P  r= >  Q , X 
T = ^ P A Q ' , n
then we change this part of the hybrid tree to:
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We have an extended proof tree fragment with G3^ proof tree(s) as
premiss(es).
-  (R) is (3 %). We simply add a history as appropriate to the version of the 
rule, depending on the context. We use contraction when the context is not 
properly extended.
-  {R) is (A^J. If the side conditions of the history rule (A^J are satisfied, we 
simply add the appropriate history to the premiss. Else, we have:
(W )r , P A Q , P = 4 ^ D
T , P a Q=>D;'H
where P E T. From the point of view of looping, both the premiss and 
conclusion aie the same. This is a loop that we describe as trivial. The new 
hybrid tree is simply the old one with the premiss obtained by contraction:
(W )V, P a Q , P  ^  , X
V ^ P A Q ^ D ' ^ n
-  [R) is (A^J is treated analogously to (A^J.
-  {R) is (V^). Similar to (A^J. If the side conditions aie satisfied, then we 
simply add the appropriate histories. Else, we have:
r , P v Q ,  T , P \ /  Q,Q ^  D X
r,PVQ=>D;7^
if P  G r  then the left premiss and the conclusion are the same and there is 
a trivial loop. In this case the new hybrid tree is obtained by removing the 
completed subtree above the right premiss and obtaining the left premiss by 
contraction: T , P \ / Q , P ^ D - n
T , p y Q = ^ D - n
Similarly if Q G F. (If P, Q G F, then we have a choice of which branch to 
remove).
-  (P) is (3/:). If the side conditions are satisfied then we simply add the ap­
propriate histories. Else, we have:
F; P  3  Q => P  F; P  3  Q, Q => D / X
F , P 3 Q = > D ; P  ^
If Q G F, then for the purposes of looping the right premiss and the conclu­
sion are the same. The new hybrid tree is obtained by removing the subtree
C h a p t e r  4 . L o o p -C h e c k in g  U s in g  a  H ist o r y  M e c h a n is m  88
deriving the left premiss, and obtaining conclusion from the right premiss by 
contraction.
We now need to consider what happens if D 6 R.  This is where the history 
mechanism prevents looping. If the history condition is not met, we know 
that below the conclusion the hybrid tree has the form:
T , P d Q ^ P  V , P D Q , Q = y D
T , P  D Q D ; R (3/;)
V , P o Q ^ D - , n ’ (3£)
where D e H  and H 3  The history is not reset at any point in this 
fragment.
This can easily be seen to contain the loop which is the reason for the side 
conditions not being met. The new hybrid tree is obtained by removing from 
the previous hybrid tree all the sequents from, but not including, the sequent 
V, P D Q D \R ' \xp to and including T ,P  3  Q D ;P . (We may need 
some contractions). We can now apply (backwards) (3/:) to the first of these 
sequents. Either the side conditions will be satisfied, or Q G F: in either case 
we know how to proceed.
As has been noted, G3 proof trees are finite and at every stage in this construc­
tion, the number of nodes of the hybrid tree without a history strictly decreases. 
Therefore the construction is terminating. As every branch in the G3 tree ends in an 
application of (aæ) or (X), the history tree we construct is a proof tree. ■
QQ^ Htst (s^iss) is a calculus with a history mechanism for propositional intuition­
istic logic. It is sound and complete. We claimed earlier that this calculus gives a 
decision procedure for propositional intuitionistic logic. We prove that backwards 
proof search in G3^*^* in the Swiss style terminates.
Theorem 4.2 Backwards proof search in the Swiss calculus G3^ *®* is terminating.
Proof: We associate with every sequent F =4> P; a triple of natural numbers:
W  ~  {k — n , k  — m,r)
where k is the number of elements in the set of subformulae of (F, P); n is the 
number of elements in the set of elements of F; m is the number of elements in R  
and r  is the size of goal formula P. (Notice that although F is a multiset, we count 
its elements as a set). These triples are lexicographically ordered from the left.
By inspection we see that W  is lower for the premisses of every inference rule than 
for the conclusion. Consider as an example, (3£):
r,P 3 Q ^  P; (DFO 3
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The conclusion has W  = [k — n , k  — m,r) .  The left premiss has W  = {k' — 
n, k' — (where k' < k). Therefore W  < W.  The right premiss has W ”
=  (/e — (n -f 1), /c, r). Therefore W" < W.  The weights of both premisses are less 
than the conclusion.
Hence backwai'ds proof search is terminating. ■
Note 4.1 The proof o f Theorem 4.2 makes explicit a theme that can be seem through­
out this chapter. We have given the calculi using multisets, in order that they match 
usual presentations, and the way that they are implemented in Prolog. However, it 
is often more natural to think o f contexts as sets. In particular, the idea of increas­
ing context is one that is based on a view o f the context as a set. In fact, as the 
theory has shown, we can look at multisets, and we only need the set view when we 
need to map proofs to tuples o f natural numbers to get a termination argument as 
in Theorem 4.2. We could rework the entire section using sets, or we could give a 
collection o f propositions about treating multisets as sets and the effect o f this on 
these calculi. However, we do not do this, instead restricting ourself to this note.
4.2 Scottish History and G3
In this section we discuss the ‘Scottish’ histoiy mechanism as applied to G3. This 
calculus takes a slightly different approach to the ‘Swiss’ calculus. Again we call 
the calculus The calculus adds to the history at several points, rather than
just one (as is the case for the Swiss history) so has to store a larger set. It also 
checks for looping more often than the Swiss history, so proof trees do not have to 
be so large. The Scottish calculus G3^ *®* can be seen in Figure 4.2.
We said earlier that when using a history mechanism to prevent looping it would be 
good to cut down the amount of storage and checking to a bare minimum. This was 
done in the Swiss G3^ ^®* -  the history mechanism operates in one place and one 
place only and other restrictions for loop prevention involve no storage. However, 
it is not clear that this is the best or most attractive approach. There is a tradeoff 
between these advantages and the obvious disadvantage of not looking for loops 
very often. We find loops more quickly if we look for them at more points. That is, 
we might continue building a proof tree needlessly when a loop might have already 
been spotted. The Scottish G3^ *®* has larger histories. This allows us to check for 
loops in more places, and in certain situations this is advantageous.
As in the Swiss history, when attempting to prove a sequent, right rules are applied 
first, breaking up a formula until it is atomic, falsum or a disjunction, and only then 
can left rules be applied. Looping due to context extensions is prevented in the 
same way. The difference between the two calculi is in the way that the history 
mechanism works.
Whereas the Swiss calculus only places formulae in the history that have been the 
goal of the conclusions of a (D^) (or (-ir)), the Scottish calculus keeps a complete
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V , P ^ P ‘% r , J_=^P;7^
r 2 % % %  Om) ilPeranaeüW  
w  «P ^ r
‘’i^^pw’ I"»') »P6ra,a±««
<A„, „ P . « «
C 'p ,
- ( ^ P l  “ « I » -
K ^ ^ C v . . )  i t P ^ «  (V.., i , « ^ «
r_ailyg.Z3.ffia .  P ^ y .g ■> «IW (V.) „p,8^r
D is either an atom, L  or a disjunction.
When the history has been extended, we have parenthesised (P, TL) for emphasis.
Figure 4.2: in the Scottish style
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record of goal foimulae between context extensions. At each of the places where 
the history might be extended, the new goal is checked against the history. If it is in 
the history, then there is a loop. The heart of the difference between the two calculi 
is that in the Swiss calculus loop checking is done when a formula leaves the goal, 
whereas in the Scottish calculus it is done when it becomes the goal.
We prove the same theorems for the Scottish as for the Swiss G3^*® .^ The
proofs aie very similar to those for the Swiss G3^ *®* and are omitted because of 
their length and repetitiveness.
Theorem 4.3 The calculi G3 and G3^ *"®* are equivalent. That is, sequent T => (7 
is provable in G3 iffV  => G; {(7} is provable in G3^*®*.
PROOF: Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1. ■
Theorem 4.4 Backwards proof search in the calculus G3^ *®* is terminating. 
P r o o f :  Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2. ■
4.2.1 Comparison of the Two Calculi
Because of the way that the Swiss history works, loop detection is delayed. Let us 
illustrate this with an example. Consider the sequent:
A , B , { A d B d C ) d C = > A d B d C
In the Swiss G3^ *®* (where T = A,B^{A D B  D C) D C and G = A d  B  D C) 
we get the following:
(ax)r=>(7;{C}
r  => B D .
r = ^ G ; ^
We have to go through all the inference steps again (in the branch above the left 
premiss) before the loop is detected -  even though we can clearly see the loop. 
However, in the Scottish calculus we get:
(ax)r= ^ (7 ;{G ,C ,B D C ,(7}  r ,C = >C ;{C }
r = > C ; { C , B D C , ( 7 }  , ,C^ T12)T = ^ B d C ; { B d C,G} , ,-  (D%2)r ^ G ;  {G}
The topmost inference, (D^), is not valid, since the left premiss has goal formula, 
G, which is already in the history. That is, the loop is detected, and is detected lower 
in the proof tree than in the Swiss style calculus.
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Spotting the loop as it occurs is not only theoretically more attractive, but could also 
prevent a lot of costly extra computation.
The two calculi both have their good points. The Swiss calculus is efficient from 
the point of view that its history mechanism requires little storage and checking. 
The Scottish calculus is efficient in that it detects loops as they occur, avoiding 
unnecessary computation. The Swiss calculus needs less space for each sequent, 
but more for the entire proof tree.
The question is whether or not in general an overhead in storage and checking of the 
history (which should not be too great due to regular resetting) is preferable to the 
larger proof trees which are the result of delaying checking. The approach we take 
to this question is to look at empirical results in the form of timings for theorem 
proving in implementations of the calculi. Note that as the two calculi are rather 
similar it is more than likely that any optimisation that can be applied to one can 
also be applied to the other.
Results for the implementations of the calculi can be found in section 4.4.
4.3 Histories and MJ
So far we have used the history mechanisms with G3 to give decision procedures 
for intuitionistic logic. We can, however, improve on these decision procedures 
by using a different base calculus. The calculus MJ has all the features (such as 
increasing context) which make it suitable for the history mechanisms to be applied 
to. MJ has fewer derivations than G3 and has focusing, therefore when searching 
for a proof, there are fewer possible proofs to check on backtracking. Hence the 
decision as to whether or not a formula is provable in intuitionistic logic ought to 
be made quicker. This is the approach taken in [How96], [How97]. The calculi 
Mj^ f*s< in the Swiss style and MJ^ *®* in the Scottish style can be seen in Figures 4.3 
and 4.4 respectively.
We can prove similar theorems for MJ^ *®* as for G3^*®  ^ The proofs are similar; 
some of these proofs can be found in detail in [How96].
Proposition 4.2 The calculi MJ and MJ^ (MJ with the goal o f (C) restricted to 
atoms, falsum or disjunctions) are equivalent That is, sequent S  is provable in MJ 
iff it is provable in MJ^.
P r o o f : Similar to proof of Proposition 4.1. ■
Theorem 4.5 The Swiss calculus MJ^ *®* is equivalent to MJ.
P r o o f : Similar to proof of Theorem 4.1. 0
Theorem 4.6 Backwards proof search in the Swiss MJ^ *®* is terminating.
P r o o f : Similar to proof of Theorem 4.2. ■
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T ^ D - H
V^P Q\(f) 
V ^ P d Q \ %  
r ,  P  L;
(ax) (^) r,p D - n
(3 m ) i f P ^ r  
( -m )  i f P ^ ^ r
D;H  r , P = ^ D ; ? ^ (C )
V ^ P d Q\ % 
r=4^±;?{
(3 m ) i f P e r
^P\n (-R2) i f P G T
T ^ p \ ( D , n )  v - ^ D ' . n
V ^ D \ %
r = ^ P ; ( D , ? ^ )
(3z:)
r
r
^ D ; n  
P\H r
(-1/:)
r = > P A Q ; 9 / {An)
D-%
V ^ D ; %
r = > P ; ? /
V => p  y  Q ',n
r ,P=>D;<^  r , Q
W l )
(VRi)
r Q D]%
T ^ D ' . n
r=>Q; ?^
v = ^ p y Q - n
(AcJ
(Vm)
T ^ D \ U
(V£) i f P ^ T a n d g ^ r
D  is either a prepositional variable, L or a disjunction.
When the history has been extended we have parenthesised (D, %)  for emphasis. 
Figure 4.3: The Calculus MJ^ *®* in the Swiss style.
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D (ax)D - n  T ^ D ; n
r ,p  Q;{g}
(j_)
r , p = ^ D ] n  
(3 m ) i f P ^ r
(C)
i f Pe T r n d Q^ n  
(-9^2) i i P e T m d ± ^ n
r = ^P ; (F , - H)  T - ^ D - , n
T ^ D - , H  
r=»P; (P,%)
(3c) ' d P i H
V ^ D - , H  
r=>P; (P,%) T ^ Q - { Q , n )
(--c) i f P ^ W
r ^ P A Q ; W
D-,H
T ^ D \ H (^ a )
(ak) u p i u a a d Q i n  
V - ^ D - H (^ a )
( V .)  K # #  (V ..I > ' « « «
r,P^Pi;{P>} r,Q=»P;{P>}
T ^ D - , H (Vc) i f P ^ r a n d Q ^ r
D is either a propositional variable, L  or a disjunction.
Where the history has been extended we have parenthesised (P, %) for emphasis.
Figure 4.4: The Calculus MJ^ *®* in the Scottish style
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Theorem 4,7 The Scottish calculus is equivalent to MJ.
P r o o f : Similar to proof of Theorem 4.1. ■
Theorem 4.8 Backwards proof search in the Scottish MJ'^ *®^  is terminating. 
Proof: Similai' to proof of Theorem 4.2. ■
4.3.1 Propositional Theorem Proving
We have described four calculi that are decision procedures for propositional intu­
itionistic logic. Another calculus which is a decision procedure for propositional 
intuitionistic logic is the contraction-free calculus G4, (This calculus can be found 
in the appendix).
We have already given a discussion of why we think that the Scottish histoiy applied 
to propositional intuitionistic logic is theoretically more attractive than the Swiss 
history. We also said that we would like to compare implementations of the calculi 
to add experimental evidence to the theoretical argument. We also compare with an 
implementation of G4.
The calculi were all naively implemented in Prolog. By a naïve implementation 
we mean one that follows as closely as possible the unintelligent searching through 
the proof trees as generated by the sequent calculi presented. We describe this for 
MJ^ *®*.
Our implementations of the calculi are syntax directed. A sequent V P\j)  (for 
the Swiss calculus), or T F; {P}  (for the Scottish calculus) is passed to the theo­
rem proven For a sequent with an empty stoup, the next inference is determined by 
the goal. If the goal is an implication, negation or conjunction, then the appropriate 
right rule is applied. If an instance of one of these rules fails, then we have to back­
track (as no other rule is applicable). If the goal is a propositional variable, falsum 
or a disjunction, the contraction rule is applied, selecting a formula and placing it in 
the stoup. If a contraction fails, another contraction is attempted, placing a different 
formula in the stoup. If the goal is a propositional variable or falsum, and contrac­
tion has failed for all possible stoup formulae, then we backtrack. If the goal is a 
disjunction and contraction has failed for all possible stoup formulae, then we may 
apply disjunction on the right. If this fails we have to backtrack. For a sequent with 
a stoup formula, the next inference is determined by the stoup formula. The next 
inference must be an instance of the appropriate rule on the left. If such an inference 
fails then we have to backtrack. Note that in (3/;) we check the right branch, the 
one with the stoup formula, first. We get failure if at any point no rule instance can 
be applied. We give an example of failure owing to the history:
V , P ^ P d Q-,{P,Q}
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fails as P  G {F, P}  and Q G {F, Q}; the side conditions are not satisfied. Owing to 
the condition on (C), no other rule instances are applicable to this sequent and we 
must backtrack. We can describe a similar process for the procedures for and
G4.
Knowledge of the invertibility of inference rules can be useful when implementing 
theorem pro vers. Although we have not used such knowledge here, we still think it 
is useful to give the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4 The following rules o f MJ^ *®^  (both Swiss and Scottish) are invertible: 
(3k i), (3k2). h n i ) .  (-■K2). (3£), (->£). (A%), (Vr). The rules (A^J, (Ac,), 
(Vri). (V%), (C) are not invertible.
P r o o f : The invertibilities aie proved by some easy inductions. We can give simple 
counterexamples to the invertibility of the other rules. ■
4.4 Results
We tested our implementations of the Swiss and Scottish G3^^®\ the Swiss and 
Scottish MJ^ ^®^  and G4 on a set ofbenchmaiks for propositional intuitionistic logic 
([Dyc97]) and on the example formulae from [How97]. The example sets may be 
found in Appendix B. As we have already said, the implementations of these calculi 
are naïve. Much more efficient implementations are imaginable, and many better 
implementations of G4 exist. The purpose of these implementations is for them to 
be simple and in the same style in order that we can make a meaningful comparison 
of the calculi.
The results are displayed in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. The benchmark formulae are 
all parameterised by natural number n. The entries in the table represent the largest 
n  for which the formula was decided in a particular calculus in less than 10 seconds 
of processor time (the larger the entry, the better the prover has performed). The 
timings in the second table are simply average timings (to two significant figures, 
with a cut off at 100000ms) for proving the formulae (the smaller the entry, the bet­
ter the prover has performed). The Prolog code was run using SISCTUS Prolog2.1 
on a Sun SPARCStation 10.
We can make several comparisons: we can compare the history provers with the 
contraction free prover; we can compare G3 and MJ as base calculi for applying a 
history mechanism to; we can compare the two forms of history mechanism.
The G4 decision procedure takes a different approach from that of the history 
provers. Therefore the implementation, though we have attempted to write it in 
the same style, is significantly different from the implementations of the history 
provers. Comparison is hard and uncertain. We therefore do not want to say any­
thing definite based on the timings given. However, the results might indicate that
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G3^"* Sc. G3^"* Sw. MJ '^®  ^Sc. MJ"*®* Sw. G4
deJorui jn_p 3 2 7 6 10deJorui jn_n 1 1 2 2 1ph_p 3 3 3 3 4
ph_n 1 1 2 2 1
con_p 50 23 54 85 130
con_n 5 2 5 6 2
schwicht-p 5 5 12 11 157SGhwicht_n 2 1 102 89 38kk_p 2 1 330 404 4kk_n 0 0 5 5 1
equiv.p 3 2 13 13 4
equiv_n 4 4 1191 1219 3
Table 4.1: Results for Theorem Provers (largest parameter giving proof in less than 
lOsec)
G4 is generally a faster decision procedure, but that for certain classes of problem, 
the history provers can be comparable or even quicker.
The comparison between G3 and MJ as the base calculus for the history mechanism 
seems quite straightforward. In all cases the Swiss MJ^ *®* is better than the Swiss 
G3^*®  ^and the Scottish MJ“^*®* is better than the Scottish G3-^ *®*. This is to be ex­
pected as MJ search space is a restriction of G3 search space. We conclude that MJ 
is a better calculus than G3 for basing a history mechanism propositional theorem 
prover on.
Our experimental results show that with both MJ and G3 as a base calculus, the 
Swiss and Scottish calculi give similar results for most examples. However, as ex­
pected, there are some examples where the Swiss mechanism is a little better, and 
others where the Scottish mechanism considerably outperforms (by several orders 
of magnitude) the Swiss mechanism. We conclude that for propositional intuitionis­
tic logic, the Scottish mechanism seems to be the better approach to loop detection. 
However, G4 seems to give the best decision procedure.
Of course, if one is interested in finding loops, or a certain class of proofs rather 
than in decision procedures, then the history calculi are very useful and G4 is not.
4.5 Histories and Modal Logic
So far we have discussed history mechanisms only with respect to propositional 
intuitionistic logic. However, their use is possible for other logics, such as modal 
logics. Indeed, as contraction-free calculi for modal logics are either not known or
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Eg Uni. P/U G3"*®* Sw. G3^ *®* Sc MJ""* Sw. MJ""* Sc. G4
1. P 49 56 14 18 7
2. P 3900 4500 1400 1700 260
3. U 1800 1800 170 160 61
4. P 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.5
5. P 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2
6. P 3.4 2.7 0.6 0.8 0.5
7. P 77 57 11 14 13
8. P 1.2 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.4
9. P NR NR 4.3 4.3 1500
10. u 1.1 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.7
11. u NR 61 24 10 NR
12. p 1.4 1.7 0.7 1.0 0.9
13. u 47 6.3 4.5 3.2 3.9
14. p 6.8 4.8 3.5 2.7 1.5
15. p 79 38 50 57 11
16. 3 p 6400 6500 800 960 1100
17. 2 p 46000 46000 7500 8500 3300
18. 4 p 63 41 63 8.5 13
18. 5 p 120 71 150 15 24
19. 2 p 52000 2500 7.8 8.1 13
19. 3 p NR NR 18000 27 260
20. 2 p 17 17 1.1 2.1 2.4
20. 4 p 970 950 5.3 6.6 33
21. 2 u 290 260 8.6 10 12
21. 3 u 1500 1500 27 33 37
22. 2 p 3200 190 370 22 8.0
22. 3 p NR 11000 12000 510 20
23. 2 p NR NR 35 45 140
23. 3 p NR NR 2200 1400 8900
24. 2 u NR NR 49 31 NR
25. 2 p NR NR 11000 20 29
25. 4 p NR NR NR 370 18000
26. 2 p NR NR 3.4 5.8 5.6
26. 5 p NR NR 17 30 40
27. 2 p 380 110 10000 47 9.3
Key:
Uni.:size of the universe the formula has been instantiated over; P: provable; U: 
unprovable; NR: no result in less 100000ms)
Table 4.2: Results and Timings (averages in milliseconds)
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Ejn, A, -IA; H [ax)
(T) (±)S|n,T;%  ^ ' E|n,±;«
m , P , Q ; H  S|n,P;K S|n,Q;?{2|n,PV0;% " ' E|n,PAQ;«
Figure 4.5: S4"*®* in the Swiss style
me complicated, history mechanisms me of more interest here than for intuitionis­
tic logic. The Heuerding et al  paper ([HSZ96]) is mainly about loop checking for 
modal logics. In this section we discuss the application of histories to some modal 
logics: S4, intuitionistic S4 and Lax Logic. We know of no contraction-free cal­
culi for intuitionistic S4 or Lax Logic (although [AF96] contains an unsuccessful 
attempt at developing one). Hudelmaier has given a contraction-free calculus for 
S4 ([Hud96]). However, this calculus is complicated and hmd to understand, mo­
tivating other approaches to theorem proving in S4, such as the one from [HSZ96] 
discussed here.
As S4 is a modal logic with classical logic underlying it, we do not need a calculus 
which deals with all the connectives, but simply one which can deal with formulae 
in negation normal form. We give the calculus for S4"*®* from [HSZ96] (where it 
is called 54'^^), [Heu98] (where it is called 54'^’^ ) in Figure 4.5. Sequents are one­
sided and of the form E|H; H.  E is a set of formulae of the form OP.  II is a set of 
formulae in negation normal form. Tiisa. set of formula.
Definition 4.2 A formula is said to be in negation normal form if it contains no 
occurrences ofD, the only negated subformulae are atoms and the formula contains 
no repeated instances of a modality (no UU and no OO).
Since the base calculus is classical logic, no loop checking is needed for this. All 
we need to consider for looping are the modalities. This is fortunate, since generally 
speaking this calculus does not have the fundamental requirement that the context 
is increasing. What it does have is an increasing context of O formulae. As noted 
in [HSZ96], this is enough to allow loop checking with a history.
In the previous section we identified two different approaches to loop detection in 
intuitionistic propositional logic. The obvious thing to do next is to see if the same 
distinction can be drawn for the modal logic.
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We reiterate the difference between the Swiss and Scottish method for intuitionistic 
logic, with reference to the (Dc) rule in the G3"*®* calculi. First the Swiss (d^):
r .  P  ^  J  g  9 - Q =» -P’ ^  i f D ^ a n d Q ^ r
And the Scottish (D/:):
The Swiss calculus checks that the goal of the conclusion is not in the history and 
if not, adds this formula to the history. The Scottish calculus checks that the goal 
of the left premiss is not in the history and if not, adds this goal to the history. For 
intuitionistic logic this makes a significant difference to where a loop is detected.
Now look at the (□) inference of S4"*®*. To illustrate the point we will look at a 
sequent with only one boxed formula in it:
An alternative rule would have been:
E|E, P ] % ,n pE|n, u p ^ n (□) i f u p ^ n
In terms of checking against the history and adding to it, these two rules are analo­
gous to those given above for intuitionistic logic. But here it is easy to see that these 
rules will have exactly the same effect. The difference between checking the pre­
miss and conclusion formula is simply a box. The addition of more boxed formulae 
to sequents makes no difference to this.
We see that the two slightly different approaches that were taken for intuitionistic 
logic merge into one for S4.
In the rest of this section we illustrate the wide applicability of history mechanisms 
by applying them to two more logics. Both are intuitionistic modal logics: intu­
itionistic S4 and Lax Logic.
4.5.1 Histories and Lax Logic
In this section we briefly present a history calculus which is a decision procedure 
for propositional Lax Logic, as presented in Chapter 3.
Lax Logic extends usual calculi for intuitionistic logic by two rules, one for the 
modality on the left and one for the modality on the right. The calculus we use here 
as the basis for the history calculus is PFLAX (see Figure 3.7). Essentially, no extra
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(ax) E, P > D\ %
v , p ^ D ' , n
(DT i^) i f F ^ r
(C)r - ^ P ; W
T , P ^ Q ;  {Q} 
r = ^ P D Q - , n
r = > P D  Q \ n  if P  € r and Q ^ 7^
r^P;(P,?f) V - ^ D - U  
r ^ Z ) : 7 f
(D£) i f P ^ W
r ,P=»oP;  {oP} 
V - ^ o R - H (oc) i f p ^ ^ r
D  is either an atom or a modal formula.
Where the history has been extended we have parenthesised (F, %) for emphasis. 
Figure 4.6: The calculus PFLAX"*®* (Scottish)
work has to be done for this calculus. It has all necessaiy features, such as increasing 
context, for use with history mechanisms. We simply take the history mechanism 
for intuitionistic logic (in either the Swiss or Scottish style, we only present one in 
the Scottish style) and apply it without change, only noting that there are formulae 
with a modality -  this presents no difficulties. The calculus PFLAX""* restricted 
to the connectives D and o is presented in Figure 4.6.
We can again prove all the usual theorems about soundness, completeness and ter­
mination.
4.5.2 Histories and IS4
Intuitionistic S4 (IS4) is a modal logic with a modality like that of S4, but built 
on intuitionistic logic rather than classical logic. The two sided single succèdent 
calculus with a single modality that we deal with here can be found in the appendix. 
More details on IS4 can be found in [BdP96] and [Sim94].
As for S4, we are faced with an immediate problem -  the context is not increasing 
(owing to the (0?^) rule). For S4 this wasn’t problematic as we only needed to check 
for looping owing to the modalities -  the propositional classical logic needs no 
history. The modal context was increasing: hence we could easily use our histories. 
Now that the modal logic is based on intuitionistic logic, we have to consider loops 
in the base calculus, as well as ones owing to the modality (which can be dealt with 
since we still have an increasing modal context).
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We do loop checking in this calculus by using two histories -  one to deal with 
the modalities (like that for S4 above) and one for intuitionistic propositional logic 
(again, as above). We formulate the calculus in order to prove formulae with no 
repeated modalities. (Sequents can be preprocessed to such a form since DDP =  
□ P . Notice that for proof enumeration such a preprocessing would not be allowed 
as it would identify non-equivalent proofs. However, for theorem proving this is a 
valid step). We display IS4"*®* (in a Scottish style) in Figures 4.7 and 4.8. Because 
of the two history mechanisms we have a lot of, but not unmanageably many, rules. 
Sequents have form OF, A P; 7(i; where none of the formulae in A are 
boxed, TLi is the modal history and 'H2 is the intuitionistic history.
The calculus uses the Scottish style of history for the intuitionistic component. We 
could easily have used the Swiss style instead. As already discussed, there is only 
one approach to the modal looping. We prove the soundness, completeness and 
termination of this calculus.
Theorem 4.9 The calculi IS4 and IS4"*®* are equivalent. That is, sequent S  is 
provable in IS4 iff it is provable in IS4"*®*.
P r o o f : Soundness is trivial. The completeness is similar to the other proofs. To 
see this, one simply has to note that the two histories work independently, with the 
modality history taking precedence. Between (0%) inferences the second history is 
much like the intuitionistic history. That the first history is much like the S4 history 
is also obvious. Building a proof tree can be done as in Theorem 4.1. ■
Theorem 4.10 Backwards proof search in the calculus IS4"*®* is terminating.
P r o o f : The proof is similar of that of Theorem 4.2. We associate with every 
sequent OF, A P; %  a quadruple of natural numbers
W  = {k — m, k — li, k — n, k — I2 )
where k is the number of elements of the set of subformulae of OF, A, P; m is 
number of elements in the set of formulae of OF; n is the number of elements in A 
when considered as a set; li is the number of elements in P i ;  I2 is the number of 
elements in 712 > The quadruples are ordered lexicographically from the left.
By inspection we see that for every inference, the premisses have lower W  than the 
conclusion. Hence backwards proof search is terminating. ■
We can easily formulate a two-sided classical S4 calculus similar to the IS4 calculus 
we have given. We simply allow multiple succedents and adjust the rules accord­
ingly. What effect will this have on the histories? Basing the calculus on classical 
logic immediately means that we do not need the second history -  loop-checking 
is not needed for classical logic. We still need to keep track of the boxed formulae 
and this is done by noting all the boxed formulae in the succèdent when performing 
(a%). That is, we end up with a two-sided calculus S4""*.
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o r , A , P = > P ; P i ; P 2 (ax) □ r , A , L = ^ P ; P i ; P 2 (^)
oT .'a
‘' « « ° ' '
i f j V € A a n d O ÿ « j
□FA A M d q !« i! wI ifMsrandQÿW;
□r, A, P D AT =4> P; -Hi; (P, % ) OF, A,Pd N,N^R, Hr-, {P} 
o r , A , P 3  7V= »P ;P i ; «2  
□r, A, P D M =» P; Pi; (P, nr, M, A, P D M =» P; ,^ ; {p}
or, A
or, A,Pz>M=^P;Pi;P2 
P- .Hr , {P,H2) o r , A ^ Q ; % i ; ( Q , % 2)
(Aci)t
□r, A =4-P A  <3; P i ;  %  
or, A , N A Q , N = ^ R ; H r  {P} or,A,Af A Q = » P ;  P i ; P 2
or, A , P A N , N ^ R ; H r ,  {P} or, A , P A N ^ R - H r , U 2 
□r, M, A, M  A Q R'j <p] {P} □r, A, M  A Q R] P i ;  P 2 
□r, M , A , P  A M  ^  R](f)] {P}
(A%) i f P , g ^ P 2
(A/:i) i f W ^ A  
(Arz) i f W ^ A
(Az:3) i f M ^ a r  
(A£4) i f M ^ a r□r, A , P  A M  => P;Pi;P2
f i f P ^ P 2 a n d i V ^  A.
Î if P  ^ P 2 and M   ^ A.
All boxed formulae in the context are in OP
M  is a modal formula, A  is a non-modal formula. P, Q, P  can be either. 
Where the history is extended we have parenthesised (P, P )  for emphasis.
Figure 4.7: IS4"*®* : axioms and rules for L, D and A
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□r,A=»P;Pi;(P,%)
a r , A = ^ P V Q | P i ; % (V„.) i f P ^ %
^  Q i Pi ;  (Q ,% ) , , ■.fnd. 'uor,A=^PVQ;%;%  ^ i f Q ^ P 2
or, A, #1 V %, =» P; Hr,  {P} or. A, Ni V JVa, % #-P;Pi; {P}
or,A ,7V i VP's = ^ P ; P i ; « 2  
or, M,A,MVN=i .R-( l>;  {R}  or, A , M  V N , N  R-,Hr, {P} 
a V , A , M y  N  ^  R; Hr ,H 2 
or, A , N y  M , N  ^  R-Hr,  {P} or, M , A , N y  M  ^  R;<t>-, {P}
(Vri)t
(V£2)t
o r , A , i V V M = 4 - P ; P i ; P 2  
or. Ml, A, Ml V Ms ^  P; 1^ ; {P} or, M2, A, Mi V M2 => P; (6; {P> □r. A, Ml V M 2 P; P i ;  P 2
(V£3)b
(^£4)#
t i f 7 V i , % ^  A 
J i f M ^  or and A 
b if M  ^ or and iV ^  A
It if Ml, M2 i  o r
All boxed formulae in the context are in or
M  is a modal formula. TV is a non-modal formula. P, Q, R can be either.
Where the history has been extended we have parenthesised (P, H) for emphasis.
Figure 4.8: The calculus IS4^“ ‘ : rules for V, O
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have investigated the use of calculi with history mechanisms 
as decision procedures for a variety of logics. We have given history calculi for 
intuitionistic logic, S4, IS4, and Lax Logic. We have proved the soundness, com­
pleteness and termination of these calculi. We have compaied our approach with 
that of Heuerding et al in [HSZ96]. We have given a theoretical discussion of this 
and have also performed a practical compaiison of the calculi for intuitionistic logic 
using Prolog implementations of the calculi. We conclude that the Scottish mecha­
nism gives a better decision procedure for intuitionistic logic, but that for this logic, 
G4 gives as good or better a decision procedure. For classical S4, the approaches 
coincide. We have also illustrated the wide applicability and flexibility of the tech­
nique by applying it to IS4 and Lax Logic.
Chapter 5 
Embedding MJ in Intuitionistic 
Linear Logic
Girard’s original paper on linear logic, [Gir87], gives an embedding of intuitionis­
tic logic into linear logic, for formulae, sequents and for proofs. The translation, 
known as the Girard embedding (the (.)° embedding of [Gir87]), was claimed to 
be correct and faithful. A detailed proof wasn’t provided in that paper -  this was 
supplied by Schellinx in [Sch91]. [Sch94], [TS96] show how the Girard embed­
ding of proofs induces a sequent calculus for implicational intuitionistic logic -  this 
Gentzen system is known as lU. We know of no satisfactory semantic justification 
for the form of lU. In this chapter we discuss lU and the Girard embedding and give 
a new embedding (defined by two functions) of a fragment of intuitionistic logic 
into (Intuitionistic) Linear Logic. This embedding induces (and was designed to 
induce) a fragment of the sequent calculus MJ. This calculus is syntactically similar 
to lU, but has in addition a semantic justification -  its proofs correspond naturally 
in a 1-1 way to the normal natural deductions of intuitionistic logic. In fact, for 
reasons discussed below, the largest fragment of intuitionistic logic that we have a 
satisfactory solution for is hereditary Harrop logic.
5.1 The Girard Embedding
Before we discuss this particular embedding, we give a definition of what we mean 
by an embedding of one logic into another.
Definition 5.1 An embedding of logic Li into logic L 2 is a function, f ,  interpreting 
formulae of Li into formulae of L 2 such that for every formula P  of Li, \~l  ^ P  iff
i-L, f{P).
We should note that this definition is given in terms simply of provability -  later in 
the chapter we ask for a little more.
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The Girai'd embedding has been quite widely discussed and can be found in, for 
example, [Gir87]. We present the embedding below:
where A  is atomicA« = A
J_s = 0
(P  D QY = !P»^Q 9
(P  A QY = Ps&Qs
(P  V QY = !P«©!Q9
tyx .PY = Væ.P«
{Bx.PY = 3æ.!P«
To embed sequents we interpret T => P  as !T^  => and (with F  the next principal 
formula) T, P  P  as !T ,^ P^ => P^. Hence if the last step in a proof of T, P  D 
g  ^  P  is (d^), then in the translation we would have:
!Tg Pg
!Tg,g^=>p^
!T5, IFff-oQff => pg
We know that the embedding is correct for provability. The following theorem can 
be found in [Sch91]:
Theorem 5.1 IL h T ^  P  CLL ^  pa.
P r o o f : The proof can be found in [Sch91]. ■
In [Gir87] a translation of proofs is also given, showing how to interpret a (natural 
deduction) proof into a linear sequent calculus proof. It is translations of proofs 
that we are really interested in in this chapter. It should also be pointed out that 
embedding logics into linear logic results in the system of Unified Logic in [Gir93]. 
This calculus, by building embeddings of classical logic and intuitionistic logic into 
linear logic, has the connectives of all three logics and allows them to interact. We 
mention connections between Unified Logic and lU later in the chapter.
5.2 Induced Calculi and lU
We look at the fragment of ILL generated by the grammar of the embedding of 
intuitionistic logic into linear logic. From the proofs in this fragment, we find a 
sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic. We say that the calculus is induced by 
the embedding. The proofs in the restricted grammar take a certain form and the 
inference steps correspond to certain rules of intuitionistic logic. We make the 
notion of induced calculus precise.
Definition 5.2 A sequent calculus G\ for logic L\ is induced by embedding e of  
logic Li into logic L 2 (with sequent calculus G2) if for every sequent S  of Li:
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r;A=4. A r,P;P => P . r , P ; - = > P
r, P; 0 ^  g  r T; 0  P D g ; -  P F;g P , F ; P D g = ^ P
T;0=^P T; 0 => g  ^
T; 0  P  A g
r;P=^PT;PAg=^P F; g => P  \ F ; P A g = > P
T; -  =» P[u/x] 
F ; - = ^ V x P
F;P[f/a;]=>P
F;VTP=>P
0 stands for either empty or a single formula. 
— stands for empty, 
t  u not free in F.
Figure 5.1; The sequent calculus lU for a fragment of intuitionistic logic
-  there is a bijection between proofs of sequent S  in G\ and proofs of sequent 
e{S) in G2
The Gentzen calculus lU induced by the Girard embedding for the D, A, V fragment 
of intuitionistic logic is displayed in Figure 5.1.
Proposition 5.1 lUh T; 0  P  ^  ILL T, 0  => P  
P r o o f : See [TS96]. ■
We have not treated disjunction, bottom or the existential quantifier in lU. This 
is because with these connectives the calculus loses the attractive feature of the 
focused formula on the left. For example, the following could occur in ILL:
!r,!Pi,g^p !T,!P2,g=4>p .
! r ,!P ie !F ^ ,g = i.p
!r,!(!P i© !P 2),g= ^P
Or even more illustrative:
(0)! P , A , 0 = > P
These correspond to intuitionistic proofs with many focused formulae.
We know of no treatment of lU and the Girard embedding that explicitly mentions 
disjunction or falsum, although it is hinted in [Sch94] that there is a correspondence 
between the induced calculus for the whole of intuitionistic logic and the intuition­
istic fragment of Girard’s Logic of Unity ([Gir93]). Schellinx says that we find
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“the neutral fragment of intuitionistic implicational logic as it appears in Girard’s 
system of Unified Logic” ([Sch94], pg. 50). The neutral intuitionistic fragment of 
Unified Logic is the fragment of the logic with connectives 3 , A, V, those of lU. 
However, beyond this fragment, the interpretations of the intuitionistic connectives 
is more complicated, and simply taking the fragment of Unified Logic for intuition­
istic logic gives an unattractive calculus (losing the single formula focusing). It does 
not give MJ.
5.3 Inducing MJ
The 3 , A, V fragment MJ is similar to the calculus lU. Its form is that of lU, but 
with the restriction that the ©s of Figure 5.1 are empty. MJ also has satisfactoiy 
rules for disjunction, falsum and the existential quantifier. We would like to find 
an embedding of intuitionistic logic into ILL which induces this calculus. This 
seems to be hard to achieve using a single mapping. Instead we use two mappings: 
a positive one which applies to formulae on the right; and a negative one which 
applies to formulae on the left. Unfortunately, we have been unable to find an 
embedding of disjunction (on the left), falsum and the existential quantifier (on the 
left) that works as we would like, and so these have been left out. We give this 
embedding:
A+ = A where A is atomic
A~ = A where A is atomic
(p  3  g)+  = !P --o !g +
( P 3 Q ) -  = !P + -o g -(p A g)+ = !P+&!g+
( P A g ) -  = p -& g -(Va;.P)+ = Va;.!P+
(Vx.P)~ = Væ.P"
We should also note the following extensions:
(pvg)+ = !P+®!g+
J-'*' = 0
(B x .P y  = Bx.lP-^
We embed sequents into the ILL calculus with split context, the system ILL^ (Fig­
ure 2.2).
The intuitionistic sequent E P  is interpreted as the sequent E“ ; — P+ in 
ILL^. The MJ sequent E R  is interpreted as the sequent E~; P~ => P'*' in 
ILL^.
The sequent E ^  P  of intuitionistic logic, is interpreted as E “ ; — P+. Every
proof of this ILL^ sequent, when viewed as an intuitionistic proof, is an MJ proof. 
Moreover, all MJ proofs can be found in this way.
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We now try to explain why we have chosen this embedding. When we translate a 
formula on the right, say P  3  Q, to a linear logic formula !P-oQ , the (-o%) rule 
can be applied sti aight away, independently of whether there is a stoup (unhanged) 
formula on the left. This does not match MJ. One fix is to translate to !P-o!Q in­
stead. In order to get to a sequent that is the translation of an intuitionistic logic 
sequent, we have to unhang the goal -  to do this we must have no unhanged formu­
lae in the context. The negative formula is still banged and is moved to the context. 
However, we then find that the translation of implication on the left loses the no­
tion of a privileged formula. Hence the two translations. One for the left, to retain 
the notion of a privileged formula, one for the right to ensure the rule can only be 
applied when we require.
The two mles where lU differs from MJ aie (3?^) and (A%). The new embedding 
induces the MJ rules. For example (using Lemma 5.1 below):
E - ; - = ^ ! P - - o ig +
Obviously if there was a stoup formula, the linear context would be non-empty and 
so we would not be able to perform the promotion (see Lemma 5.1).
The presentation of ILL that we use to prove results about the embedding is ILL^. 
This can be seen in Figure 2.2. We prove that the embedding is correct and faithful. 
Note that for presentational purposes we write MJ sequents differently from normal: 
we write S; — P  instead of E => P  and we write E; P  P  instead of E P.
Theorem 5.2 The embedding given above is correct for proofs. That is, for every 
proof in MJ o/E; 0  P  there is a proof in ILL^ of'E~] 0 “ => P+.
Proof: The proof is by an easy induction on the height of derivations. We shall 
illustrate it for just one case, the others being very similar.
The last inference is (3/%). We have:
E ; - ' ^ P  E;Q '=>P  
E ; P 3 Q = > P
So by the induction hypothesis we have proofs in ILL^ of:
E -; -  P+ E - ; Q -  => P+
And hence we have a proof:
E~; !P+-oQ - => p+ (~°c)
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■
We need two lemmas:
Lemma 5.1 I f  sequent E “ ; 0 "  =^IR^ is provable in ILL^ then 0 “ =  (f).
Proof: Induction on the height of derivations. ■
Lemma 5,2 If  sequent E“ ; 0 “ => P+ is provable in ILL^ then 0 ” has zero or one 
elements.
Proof: Induction on the height of derivations. ■
Theorem 5.3 The embedding given above is faithful for proofs. That is, for every 
proof in ILL q/'E"; 0~ there is a proof in MJ q/"E; 0  => P.
Proof: We prove the result by induction on the height of derivations.
1. Case: the last inference is an instance of (-o%); we have the following:
E - , P - ; 0 -  .
E - ; 0 -  =>!P--o!Q+
By Lemma 5.1 0 “ is empty and the next inference in therefore (P). By the 
induction hypothesis we have an MJ proof ending in:
E , P ; ~  =» Q y \
E; -  =:x P  3  Q
2. Case: the last inference is an instance of we have the following:
E"; 0j- =>!P+ E - ; Q - ,0 ^ = >  P+
E " ;!P + -o g - ,0 - ,0 -
By Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2, 0 [  and 0g are empty and the left premiss 
must result from (P). By the induction hypothesis we have an MJ proof 
ending in:
E ;-  =» P  E ;g  ^  P  , X 
T . - , P ^ Q ^ R
3. Case: the last rule is an instance of (&%); we have the following:
E -;0 -  =^!P+ E -;0 -  =>!g+
E - ; 0 -  =>!P+&!g+ (&:%)
By Lemma 5.1, 0  is empty and therefore both premisses are the result of 
(P). By the induction hypothesis we have an MJ proof ending in:
E; ~~ P  E; — g  y \
E ; - = i . P A g
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4. Case: the last inference is an instance of (&£i). We have the following:
By Lemma 5.2, 0  is empty. By the induction hypothesis we have an MJ 
proof ending as follows:
(A£i)E; P  A Q P
5. The case for (&£2) is similar to
6. Case: the last inference is an instance of (D). We have the following:
E - , P - ; 0 - , P -  =>P+E- p-;0- ^ p  + [D]
By Lemma 5.2, 0 “ is empty. By the induction hypothesis we have an MJ 
proof ending: E, P; P  =4" P  
E , P ; - = > P
7. Case: the last inference is an instance of (aæ). We have the following:
(ax)E - ; P -  =>P+
We have an MJ proof:
(ax)E ; P = > P
8. Case: the last inference is an instance of (V%). We have the following:
E - ; 0 -  =»P[i//a]+
E - ;0 -= » V æ .P +
(with y not free in E“ , 0 “ ). By Lemma 5.1, 0 “ is empty. By the induction 
hypothesis we have an MJ proof ending in:
S; -  =» P[y/x]
S; -  \/xP
(with y not free in E).
9. Case: the last inference is an instance of (V^). We have the following:
E ~ ;P [f/a :]- ,0 “ =^P+
E “ ;Va;.P~,0“ => P+ (v^)
By Lemma 5.2, 0  is empty. By the induction hypothesis we have an MJ 
proof ending in:
S ; P [ V x ] ^ P
2 ;V z .P = ^ P
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10. We can also add the cases for disjunction and the existential quantifier on the 
right.
The proofs of the two theorems above show that a fragment of MJ is indeed the cal­
culus induced by the new embedding. There is therefore an isomorphism between 
the proofs in the fragment of ILL described above (that is, ILL over the grammar 
of the embedding) and the proofs in the fragment of MJ. The D, A, V fragment of 
MJ lives inside ILL. An obvious corollary of the above theorems is that the new 
embedding is correct and faithful for provability.
The embedding given above uses two translations; one for occurrences on the left 
and one for occurrences on the right. That the embedding requires this is, perhaps, 
not surprising, given the lack of symmetry in intuitionistic logic between the left and 
the righthand sides of the consequence relation and the symmetry that is observed 
in CLL. Note that embeddings using a positive and a negative translation have been 
used by several people when embedding calculi in linear logic. See for example, 
[Tro92], [HM94], [HP94].
As noted several times above, we have only given the embedding for the D, A, V 
fragment of intuitionistic logic. This is because our interest is in the induced calculi 
and these are unattractive outside of this fragment. We leave it as an open problem 
how to embed disjunction on the left, falsum and the existential quantifier on the 
left in order to induce MJ. We are not optimistic that a solution can be found.
The problems with some of the connectives result from trying to embed intuition­
istic logic into unrestricted ILL. If we restricted the fragment we were looking at 
by, for example, only looking at sequents with one unhanged formula on the left, 
then we could embed to get the result required. However, in this case we are simply 
making the ILL calculus closer to the intuitionistic calculus.
Notice that the fragment of MJ we can induce by the new embedding is enough to 
cover hereditary Harrop formulae. That is, we can reason about this fragment of 
intuitionistic logic (important from the logic programming perspective) inside ILL. 
As noted in [Har94], hereditary Harrop logic is in some natural sense the largest well 
behaved fragment of intuitionistic logic (for example with respect to goal-directed 
proof search), and so we are not surprised that this is the largest fragment that can 
easily be embedded to give MJ. Haiiand and Pym have also embedded hereditary 
Harrop formulae into linear logic using a two function, positive and negative, em­
bedding (see [HP94]). Their embedding into ILL doesn’t induce a uniform proof 
calculus for hereditary Harrop formulae. If, however, the embedding is into a uni­
form proof calculus for linear logic, then the calculus induced will be a uniform 
proof calculus.
Embedding intuitionistic logic into linear logic has also been investigated (with 
different motivation) by Negri in [Neg95]. Also by Lincoln, Scedrov & Shankar 
([LSS93]). Danos, Joinet and Schellinx have written extensively on embedding
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logics into linear logics. As well as Schellinx’s thesis ([Sch94]), embeddings in 
intuitionistic logic into linear logic are given in [DJS95], [Sch92].
Chapter 6 
A Sequent Calculus for Intuitionistic 
Linear Logic
In this chapter, the ideas behind the MJ calculus for intuitionistic logic are applied 
to Intuitionistic Linear Logic (ILL). We develop a Gentzen-system, SILL, for ILL 
whose derivations can be translated in a 1-1 way to the normal natural deductions 
for ILL. We prove some properties of SILL and discuss possible alternative systems. 
We also discuss SILL in relation to linear logic programming languages, paying 
particular attention to Lolli.
6.1 Natural Deduction
The primary natural deduction system we consider is that of Benton, Bierman, de 
Paiva and Hyland ([BBdPH92], [BBdPH93b], [BBdPH93a], [Bie94]). This can be 
seen in Figure 1.6. We are interested in deductions in normal form and we give the 
beta-reductions and commuting conversions from [Bie94] in order to define normal 
natural deductions for ILL.
With the promotion rule, the discharged assumptions are written as [!Pi...!P„]. This 
means that all assumptions are of the form !P* and that they are all discharged at (P ).
First beta-reductions: 1
11. Linear implication:
( ^ i )  P  f
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2. I:
3. Tensor:
4. With:
Also:
5. Plus:
Also:
i h )  i
(Is) P
\ \ [-PllQl
k .R
P Q
R
(& j)
P
P&Q
Q
(&i)
(&e.) Q
i [P] [Q]P  / \ • :P®Q R RR
: [P] [0]QP®Q (@%) k AR
i®e)
(®e)
R
Q
R
6. Ofcourse, promotion with dereliction:
Q (D)
[P) !Pi .... !P„
Q
7. Ofcourse, promotion with weakening: 
[!P i....!P j
\Pi .... !P„
!Q
Q
R (P) R (IF) !Pl .... IPn R _ (IF*)
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Note that the minor premisses of the promotion rule are ordered left to right, 
and therefore that the minor premisses of {W*) are also ordered left to right. 
This also applies in the next reduction.
8. Ofcourse, promotion with contraction:
\Px .... \Pn Q
\Q iP )
R
R (C)
pPi
'.Q
È . I P )
IQ (P)
IPI IPn R
R (C*)
Notice that the last two reductions involve the use of (C*) and (IF*) — 
inference rules which are combinations of multiple uses of the ordinary (C) 
and (VF) rules. Ordering these occuiTences makes them a shorthand for n  rule 
applications, rather than new admissible rules in their own right (although the 
admissibility of such a rule could be shown).
Next, the commuting conversions. Here, the ellipsis s is for one of (0e), (Je), 
(©e), (Oe), (VF), (C), and r is for one of s or one of (-o^), (&^J, (&gj, 
{D). Note that all the commutations are presented with two premiss rales. 
The changes where the rule is in fact a single (or multiple) premiss rale are 
obvious.
9. Commutation of (0g):
[P][Q]
P ® Q R
R (®.)
(P ][Q ]
R
P ® Q S (®e)
10. Commutation of (/e):
I  P I s (4)
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11. Commutation of (Og) :
12. Commutation of (©g):
r  P  A, Q A, F  A, Q
à  A . : à ___ i r
B  i P © Q  S  S
S'
13. Commutation of (W):
14. Commutation of ((7) :
[!Q]J!<3] [!«9][!(31
15. Commutation of an 5-rule with (F):
R '.Pi [!Pi, \P„\IPi .... !Fi .... !P„ Q , ,
!Q
[!Pi....!P„]
; IPi .... IP„ QR \Q\Q ^
16. Commutation of (P) with (P):
pPi....!f4.]|
iP)
.Rx .... .Rjyi Pj
!Pi....!P,nj
\P\ .... \Pi .... \Pn Q (r>\
!Q
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Pi
(P)
'■Q {P)
We finally have some commutations associated with with the (Og) and (T%) 
rules.
17. Commutation of (Og):
Ti Tn
0 Pi Pfl (r\ \ 0 Ll • ■. • Ln (r\ \
18. Commutation of (T j) :
Tl Tn
 Y ^  (T i) ^  -ip (T j)
Definition 6.1 A deduction in NILL is said to be in (p, c)-normal form if no (3- 
reductions and no c-reductions can be applied to it.
6.1.1 Rewriting to normal form
It would be preferable if every natural deduction rewrote to a unique normal form. 
That is, that the above normalisation process was confluent. Unfortunately the 
above normalisation procedure is not confluent. Firstly, consider the beta-reductions 
for promotion with weakening and promotion with contraction (reductions 7. and
8.) As noted above, these reductions involve multiple applications of weaken­
ing/contraction. As the usual formulations of these rules have single formulae being 
weakened/contracted, we are left with a choice: either we make the multiple rules 
primitive, or we have them simply as a shorthand for multiple applications of the 
single rule.
We choose the latter option. This means that the (VF*) and (C*) rules have or­
dered premisses. Now consider promotion. We again have a choice. Are the minor 
premisses ordered or not?
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On the one hand, if they are, then there are proofs which are not equivalent, yet aie 
the same up to the ordering of the minor premisses. On the other hand, if they are 
not ordered, then we can perform the reductions in many ways.
In fact we stipulate that the minor premisses of promotion are ordered (left to right 
as written). Later in this chapter, the existence of an order will make the calculus 
easier to handle.
However, this is not the only place where we have a problem with confluence. Con­
sider the commutation of an s-rule with promotion (reduction 15.) Even with an 
order on the minor premisses of promotion, this reduction is not confluent. For 
example:
[!Ai, lAg]
Bi O B2 lAi / X Bg ® Bi \ :
 ÎÂ  lA, C
!C
[!Ai, !A.2] 
!Ai IA2 C
(% )
{P)
or
[!Ai, !A_2 
\Ai !A.2 C
Bx ® B 2 _ J C (P)
The following example illustrates the non-confluence introduced by the interaction 
of (3- and c-reductions:
[S][T]
; [lA -J-P J
IP.  IP.  I P  oI  ... .J. 2 ... ,±  ^  f  T J \
s
We can reduce in two ways: either first perform the ^-reduction then the commuting 
conversion, or first perform the commuting conversion then then /^-reduction.
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[51|T]
\ h  R
R
\Pi itR {W)
or
P
\Pi_____ R
« («,)
M in  t W
i  k* - (w)
(VF)
It is known that if we consider only ^-reductions then normalisation is confluent 
and strongly normalising. See [Bie94] and [Ben95].
What can we say for {(3, c)-reduction? The above examples show that confluence 
does not hold. We can, of course, give a strategy for normalising non-normal de­
ductions which would give a unique normal form. For example, pick any top most 
non-normal inference and recursively normalise.
What can be said is that all proofs in (P, c)-normal form are irreducible. A proof is 
irreducible if no normalisation steps can be applied to it. The (/?, c)-normal proofs 
are all the irreducible proofs.
These problems with normal proofs suggest a more involved notion of normal form 
for ILL, as discussed in section 6.3.
6.2 Term Assignment for Normal Natural Deductions
This section details a term assignment system whose terms are in 1-1 correspon­
dence with NILL deductions in (/?, c)-normal form. We also give a sequent-style 
natural deduction calculus allowing only deductions in normal form. This deduc­
tion system exactly types the proof terms. This calculus has two judgement forms 
in order to restrict the deductions to those in (/?, c)-normal form.
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The term assignment has two syntactic categories, A and N. The normal proofs 
are given by the N terms. These are displayed below (where V is the category of 
variables):
A::=
var{V) I ap{A,N)  | der{A) | withel{A) \ withe2{A)
N::=
* I ie{A,N)  I tene{A,V.V.N) | weak{A,N)  | cont{A^V.V.N) | withi{N,N)  | 
plusil{N)  I plusi2{N) | pluse{A, V.N^ V.N) | tr{{var(V) , ..., var{V)})
an{A) I XV.N | teni{N^ N)  | prom{A, V  -N) | fal{A, {var{V)^..., var{V)})
The full calculus with term assignments, which we call NNILL, is presented in 
sequent style in Figure 6.1.
6.2.1 Justification of the Restrictions
We now go through each of the /^-reductions and commuting conversions and show 
that none of them can be performed in the calculus presented in the previous section.
1. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (-o^) is an N term whereas the 
left premiss of (-Og) has to be an A term.
2. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (7%) is an N term whereas the 
left premiss of (Jg) has to be an A term.
3. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (®%) is an N term whereas the 
left premiss of (0g) has to be an A term.
4. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (&%) is an N term whereas the 
premiss of (&g) has to be an A term.
5. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (0 j)  is an N term whereas the 
leftmost premiss of (0g) has to be an A term.
6. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (P) is an N term whereas the 
premiss of (P) has to be an A term.
7. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (P) is an N term whereas the 
left premiss of (IF) has to be an A term.
8. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (P) ia an N term whereas the 
left premiss of (C) has to be an A term.
9. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (0g) is an N term whereas the 
left premiss of any of the r-rules has to be an A term.
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X : P t> var{x) : P
T\> A :  P -oQ  A : P  r, A > ap{A, N)  : Q
ih )
(ax)
r,x : P  : Q 
r  t^^Xx.N : P-oQ
r >  A :  I  A : P
(-Oe)
(j) [»* : I  r, A N) : P
r  U>Ni : P  A l»iV2 : Q , .
r ,  A M>teni{Nx,N2) :P<»Q 
V > A :  P ® Q  A^xi : P,X2 : Q D=t>iV : R  
r ,  A t:i>tene(A, X1 .X2 .N) ; R
(4 )
(® .)
r t > ^ : ! P  A t » N i Q {W) rc>4: !P A,Xx-.\P,X2 . \ P v o N  -.Qr, A t^weak{A, N) : Q
r>A:lP (D)
T,Ati>cont(A,Xi.X2 .N) : Q
r' »  ^  : -P (M)
iC)
r  > der(A) : P T t»a,n(A) : P
Ai > Ai :!Pi .... An>An:\Pn X\ :\Pi, ....,Xn'3Pn^N ■ Q 
Ai,...., A„ \»prom(A^  x .N) :IQ 
r  M>Ai : P  r  M>A2 : Q
iP)
(&j)
r  > A : Pfcgr > mf/iel(A) : P 
ri>E>iV : P (®Xl)r  \»p lus i l (N)  : P © Q 
r  > A : P © Q  A,rci:PK>iVi
r  > A : P k Q  
r  > W2it/ie2(A) : Q
r i » A  : Q r IX>p^ wg(2(A) : P © Q 
: P  A,X2 : Q 0C>iV2 : Pr, A [»p/w5e(A, æi.Ai,rE2.AT2) : P 
Pi > uar(æi) : Pi ....
Pi,..., P„ M>fr({uar(Ti),..., ?;ar(æn)}) : T  ^ 
Pi > var(a;i) ; Pi .... P„ > uor(a;n) : P„ A > A : 0 
A,Pi, ...,P„ f>t>/a/(A, {uar(n;i), ...,var(a:n)}) : Q
(0 x2)
(©e)
(Og)
Figure 6.1: NNILL; Sequent style natural deduction calculus for ILL, giving nor­
mal natural deductions, together with term assignments.
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10. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (Jg) is an N term whereas the 
left premiss of any of the r-rules has to be an A term.
11. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (Og) is an N term whereas the 
left premiss of any of the r-rules has to be an A teim.
12. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (0g) is an N term whereas the 
left premiss of any of the r-rules has to be an A term.
13. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (VF) is an N term whereas the 
left premiss of any of the r-rules has to be an A term.
14. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (C) is an N term whereas the 
left premiss of any of the r-rules has to be an A term.
15. This is not applicable since the conclusion of any s-rule is an N term whereas 
the minor premisses of (P) have to be A terms.
16. This is not applicable since the conclusion of (P) is an N term whereas the 
minor premisses of (P) have to be A terms.
17. This is not applicable since all the minor premisses of (Og) must be instances 
of (ax).
18. This is not applicable since all the premisses of (T%) must be instances of 
(ax).
Hence none of the reductions and commutations are applicable. Due to the (M) 
rule, every other combination of inferences that was possible before is still possible. 
Therefore the calculus does, as claimed, capture exactly the (p, c)-normal natural 
deductions of ILL.
Proposition 6.1 The calculus NNILL generates exactly the (p, c)-normal natural 
deductions of ILL.
6.2.2 Multiple Field Version of Natural Deduction
It should be noted that natural deduction for ILL might be presented with the as­
sumptions split into two fields. One field contains linear assumptions which have 
to be discharged exactly once. The other contains non-linear (that is, banged) as­
sumptions packets -  as in the usual natural deduction formulations for intuitionistic 
logic. The rules then have to be adapted to take this into account and weakening 
and contraction can be replaced by a single structural rule. We might find this an 
attractive approach as it ties in with other work on linear logic and logic program­
ming. See for example the calculus ILL^ in Figure 2.2 and the discussion in section 
6.7.
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6.3 Alternative Natural Deduction and Term Systems
We have given the results so far for one presentation of natural deduction for ILL. 
There are, however, several others in the literature, some of which are discussed 
here.
6.3.1 Logical Constants
We have given the system as formulated in [Bie94]. This formulation of natural 
deduction has multiple premiss rules for (T%) and (Og) along with some reduction 
rules. We could have replaced these rules with the following:
(Tx)
(Og)
• -Pi) •••) Xfi . Pfi )...) x^ j)") . T
A > A : 0
x% . P i) ..., Xfi . Pfi  ^A f  Q/l(^X\ ;...) Xjj,)") A) : R
NNILL with these rules (or NELL with similar mles) remains closed under substi­
tution.
6.3.2 Promotion
Early formulations of natural deduction used the following apparently simpler in­
troduction rule for !:
(P)IT ^ !Q
This is the rule to be found in [Avr88], [Abr93], [Wad92], originally in [Tro92], 
[Val92] and [RdRR97]. Unfortunately, natural deduction with this rule is not closed 
under substitution. This is a fairly fundamental property from a computational point 
of view, and so another formulation is desirable. The system we have already de­
scribed above is closed under substitution, as is the system Nat in [LM92] (this 
system is similar to the one we discuss, in particular, it has the same rule for pro­
motion).
The promotion rule for ELL suggested so far is still a rather strange looking rule. It 
is an introduction rule, yet looks more like an elimination rule. It has the form taken 
in order to make the possibility of substitution explicit -  the rule can be thought of 
as a promotion in the style rejected above, together with n substitutions. As noted 
above, it has to be decided whether the premisses of promotion are ordered or not. 
We are unsatisfied with our answer to this question. This motivates attempts to find 
another way of looking at the promotion rule in natural deduction.
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5  h!Q
« > . )  ^ 4 7 ^  « > . )< r > i p H P  r , A h P
r, M, M h p , .
r , M \ - R
5  consists of bracket formulae and ! formulae.
M  consists of bracket formulae and ! formulae.
Figure 6.2: MBILL: natural deduction rules involving the < >  bracket
In [Tro95] another approach to natural deduction for ILL is developed. The promo­
tion rule is given as follows: V i  V n
[!%  ... \Rn]
: V
Here is a complete list of open assumptions in deduction V  and where
deductions Vi  may be substituted for the !Pj. That is, this rule is much like the 
one above in that it makes the possibility of substitution explicit. However, this 
approach is hard to extend into the additives.
Yet another approach to natural deduction for ILL comes from Mints. In [Min95] 
a natural deduction system is presented which avoids the use of an elimination-like 
promotion rule by using an explicit notation for these substitution-like aspects of 
promotion. This also orders the occurrences in a way that doesn’t happen in the 
original system. The new rules can be seen in Figure 6.2 (the rest of the calculus is 
as before).
We have given the contraction rule as presented by Mints, although we could use the 
one given earlier. The judgement < P >ip, A h Q can be read as “Q is deducible 
from A and !P; also, !P is deducible from P”. Notice that the system as presented is 
not closed under substitution, but that by restricting the condition on promotion so 
that all assumptions are bracketed, the system becomes closed under substitution.
Whereas in the natural deduction system presented in Figure 1.6, all the substitu­
tions occur as part of the promotion rule, here they occur individually before the 
promotion. Although we use the Benton et al. system we could easily have used 
that of Mints instead. Indeed we find some of its features more attractive than the 
one we use, but are unhappy about the use of the brackets as some sort of logical 
connective -  we do not feel that we understand it properly. Also, the commuting 
conversions for the bracket elimination rule are not obvious. It appears to commute 
with everything, including itself, in either direction. Then in what order do these 
eliminations occur?
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6.3.3 Tensor Elimination
One of the most unsatisfactory features of normal natural deductions for ILL are 
chains of tensor eliminations. For example:
and
Fi >
F 2 > C ® D  Fi,A,C,D[)>P ,
r i , r 2 , A D > P
V 2 > C ® D  A , A , B , C , D » P
Fi > A 0  B T 2 , A , A , B u > E , ^ ^
(®.)
(®s)
Fi, F2, A
would seem to the same, yet are different normal natural deductions. A solution 
would be to have an n premiss tensor elimination rule. Such an approach is outlined 
by Mints in [Min97], [Min98]. The new tensor elimination rule is:
Fi ... Fn, b* 7^ © Qn P1} •••jPnjQlj •••Î Qn P  / _ \
F i , . . . ,F » ,A i» B
Extra normalisation steps would then have to be added to bring tensor eliminations 
together into such a rule. One might also add extra rules to commute tensor elimina­
tions with other elimination rules. Such a natural deduction would greatly improve 
the denotational power of the natural deduction system, bringing it much closer to 
expressing the equalities we would like. However, in this thesis we work with the 
usual system for normal natural deductions.
6.4 Sequent Calculus
We now describe a calculus in the style of MJ for ILL. We call this calculus SILL 
(for ‘Stouped’ Intuitionistic Linear Logic). We do not describe SILL as ‘permutation- 
free’ since the study of the permutability of the inference rules of ILL conducted 
in Chapter 2 shows that many derivations that would be seem to be equivalent are 
not identified by SILL. Most obvious amongst these are those to do with (0^) -  
these permutations correspond to ones that it would appear natural to identify even 
in natural deduction, but are not identified under usual formulations of normal form 
for natural deductions (see discussion in the previous section). SILL does have the 
property that its proofs can be translated in a 1-1 with normal natural deductions 
for ILL, the proofs of NNILL. The sequent calculus SILL can be seen in Figure 6.3.
This calculus has three forms of judgement. There are the usual sequents with no 
privileged formula, there are sequents with a single stoup which behave much like 
stoup sequents for MJ. Finally there are sequents with a multiple stoup, of the form
[!'®r][A]F  ^  R. This is the form of judgement reflecting the structure of the promo­
tion rule for natural deduction. The multistoup contains two lists, one of banged
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(ax) r -------»  Rr ------ »  R
(tog)
r ][A]
r , A = > B (seU) R
r , p = > Q
r  => p —oQ
T . Q ^ R
{~^n)
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r ^ P P  A Q R
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r = > p  r = ^ Q r - A p (&Xi) r - ^ pr  =>P kQ  r ^ p  r ^ p (<^ Xa)
[I$][P,$] ^r  »  p
r  - — - »  p
r=4>p
r - ^ p
(VF)
^  miQM „r ------ »  p
[!$][P&Q,9]r ------ »  p
r, IP, !P=>p  
r - ! 4 p
r ^ R
(D*) r -A p
V - ^ R (D)
(C) 
! ^ = » P
^ J Ü Ï I ^ I P (P)
Figure 6.3: Sequent calculus SILL for Intuitionistic Linear Logic
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formulae, and one of formulae of a certain form (formulae built from any banged 
formulae using !, - o ,  &, where the formula P  in P-oQ  can be of any form). In 
backwards proof search, a multiset of formulae is selected and ordered and becomes 
the second list in the multistoup of the premiss. The first formula is then principal. 
If it is banged it can be derelicted or appended to the first list. If the formula is 
an implication or a with, then the appropriate rules may be applied, the result re­
maining principal. There are no rules for formulae with other top connectives in the 
multistoup -  that is to say, they should not be there. Each formula in turn is decom­
posed until the formula at the head of the second list is a bang formula. Each of 
these compositions corresponds to a minor premiss of promotion in normal natural 
deduction. When the second list is empty and the context is empty, a promotion is 
possible (and is the only applicable rule). Notice that, since this is the only way of 
leaving a multistoup, we should only perform (seU) when the goal is banged. We 
should point out that we have yet to mention cut. Cut is eliminable in ILL and will 
be discussed in section 6.6.
6.4.1 Term Assignment
We also give a term assignment system. There are again different kinds of term 
corresponding to the different judgement forms of the calculus, that is, there are 
three kinds of proof terms. Again the terms are typed by the sequents of SILL. We 
give the proof terms below (V is the category of variables).
M:;=
(Ÿ;  M ss ’) I (V; Ms)  | W . M  | tenr(M,  M) | * | t r { { V , V}) 
plusrl{M)  I plusr2{M) \ withr{M, M)
Ms::=
[ ] I (M :: Ms)  | tenl{Vy.M)  | il{M) | fal{{V, ..., V})  | plusl{V.M, V.M) 
withll(Ms)  I withl2{Ms) | w{M) | c[V.V.M) | d{Ms)
We need to explain the notation for the following Mss* terms. The Mss* have been 
written with a superscript. These superscripts are natural numbers and form part of 
the detail of the proof term. They are included to ensure that the terms are built in a 
specific order, as the sequents are.
Mss*::=
(fu^(Mss*^^))* I (M Mss*)* | {withll{Mss‘^ )y | {withl2{Mss'^)y 
(diMss‘)Y I (p(V.M ))"+'
SILL together with its term system can be seen in Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6.
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r  Mss  ^ : R (seh) M s : Rr ,  X: A => (x ; Mss^) : R  ' P, x : Q =» (x; Ms)  : R
r ,  X : jP => M : Q
( s e l )
T = ^ M  : P
r  =» Xx.M : P -^ Q
r  => Ml : P  A => M 2 : Q , 
r,A=>fenr(Mi,M2) :P0Q
(&)
(©%i)
{xi} : r  => fr({ x j)  : T 
r = > M : Q
(T7^)
r  => plusrl{M) : P  P => plusr2{M) : P  ® Q
F => Ml : P  F => M2 : Q
(©%)
F => withr{Mi, M 2 ) : P k Q (kn)
Figure 6.4: SILL with proof-term annotations: M terms.
M : P  A M s - R  
r ,  A ^  (M :: Ms) : R
F, xi : P,X2 : Q M  : R
(-Or)
r  ^  t e n l { x i . X 2 . M )  : R (® r)
M  : P (Ic)r  - A  zf(M) : F  {ij} : r  fal{{Xi}) : P
F) xi : P  => Ml : P  F, X2 : Q M2 : R
(Or)
r  ^  plusl{xi.Mi,X2.M2) : R (® r )
M s  : R
F ^ r n f m ( M s )  : R  
F = > M : P
F Q Ms  : P
\P. w{M) : P
(VF)
r  ^  withl2(Ms) : R  
F,xi  :!P, X2 :!P M  : P
!P
M s : P
r  d(Ms) : K
c(æi.æ2'M) : R  
(D )
(C )
Figure 6.5: SILL with proof-term annotation: Ms terms.
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(tog)
r ^  M : P A  »  Mss* : R
r,A ----- »  (M : :M ss* )* :P
[!$][P,^]r  »  Mss* : R
r  -------»  {withll{Mss^)Y : R
r Mss* : R
r  ‘' f l l f î ÿ '  {withl2{Mss')Y : R
[!$][P,9] r  »  Mss* : R
r  — ^  (d(Mss*))* : P
{x%} M  : P
(D *)
[!»][4> (p ( ï  .M))"+i ;!P
t  n is the number of elements in { x j .
(F )t
Figure 6.6: SILL with proof-term annotation: Mss* Terms.
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6.5 The Correspondence Between Natural Deduction 
and Sequent Calculus for ILL
We have given a calculus for normal natural deductions, along with a term assign­
ment system for this calculus. We have also given a sequent calculus for ILL, which 
restricts the sequent derivations which can be found in backward proof search in the 
calculus. Again we have given a term assignment system for this calculus. We 
claim that the sequent derivations in SILL naturally correspond to the normal natu­
ral deductions (the deductions of NNILL) in a 1-1 way. In order to prove this we 
give mappings from proof terms to proof terms in both directions, hence we have 
an isomorphism between proof terms.
Sequent Calculus Natural Deduction:
^ : M ^ N
0{~É; Mss^) =  9'{var(x]j Mss^) 
9{{x\ Ms)) = 9'{var{x)^ Ms)  
9{Xx.M) = Xx.9{M) 
9(tenr(Mi, M 2 )) = teni{9{Mi),9{M2))
9{^) = *
0 ( f r ( { x i } ) )  =  t r { { v a r { x i ) } )
9{withr{Mi, M 2 )) = withi{9(Mi),9{M2)) 
9{plusrl{M)) — plusil{9{M)) 
9{plusr2{M)) = plusi2{9[M))
9' : A x  Ms — > N
9’{A, [ ]) =  an(A)
^'(A, (M :: Ma)) =  l9'(ap(A, (9(M)), Ma)
9' (A,tenl{xi.X2.M)) = tene{A,Xi.X2.9{M))
^%A,2((M)) =2e(A,^(M))
9'{A, fal{{xi,  ...,x»})) =  fal{A, {var{xi), ...,var{xn)}) 
9'{A,plusl{xi.Mi,X2.M2)) = pluse{A, xi.9{Mi)^ X2.9{M2)) 
9'{A^ withll{Ms))  =  9'(withel(A), Ms)
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9'{A, withl2{Ms)) =  9'[withe2{A)^ Ms)
^%A,w(M)) =  w6aA;(A,^(M))
9 '{A,c{x i .X2.M)) =  cont(A, x i .X2.9{M))
(9%A, d(Ma)) =  ^'(der(A), Ma)
9” :~É^x Mss* — y N
9”{ [ A l , A i ,  v a r{ x i+ i ) , v a r { x n ) ] ,  (fop(Maa*+^))*)
=  9”{ [ A l , A i ,  v a r{ x i+ i ) , va r { x n ) ] ,  Maa*+^)
9”{[Ai, ..., Ai, v a r { x i+ i ) , v a r { x n ) ] ,  (M  Maa*)*)
=  9 " { [ A i , a p { A i ,  ^(M )), f  a r ( x i + i ) , var{xn)], Maa*)
9"{[Al, ..., Ai, v a r { x i p i ) , v a r { x n ) ] ,  (WWl(Maa*))*)
=  9”{ [ A l , w ithe l{A i ) ,var{x i^ i ) ,var{xn%  Maa*)
9”{ [ A l , A i ,  var{xi+i), ...,var{xn)], {withl2{Mss^)Y)
=  ^ " ( [ A i , withe2{Ai), var{x ip i) ,var{xn)] ,  Maa*)
^"([A i,, Ai, var{xi+i), ..., var{xn)], (d(Maa*))*)
=  0"([Ai, ...der{Ai), var{xi+i),..., var{xn)], Maa*)
9"{ [ A l , A J, (p('#.M))"+^) =  p ro m (^ , ~t.9{M))
Natural Deduction — y Sequent Calculus
-0:N — y M
'ijj{Xx.N) =  Xx.'tJj{N)
xp{teni{Ni, N 2 )) =  tenr{'ip{Ni),'if){N2 ))
'^(t) =  *
V;(%e(A, W)) =  "^%A,2Z(V;(N)))
'ip{tene{A, X1 .X2 .N)) =  'ip' {A,tenl{xi.X2 .'i/j{N)))
'ip{cont{A, X1 .X2 .N)) =  '0'(A, c(xi.X2.'0(iV)))
ip{weak{A, N)  =  ip'{A,w{i}){N)))
ip{prom{À, '^ .N))  = 'ip”{ [ A i , A„], (p(^.'0(A/')))**+^)
^(an(A)) =xp'{A,[])
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ipifaliA,  {^ar(x^)})) =  fal{{xi}))
'ip{withi{Ni, N 2 )) = withr{ip{Ni),'ip{N2 ))
'ijj{plusil{N)) — plusrl{ilj{N))
'ip{plusi2{N)) = plusl2{’ip{N))
'tjj{pluse{A,xi.Ni,X2>N2)) — ip'{A,plusl{xi.il;{Ni),X2.ip{N2)))
' i p { t r ( { v a r { x i ) ,?;ar(xn)})) =  t r ( { x i , x»})
■0':A X Ms — y M
ip'{var{x), Ms)  =  (x\Ms)
'ip'(ap{A, N ) , Ms)  = 'ip\A, (^(iV) :: Ms))
'ip'{withel{A),Ms) = ip'{A,withll{Ms))
'ip'{withe2{A), Ms) = ip'{A,withl2{Ms)) 
ip'{der{A),Ms) = ip'{A,d{Ms))
Ip” Mss* — y M
'ip''{[var{xi), . .. ,var{xn)],Mss^) = (x \M ss^)
'ip''{[Ai,...,Ai, m r ( x i + i ) , var{xn)], Mss*+^)
=  ' i p ' W A i , A i ,  v a r ( x i + i ) , var(x„)], (to^(Mss*+^))*) 
ap{Ai, N) ,  va r{x i+ i ) ,va r (xn )]y  Maa*)
=  Ai, v a r { x i ^ i ) , v a r { x n ) ] ,  ('^(-/V) :: Maa*)*)
'ip”{[Ai,..., withel{Ai),var{xiJi.i),var[xn)]-,  Maa*)
=  'ip”{[Ai,..., Ai, m r ( x i+ i ) ,v a r ( x n ) ] ,  (mit/i/l(Maa*))*) 
ip”i\Ai,... ,  withe2 (A*), var (x*+i),..., war (x„)], Maa*)
=  '0 " ( [ A i , Ai, v a r ( x i + i ) , var(xn)], (w%W2(Maa*))*)
? /;" ( [A i,d e r(A i) , u a r ( x f + i ) , m r(x„)], Maa*)
=  '0 " ( [ A i , Ai, v a r { x i+ i ) , va r { x n ) ] ,  (d(Maa*))*)
In the following two lemmas we prove, using the translations above, that the two 
systems are isomorphic.
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Lemma 6.1
i) For all terms M, il)(6{M)) =  M
ii) Also, for all terms M s  and A,
iii) Also, for all terms Maa* and A i , A i , v a r { x i + i ) ,  ...,var{xn),
' ip{9” { [ A i , A i ,  v a r { x i j ^ - i ) , v a r { x n ) ] ,  M aa*)) =
Ai, var{xi+i) ,var{xn)] ,  M aa*)
P r o o f : By simultaneous structural induction on M, Ma, M s s \
1. The M term has form (x; Ms)
ijj{6{{x;Ms))) = 'ip{6'{var{x),Ms)) def 0
= Ip'{var{x), Ms)  ind ii)
= (x; Ma) def-0'
2. The M term has form ("#; M aa^)
'ip{9{'É; Mss^)) = i p {9 '^ ( ^^^ ,  Mss^)) dof9
= 'ip”{var{x], Mss^) ind iii)
= {l t;Mss^)  def^"
3. The M term has form Xx.M
ip{9{Xx.M)) = ip{Xx.9{M)) def ^
= Xx.ip{9{M)) def Ip
= Xx.M  ind i)
4. The M term has form tenr{Mi, Mg)
ip{9{tenr{Mi,M2))) = ip{te'ni{9{Mi),9{M2))) def ^
= tenr{ip{9{Mi)), ^{9{M2))) def ip
= few  (M l, M g) ind i)
5. The M term has form *
^(^(*)) = '0(*) def ^
= * def Ip
6. The M term has form f r ( {x i , x^^})
ip{9{tr{{xi , . . . ,Xn}))) = ip{tr{{var{xi) ,  . . . ,var{xn)}))  def 9
= fr({xi, ...,x„}) def
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7. The M term has form plusrl  (M)
’4>{d{plusrl[M))) = ij){plusil{9[M))) def 0
= plusrl{ij){9[M))) def Ip
-  plusrl{M)  ind i)
8. The M term has form plusr2{M)
ip{9{plusr2{M))) = ip{plusi2{9{M))) def 9
= plusr2(ip{9{M))) def ip
= plusr2{M) ind i)
9. The M term has form withr{Mi,  Mg)
ip{9{withr{Mi, M 2 ))) = ip{withi{9{Mi),9{M2))) def 0
= wit hr (ip {9 {Ml)), Ip {9 {M2 ))) def ip
= withr{Mi, M 2 ) ind i)
10. The Ms term has form [ ]
ip{9'{A,[])) = ip{an{A)) def 9'
= ip'{A,[]) def Ip
11. The Ms term has form (M Ms)
ip{9'{A,{M Ms))) = ip{9'{ap{A,9{M)), Ms)) def 9'
= ip'{ap{A,9{M)),Ms) ind ii)
= Ip {A,{ip{9{M)) :: Ms)) def ip'
= Ip {A, (M :: Ms))  ind i)
12. The Ms term has form tenl{xi .xg.M)
ip{9'{A,tenl{xi.X2 -M))) = ip{tene{A,xi.X2.9{M))) def 9'
= ip'{A,tenl{xi.X2^ip{9{]Mi)))) def ip
= ip'{A,tenl{xi.X2 -M)) ind i)
13. The Ms term has form il{M)
^(^%A,%((M))) = ^(2e(A,0(M))) def^'
= ^%A,2((^(^(M)))) def^
= ip'{A,il{M)) indi)
14. The Ms term has form /a/({xi})
ip{9'{A,fal{{xi}))) = ip{fal{A,{var{xi)})) def 9'
= ip'{A, fal{{xi})) def Ip
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15. The Ms term has formp^us/(xi.Mi, xg.Mg)
il){9'[A,plusl{xi.Mi, xg.Mg)))
= ip{pluse{A,xi.6{Mi),X2-9{M2))) def O'
= ip'{A,plusl{xi.'ip{9{Mi))),X2.ip(o{M2))) def ijj
-  ip'{A,plusl{xi.Mi,X2 .M2 )) indi)
16. The Ms term has form withll{Ms)
ijj{9'{A,withll[Ms))) = il}{9'{withel{A),Ms)) def 9'
= Ip' {withel (A ) , Ms)  ind ii)
= ip'{A,withll{Ms)) def Ip'
17. The Ms term has form iuff/iZ2(Ms)
ip{9'{A,withl2{Ms))) = ip{9'{withe2(A), Ms)) def 9'
= Ip'(withe2(A), Ms)  ind ii)
= ip'{A,withl2{Ms)) def Ip'
18. The Ms term has form w{M)
'ip{9'{A,w{M))) -  ip{weak{A,9{M))) def O'
= ip'{A,w{ip{9{M)))) def ^
= ip'{A,w{M)) indi)
19. The Ms term has form c(xi .Xg.M)
ip{9'{A,c(xi.X2.M))) = 'ip(cont{A,xi.X2.9{M))) def 9'
= 'ip'{A,c{xi.X2.ip(9{M)))) def Ip
-  iP'Ia,c{xi.X2 .M)) indi)
20. The Ms term has form d{Ms)
ip{9'(A, d{Ms))) -  ip{9'{der{A),Ms)) defB
= ip'{der{A),Ms) ind ii)
= Ip'{A, d{Ms)) def ip'
21. The Mss* term has form (fo^(Maa*+^))*
ip{9''{[Ai,..., Ai, var{xi+i),..., var{xn)], (fop(Mss*+^))*))
= ip{9''{[Ai, ...,Ai,var{xi+i), ...,var{xn)],Mss'''^^)) def 9''
= ip''{[Ai, ...,Ai,var{xi-^i), ...,var{xn)],Mss''"^^) ind iii)
= ip''{[Ai,...,Ai,var{xi+i),...,var{xn)],{tog{Mss^-^^))^) def ip''
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22. The Mss* term has form (M  :: Maa*)*
Ai, var(xi+i),..., var{xn)], (M :: Maa*)*))
= 'ip{9”{[Ai,..., ap{Ai, 9{M)), var{xi+i),..., var(xn)], Maa*)) def 9”
= ip”{[Ai,...,ap{Ai,9{M)),var{xi+i),...,var{xn)],Mss'') ind iii)
= ..., Ai, var{xi+i) , ..., var{xn)], {'ip{9{M)) :: Maa*)*) def ip”
= ip”( [ A i , A i ,  var{xi^i) , ..., var{xn)], (M :: Maa*)*) ind i)
23. The Mss* term has form {withll{Mss^)Y
ip{9”{[Ai,..., Ai, t ia r ( x i+ i ) , ..., t;a r (x „ )], (mf/i/l(Maa*))*))
= ip{9”{[Ai,...,withel{Ai),var{xi+i),...,var{xn)],Mss^)) def 9”
= ip”{[Ai, ... ,withel{Ai),var{xi^i), ...,var{xn)],Mss^) ind iii)
= ip”{[Ai, ... ,Ai,var {xi+i), ...,var {xn)],{withll{Mss^)y) def ip”
24. The Mss* term has form (wPM2(Maa*))*
ip{9”{[Ai, ..., Ai, var{xi+i),..., aar(x„)], {withl2{Mss^)Y))
= '0(B'([Ai,...,wif/ie2(Ai),'yar(xi+i),...,i?ar(x„)],Maa*)) def
= ip”{[Ai,...,withe2{Ai),var{xi.i.i),...,var{xn)]jMss'') ind iii)
= ip”{[Ai, ...,Ai,var{xi+i), ...,var{xn)],(withl2{Mss'')Y) def^"
25. The Mss* term has form (d(Maa*))*
ip{9”{[Ai, ..., Ai, uar(xi+ i),..., uar(x„)], (d(Maa*))*))
= ^ ([Ai,... ; der (A^), t h z r ),..., (x»)], Maa*)) def
= '0"([Ai,..., der(Ai),z;ar(xi+i), ...,?;ar(xn)], Maa*) ind iii)
= ^"([A i,..., Aj,?;ar(xi+i), ...,i'ar(x„)], (der'(Maa*))*) def-0"
26. The Mss* term has form (p("#.M))**+^
^(g"([Ai,...,A^],(p(-#.M ))"+i))
= ip{prom{[Ai,...,Ari\,~i'.9{My)) def 9”
= .., An], (p (^ , ip{9{M))))^+^) def ip
= ip”{[Ai,..,An],{pi't,M))^+^) indi)
Lemma 6.2
i) For all terms N , 9{ip{N)) =  N.
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!:) Also, for all terms M s and A,
iii) Also for all terms Mss^ and A i , Ai ,  v a r { x i+ i ) , v a r { x n ) ,
${ijj”{ [ A i , Ai, v a r { x i+ i ) , v a r { x n ) ] ,  Mss'^)) =
0”{[Ai,..., Ai, var{x i+i) ,var{xn)] ,  Msg*)
Proof: By simultaneous structural induction on N  and A.
1. The N term has form *
= #(*) def^/j
= * def 9
2. The N term has form ie[A, N)
9{ilj{ie{A, N))) = 9('il^'(A,il('ip{N)))) def= indii)
= defg'
= ie{A, N)  ind i)
3. The N term has form tene{A, xi .X2 .N)
9{'ijj{tene{A,Xi.X2>N)))  = 9{'i/j'{A,tenl{xi.X2.'iJ^{N))))  def-0
= 9'{A,tenl{xi.X2.il>{N))) indii)
=  tene{A,x i .X2.9{ ip{N)))  de f  9'
= tene{A,xi.X2 ‘N)  ind i)
4. The N term has form weak{A, N)
9{'ip{weak{A, N)))  = 9{'il)'{A,w{'il){N)))) d e f ^
= 9'{A,w{i^{N))) indii)
= weak{A,9{ip{N))) def
= weak{A,N)  ind i)
5. The N term has form cont{A, x\,X2 .N)
9{ 'tp{cont{A,xi .X2.N)))  =  9{'il;'{A,c{xi.X2.'4>{N)))) de f  ip
= 9'{A,c(xi.X2.ip(N))) indii)
=  cont{A,xi .X2.9( ip{N)))  de f  9/
= con t{A ,X i .X 2 .N )  ind i)
6. The N term has form withi{Ni, N 2 )
9{ip{withi{Ni ,  N 2 )))  =  9{withr{ip{Ni) , ip(N2)))  de f  ip
= wm2(0(^(Ari)),g(^(A2))) def^
= withi{Ni ,N 2 ) ind i)
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7. The N term has formp lusil{N)
9{ip{plusil{N))) = 9{plusrl{ip{N))) def ip
= plusil{9{ip{N))) def 9
= plusil{N)  ind i)
8. The N term has form^/ws^2(iV)
9{ip{plusi2(N))) = 9{plusr2(ip{N))) def ^
= plusi2{9{ip{N))) def 9
= plusi2{N) ind i)
9. The N term has form pluse{A, xi.Ni,  X2 .N2 )
9{ip{pluse{A, xi .Ni,  X2 .N2 )))
= 9{ip'{A,plusl{xi.ip{Ni),X2.ip{N2)))) def Ip
= 9'{A,plusl{xi.ip{Ni),X2.'ip{N2))) indii)
= pluse{A,xi.9{ip{Ni))),X2.9{ip{N2))) def 9'
-  pluse{A,Xi.Ni,X2 .N2 ) ind i)
10. The N term has form an(A)
9{ip{an{A))) = 9(ip'{A,[])) def ip
= 0'(A, []) indii)
= an{A) def 9'
11. The N term has form Xx.N
9{ip{Xx.N)) = 9{Xx.ip{N)) def Ip
= Xx.9{ip{N)) def 9
= Xx.N ind i)
12. The N term has form teni{Ni, N 2 )
9{ip{teni(Ni, N 2 ))) = 9{tenr{ip{Ni),ip{N2))) def'^
= fem (g(^(N i)),^(^(A 2))) def (9
= teni{Ni ,N 2 ) ind i)
13. The N term has fo rm prom (^, ~É.N)
9{ip{prom(i, i t .N )) )
= - ,  An], (pC^.'0(A)))**+i)) def Ip
-  9"{[Ai, ..., An]y (p('#.'0(iV)))"+i) ind iii)
= promÇÂ,1^.9{ip{N))) def 9"
= prom(Â,  ~^.N) ind i)
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14. The N term has form tr{{var{xi)})
9{ip{tr{var{{xi})))) = def ip
= fr({uar(rci)}) def 9
15. The N term has form fal{A,  {?;ar(xi)})
9{ip{fal{A,{var{xi)}))) = 9{ip'{A, fal{{xi}))) def ip
= 9'{A,fal{{xi})) indii)
= fal{A,{var{xi)}) def 9'
16. The A  term has form var{x)
9{ip'(var{x), Ms)) = 9{{x]Ms)) def ip'
= 9'{var{x), Ms)  def ^
17. The A  term has form ap{A, N)
9{ip'{ap{A,N),Ms)) = 9{ip'(A,{ip{N) :: Ms))) def ip'
= 9'{A,{iP{N)::Ms)) indii)
= 9'{ap{A,9{ip{N))),Ms) def 9'
= 9'{ap{A,N),Ms)  ind i)
18. The A  term has form der(A)
9{ip'{der{A), Ms)) -  9{ip'(A,d{Ms))) def ip'
= 9'{A,d{Ms)) indii)
= 9'{der{A), Ms) def 9'
19. The A  term has form mf/iel(A)
9{ip'{withel{A), Ms)) = 9{ip'(A,withll{Ms))) def ip'
= 9'(A,withll{Ms))  indii)
= 9'{withel{A), Ms) def 9'
20. The A  term has form withe2{A)
9{ip'{withe2{A),Ms)) = 9{ip'{A,withl2{Ms))) def ip'
= 9'{A, withl2{Ms)) indii)
= 9'{withe2{A), Ms) def 9'
21. The ~É. term has form var{x]
9{ip"{var{x], Mss^)) = 9{'É’; M ss )^ def-0"
= 9"{var{x], Mss^) def 9"
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22. The 'É term has form [A i,..., Ai, vor(a;i+i),..., var{xn)]
9(ip"{[Ai, ..., Ai, var{xi.^i) , ..., var{xn)],
= 9{ip"{[Ai, ..., Ai, var{xi+i) , ..., ?;ar(a;„)], (fop(Mss*+^))*)) def ip"
= 9"{[Ai, ..., Ai, ?;ar(a:i+i),..., î;ar(x„)], (fo^(Mss*+^))*) ind iii)
= 0"([Ai,..., Ai,î;ar(a:i+i), ...,z;ar(a;n)],Mss*+^) def
23. The ^  term has form [A i,..., ap{Ai, N),  var{xi+i) , ..., var{xn)]
9{ip"{[Ai, ..., ap{Ai, N),  var{xi+i) , ..., var{xn)], Mss*))
= 9{ip"{[Ai, ..., Ai, var{xi+t) , ..., i;ar(æ^)], (%A(A) :: Mss*)*)) def ip"
= 0"([Ai,..., Ai, var(a;i+ i),t)ar(a;n)], (^(A ) :: Mss*)*) ind iii)
= 9"([Ai, ..., ap(Ai, 0(^(iV))), war(a;i+i),..., i)ar(rr„)]. Mss*) def 9"
-  9"([Ai,...,ap{Ai,N),var[xi+i),...,var{xn)],Mss') ind i)
24. The A term has form [A i,..., withel{Ai), var{xi.^i) , ..., var{xn)]
9{ip"{[Ai, ..., withel{Ai), var{xi+i) , ..., var{xn)], Mss'^))
= (9('0"([Ai,..., Ai, var(rci+i),..., ?;ar(æ„)], (w%fWl(Mss*))*)) def ip"
= 0"([Ai,..., Ai, var{xi+i) , ..., ifar(rc„)], (mt/i/l(Mss*))*) ind iii)
= 9"{[Ai, .,.,withel{Ai),var{xi+i), ...,var{xn)], Mss'') def 9"
25. The ^  term has form [A i,..., w^f/te2(Ai), t)Gr(æi+i),..., ?;ar(a:„)]
9{ip"{[Ai, ..., u;zi/ie2(Ai), ?;ar(a;i-|.i),..., mr(a;„)]. Mss*))
= 0(^"([A i,..., Ai, var{xi^i) , ..., i;ar(æ„)], {withl2{Mss^)Y)) def ip"
= 0"([Ai,..., Ai, var{xi.^i) , ..., ?;ar(æ„)], {withl2{Mss^)Y) ind iii)
= 9"{[Ai, ...,withe2{Ai),var{xi+i), ...,var{xn)],Mss'^) def 9"
26. The ~É. term has form [A i,..., der(Ai), t;ar(a;i+i),..., var{xn)]
9{ip"{[Ai, ..., der(Ai), i!ar(xi+i), ...,var(xn)], Mss*))
= 9{ip"{[Ai,...,Ai,var{xi+i),...,var{xn)],{d{Mss^)Y)) def ip"
= ^'%[Ai,..., Ai, f ar(æi+i);..., 'uar(æ^)], (d(Mss*))*) ind iii)
= 0"([Ai,...,der(Ai),î;ar(æi+i), ...,î;ar(æ„)],Mss*) def^"
Theorem 6.1 The deductions of  NNILL are in 1-1 correspondence with the se­
quent derivations given by the sequent calculus SILL.
Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2. ■
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Theorem 6.2 (Soundness) The following rules are admissible: 
r ^ M  : R  y  At> A :  P  F ^  M s  : R
r ! » e { M ) : R '  V,Ax>9'{A,Ms) : R
_______ T>i ... T>n r    Mss* : R ________
r ,  A i , ..., An W>0"([Ai,..., Ai, var{xi+i), ...var{xn)], Mss*) : R
where the Vi,...,T>n are (in order):
Ai t> A\ :!jPi
Ai_i > Ai_i :!Pi_i
Ai > Ai : Pi
Ai+i t> var(xi+i) : Pi+i
An > var{xn) : Pn 
Proof: By simultaneous structural induction on M, Ms and Mss*.
1. The M term has form ("#; Mss^ )
We have a derivation ending in:
r  ‘1 ^ $ ’ Mss^ : R
and we know that for all i
Pi t> varixi) : Pi
is deducible. 
So we have:
[ ] [ P l c ” )Pn]P i>  v a r { x i ) P i  ... Pn\> var{xn) : Pn P -------»  Mss^ : R  ,, ■
r ,  P i , ..., Pn t:^6''{var{x), Mss^) : R  
and we know that
6''{var{x], Mss^) =  9(~^ -, Mss^)
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2. The M term has form (rr; Ms)
We have a derivation ending in;
r  ^  M s : R
r ,  P  (rc; Ms) : R  
and we know that
P  t> var{x) : P
is deducible.
So we have
P  > var{x) : P  P Ms : R  ... 
T,PtX>e'(var(x),Ms):R
and we know that
9'{var{x), Ms) ~  {x',Ms)
3. The M term has form Xx.M
We have a derivation ending in:
T,x  : P  M  : Q
P Xx.M : P-oQ
whence T ,x  : P  ^  M  : Q
{~°n)
T ,x  : P  U>9{M) Q . .\-^x)P : P ^ Q
and we know that
Xx.9[M) =  9{Xx.M)
4. The M term has form tenr(Mi , M2)
We have a derivation ending in:
Pi Ml : P  P2 M2 : Q
Pi, P2 tenr{Mi, M 2 ) : P  <S> Q
whence Pi =» Ml : P  P2 => M2 : Q
Pi [)D>^(Mi) : P  '  Pg M>^M2 : Q 
Ti, T2 a>teni(e(Mi),  ^(Mg)) : F  ® Q
and we know that
teni{9{Mi),9{M2)) — 9{tenr{Mi, M 2 ))
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5. The M term has form *
We have the following derivation:
* : /
we also have the following deduction:
77 (&)
I>f> * ; /
giving the result.
6. The M term has form
We have the following derivation:
Xi  : Pi, . . .,Xn : Pn : T
we also have the following deduction:
Pi > var(^ i) : Pi ... P„ > var(xn) : Pn Pi,..., Pn W>fr({?;ar(a;i)})
and we know that
7. The M term has formplusrl(M)
(Tx)
We have a derivation ending in:
r=>M:P
r  => plusrl{M)  : P  0  Q
whence r = 4 > M : P  .Xr \x>e(M) : p , ,(Gzi)r  O{>p/ws2l(0(M)) : P  0  Q 
and we know that
plusil{9{M)) = 9{plusrl{M)) 
The M term has form plusr2{M)
We have a derivation ending in:
r  M  : Qr => plusr2{M) : P 0 Q (®%)
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whence
T M m - Q
r  ï::î>plusi2{9{M)) : P  
and we know that
plusi2{9{M)) = 9{plusr2{M))
9. The M term has form m f/ir(M l, M2)
We have a derivation ending in:
r  => Ml : P  r  M2 : Q 
r  => withr(Mi, M2) : P&Q
whence
(&:%)
r Ml : P r => M2 : Q
T[)[>0(M i):P  '  r i» ^ (M 2 ) :Q  
T[)^w%f/i%(^(Mi),^(M2)) : P&Q
and we know that
withi{9{Mi), ^(Mg)) =  9{withr{Mi, Mg))
10. The Ms term has form [ ]
We have a derivation
and we can deduce
and we know that
— A  : P —  
A t»an(A ) : P
an{A) = 9’{A, [ ])
11. The Ms term has form (M  :; Ms)
We have a derivation ending in:
Ti => M  : P  Tg Ms  : R  ^
whence
Ti => M  : P i)A >  A :  P~oQ T i U>9{M) : P
ri,A l> ap (.4 ,6 i(M )) : Q M s ; F
T i,T2, A  Ct>e'(ap(.4,0(M)), Ms) : F Ü)
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and w e know that
6)(M)), Ms) = ^(A, (M :: Ms))
12. The Ms term has form tenl{xi .Xg.M)
We have a derivation ending in:
V,xi : P,X2 Q ^  M  \ R
r  — > timl{xi.X2.M) : R
whence
V,xi \ P,X2 Q M  : R  
A t> A : P  0  <5 T,Xi \ P,X2 Q [»^(M ) : P  
r ,  A [»fene(A, xi.X2.0(M)) : R
and we know that
tene{A,xi.X2>B{M)) — 6' {A,timl{xi.X2.M))
13. The Ms term has form il{M)
We have a derivation ending in:
r=>M:P
r -L il(M) : R
whence
{Ic)
r =» M : P  A > A : 7 r [)e>0(M) : A
r,A D {>26(A ,^(M )):P
and we know that
%e(A,^(M)) =0'(A%Z(M))
14. The Ms term has form /a/({xi})
We have the following derivation:
Xi : Pi, ...,Xn : Pn fal{{xi}) : R
We also have the following deduction:
Pi > var{xi) : Pi ... Pn > var{xn) '> Pn A > A : 0 
A, P i,...,Pn  I>E>/a/(A, {var{xi), ...,var{xn)}) : R
and we know that
fal{A,  {^ar(zi)}) =  0'(A, fal{{xi}))
(0.)
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15. The Ms term has fo r m p /u s /(x i.M i, X2 .M 2 )
We have a derivation ending in
r,Xi : P Ml : R V,X2 ■ Q Mg : R 
r ^  p luslix1 .MuX 2 .M2 ) : R
whence
(®£)
r,Xi : P Ml : R T, Xg : Q => Mg : RA> A : P r , x i  : P IX>^ (Mi) : R F, Xg : Q t>t>^ {M2) :R 
T,Au>pluse{A,xi.e{Mi),X2.e{M2)) : R
and we know that
pluse{A, xi.O{Mi), X2>9{M2)) = 6'{A,plusl{xi.Mi, X2 .M2 ))
16. The Ms term has form withll{Ms)
We have a derivation ending in:
r - ^ M s - . R
r  ^  withll{Ms)  : R
whence  ^ _A > A : P&Q . .
T. PA  O withel{A) : P  " F M s : P  . 
F, A »0% W (/iel(A ), Ms) : P
and we know that
9'{withel{A),Ms) — 9’ {A,withll{M s))
17. The Ms term has form withl2{Ms)
We have a derivation ending in:
r ^ M s : R
r  ^  withl2{Ms) : R
whence  ^ ^A > A : P&Q . .(^£2) T-l QA  t> withe2{A) : Q " F Ms : P  . 
F, A \^9'{withe2{A), Ms)  : P
and we know that
9'{withe2{A), Ms)  =  9'{A, withl2{Ms))
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18. The Ms term has form w (M)
We have a derivation ending in:
—P => M : P — 
r  w{M) : R
whence P ^ M : P  .X 
A > A :!P P : P  ^
P,AM>weok(A,^(M)) : P
and we know that
u;eoA:(A,^ (M)) = (^A,w(M))
19. The Ms term has form c{xi.X2 -M)
We have a derivation ending in
P, x\  :!P, X2 :\P M  \ Rip V^/P ^-4- c{x i .X2.M) : P
whence P ,x i :!P, xg :!P M : P  .A> A:!P P,xi :!P,Xg :!P|»0(M):P
r ,  A [>C>cont{A, xi .X2.0{M)) : P
and we know that
cont{A,xi.X2.9{M)) =  ^%A, c(xi.xg.M))
20. The Ms term has form d{Ms)
We have a derivation ending in
P Ms  : P  ^2))
r  d{Ms) : R
whence , .A [> A :!P /T^ \
A > der{A) : P  > V ^  M s - .R  
T,Au>6'(der{A),Ms)-.R
and we know that
6)%der(A), Ms) =  ^(A, d(Ms))
Mainly for reasons of typography, for the following Mss* cases we leave out 
the details of the left premisses unless absolutely necessary. We replace them 
with the ellipsis Ip.
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21. The Mss* term has form (fogr(Mss*+^))*
We have a derivation ending in
r  : R  , .
whence
_________g  r : R____________
r ,  A i , ..., A„ ...,Ai,var{xi+i), ...,var{xn)], Mss*+^) : R
and we know that
9”{[Ai, .. .,Ai,var{xi+i), ...,var{xn)],Mss''^^)
=  ^"([A i,..., Ai, î;ar(a;i+i),..., var{xn)], (top(Mss*+^))*)
22. The Mss* term has form (M :: Mss*)*
We have a derivation ending in
Fi ^  M  : Q Fa M ss‘ : R  , ,
....
whence j
-$ ^  M s é  : R  ...
Ti, Tg, A i , A n  \ » 9 " ( [ A i , a p { A i ,  9[M)) ,var[x i^ i ) , .., var(xn)], Mss*) : R  
and we know that
6>"([Ai,..., ap{Ai, 9{M)), var(x i+ i) ,var{xn)] ,  Mss*)
=  9”{[Ai, ...,Ai,var{xiJi.i), ..,var{xn)], (M :: Ms*)*)
23. The Mss* term has form (w%fMl(Mss*))*
We have a derivation ending in
 r  Z$> Mss* : P _____
 '
iii)
J
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whence
r ,  A j , A n  Ot>0''([Ai, . . . ,withel[Ai),var{xi. i . i) ,  . . . ,var{xn)\ ,  Mss')  : R  
and we know that
9 " { [ A i ,w i th e l { A j ) ,  var{xi+i) ,var(xn)] ,  Mss'’)
— ^ " ( [ A i , A i ,  t ; a r ( x i + i ) ,var{xn)Y {withll{Mss'))')
24. The Mss* term has form {withl2[Mss'))'
We have a derivation ending in
r  -------»  M s s ' : R  /p
whence
r, A i, ..., An O£>0"([Ai, ..., withe2{Ai),var{xi+i) , ..., var{xn)]y Mss')  : R  
and we know that
9"{[Ai, ..., withe2[Ai), î;ar(xi+i),..., ?;ar(xn)], Mss*)
=  0"([Ai,..., Ai, ?;ar(xi+i),..., var{xn)], {withl2{Mss'))')
25. The Mss* term has form (d(Mss'))'
We have a derivation ending in
r -------»  Mss' \ R---------------  i-L'*)
whence
r, A i , ..., An K>^ "([Ai, ..., der(Ai), ^;ar(xi+i),..., var{xn)], Mss' )  : R  
and we know that
9”{[Ai, ..., der{Ai), var{xi+i) , ..., var{xn)], Mss ' )
=  (9"([Ai,..., Ai, t/a r(x i+ i),..., 'yar(xn)], (d(Mss*))*)
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26. The Mss* term has form
We have a derivation ending in
xi :!P i,..., Xn :!Pn => M : R iP)
whence Xi :!P i,..., Xn :\Pn M  : R  
Ip x i : \ P u . . . , X n : \ P n ^ O { M ) : R ^ .  
A i,...,A n t^prom(Â,1^ .6(M))  :\R 
and we know that
promÇÂ, ’c^.9{M)) — 9"(Â,
Theorem 6.3 (A d e q u a c y ) The following rules are admissible: 
r  : R  A >  A : P  T - A  M s : P
r  ^(W) : P  '  r,A = > ^% A ,M s) : P
________ V i  ... Vn r  ----- -Mss* : P ______________  ...^
r ,  A i , ..., An =» ip"{[Ai, ..., A i,i)ar(xi+i),..., var(o;n)], Mss*) : P
where theV\, .. . ,  T>n are (in order):
Ai |> Ai :!Pi
Ai_i > Aj_i :!Pi_i 
Ai > Ai ; Pi
Ai+i > var(xi+i) : Pi+i
An > var(xn) : Pn 
P r o o f :
1. The N term has form Xx.N
We have a deduction ending in
r ,  X : P  tf>N : Q
r  I » A x . i V  : P~oQ {-Ox)
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" " " "  T , x : P ^ N : Q
r , x  : P  ^  ip{N) :Q , .
r  => Ax.^(W) : P -cQ
and we know that
Xx.'ip{N) = ip{Xx,N)
2. The N term has form teni[Ni , Ag)
We have a deduction ending in
Ti M>Ai : P  Tg [»A g : Q
Fi, Fg \»teni{Ni ,  N 2 ) : P  ®Q
whence
(®i)
Ti COiVi : P  Fa C0 JV2 : Q .
Fi ^  V>(iVi) :P ' Fa ^  V"(%) : Q 
Fi,Fa =g> tenr{i){Ni),i>{N2)) :P®Q 
and we know that
fenr('0(Ai),'0(Ag)) =  ijj{teni{Ni, N 2 ))
3. The N term has form *
We have a deduction
I »  * : 7
and we know that we have a derivation
^ 7 7 7
Hence result.
4. The N term has form ie{A, N)
(4 )
We have a deduction ending in
F i > A : 7  Fg [ » A  : P  
Fi,Fg [»26(A, A) : P
whence Fg i » A  : P  .
Fa =» m )  : R
Fi > A ; 7 F a - L  ; R
TuT2^iP'{A,i l{ iP[N)))- .R
and we know that
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5. The N term has form tene{A, xi .x g .A )
We have a deduction ending in
Ti > A : P  0  Q V2,xi : P,X2 : Q U>N : R  
TijFg K>tene(A,æi.a;g.A) : R
whence
FgjXi : P,xg ; <5 M>A : R
(% )
V2,Xi : P,X2 : Q =,• ip(N) : R
Fi >  A : f  ® Q T 2 ^ t e n l { x i . X 2 4 j N ) ) : R  . 
Fi,Fg ^  ip'{A,tene{xi.X2 .ip{N))) : R
and we know that
ijj' {A,tenl{xi.X2 .ip{N))) = '0(fene(A, xi.rcg.A))
6. The N term has form cont{A, xi.xg.A)
We have a deduction ending in
F i > A : ! P  Fg,xi :!P, xg :!P i::C>A : P  
Fi,Fg l»conf(A, xi.xg.A) ; P
whence
(C)
Fg,xi :!P, xg :!P l» A  : P  
Fg, Xi :!P, Xg :!P ^  ^(A ) : P  ^
Fi > A :!P Fg c{xi.X2.ip{N)) : P  . 
Fi,Fg => ip'{A, c{xi.X2.ip{N))) : P  
and we know that
il)'(A,c{xi.X2-'ip{N))) = ip(cont{A,xi.X2.N))
7. The N term has form weak{A, A)
(ly)
We have a deduction ending in
Fi > A :!P Fg M>A : P  
Fi, Fg l»weuA;(A, A) : P
_ £ i ± Æ h l Z ^ w )
Ti >  A :!P Fa w(rp{N)) ; P  . 
F i ,F a = # .f (A ,« ,W N ))) :P
and we know that
'4>'{A,w{ip(N))) =  ij)(weak{A, N))
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8. The N term has ïovmpromÇÀ, ~É.N)
We have a deduction ending in
Ai > Ai :!Pi ... An>An'.\Pji : ! P i , l » A  : P
A i, ..., An t>£>prom(^, i t .N )  :\R
whence
Xi :!P i,..., Xn '.\Pn M>A : P
Xi :!P i,..., Xn :!Pn =7 ^(A ) : P  
A i > A i : ! P i  ... (p(^.^(7V)))"+i :!P
A i,..., A„ =»- ij)"(À .ip i 'É ,i)>{N))y'+'-) :!P  
and we know that
{pif^.ip{N))Y'^^) = i p { p r o m Ç Â .N))
9. The N term has form an{A)
We have a deduction ending in
r > A : P
r  t>t>an(A) : P  
and we have the following derivation:
(M)
whence
 7-----------r > A : P  i / , A [ ] : P  .
and we know that
ip'{A,[]) =  '0(an(A))
10. The N term has form fal{A, {fur(xi)})
We have a deduction ending in
Pi >  var{xi) : P i ... Pn > var{xn) : Pn A [> A : 0 
A, P i , ..., Pn K >/a/(A , {^ur(xi)}) : P
whence
(Os)
A > A : 0 xi : Pi, ...,Xn : Pn fal{{xi})  : P  .. 
A, P i , ..., Pn => ip'{A, , fal{{xi})) : P
and we know that
ip'{A, , /aZ({xi})) =  ijj{fal{A, {var(xi)}))
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11. The N term has form withi{Ni , Ag)
We have a deduction ending in
r [»Ai : P  r M>Ag : Q
r  \^w i th i (N i ,  N 2 ) : P&Q
whence r o A i  : P  r M>Ag : Q
r ^ ^ ( A i ) : P  '  r = » ^ ( A g ) : Q  
r  w%;^/tr(^(Ai),'^(A2)) : P&Q
and we know that
withr{'ip{Ni),ip{N2 )) — ip{withi{Ni, N 2 ))
12. The N term has form plusil(N)
We have a deduction ending in
r  [» A  : P
r  U>plusil{N) : P  © Q
whence
r  0E> A  : P
( % )
r  ip(N) : P  ,
r  => plusrl{'ip{N)) : P  0  Q 
and we know that
plusrl{ip{N)) — ip{plusil{N))
13. The N term has form plusi2(N)
We have a deduction ending in
r  t>t>A : Q
r  t^plusi2{N)  : P  0  Q
whence r Ot>A : Q
(Gig)
r  => plusr2{ip{N)) : P  0  Q 
and we know that
plusr2('ip{N)) =  ip{plusi2{N))
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14. The N term has formpluse(A, Xi.Ni, xg.Ag)
We have a deduction ending in
r  > A :  P  A ,x i  : P  l» A i : R  A, Xg : P  l»A g : R  
r ,  A \^pluse{A, xi .Ni,  xg.Ag) : R
whence
(0e)
A,Xi : P  l» A i : R  A, Xg : Q M>Ag : R
A ,x i : P  => ip{Ni) : R  A,xg : Q => ^(Ag) : R■ (Gc)r  > A : P  0  Q A — > plusl{xi.ip{Ni), xg.'^(Ag)) : R  .
r ,  A => ip'{A,plusl{xi.'ip{Ni),X2.ip{N2))) : R
and we know that
ip'{A,plusl{xi.ij){Ni),X2.ip{N2))) =  i}){pluse{A,xi.Ni,X2.N2))
15. The N term has form fr({t>ar(xi)})
We have a deduction
P i > var{xi) : P i ... P„ > var{xn) : Pn 
P i , ..., P n  t » f r ( { u a r ( x i ) } )  : T
we also have
X i  : P i,  ..., X n '  P n ^  • T
and we know that
ir({xi}) = ip{tr{{var{xi)}))
16. The A term has form var{x)
We have deduction   ----------   (aa;)
X : P  > var{x) : P  
and we find the following:
r - ^ M s - . R  (gg;)
(T i )
r ,  X : P  => (rc; Ms) : R  
and we know that
(x; Ms) =  ip'{var[x), Ms)
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17. The A term has form ap{A, N)
We have a deduction ending in
Ai > A : P-oQ  Ag \ » N  : P  
Ai, Ag > ap(A, N)  : Q
whence
Ag |» A  : P  
A; =» i>(N) - .P^’ r  A  M s : J?
A i > A : P - o Q  r , A 2 ^  (>/>(iV) Ms) : P  . ^r, Ai, Aa ^  V'(A, (i>(N) :: Ms)) : R
and we know that
Ip'{A, ('0(A) :: Ms)) — ip'{ap{A, A), Ms)
18. The A term has form withel{A)
We have a deduction ending in
A > A : P&Q
A > withel[A) : P
whence
(& « )
r  A  Ms : P
A C> A : P&Q r  ^  withll(Ms) : R  . 
r , A = >  ^%A,wmZl(M s)) : R
and we know that
'ip'{A,withll{Ms)) = Ip'{withel{A), Ms)
19. The A term has form withe2{A)
We have a deduction ending in
A > A : P&Q
A t> withe2(A) : Q
whence
(^£l)
r ^ M s : P
A > A : P h Q  r ^  withl2{Ms) : R  . r, A => '^(A, withl2(Ms)) : R
and we know that
'ip'{A,withl2(Ms)) — Ip'{withe2{A), Ms)
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20. The A term has form der{A)
We have a deduction ending in
A >  A :!P
A D> der{A) ; P
whence
(D)
r  Ms : R
A > A :!P r  d{Ms) : R  . 
r ,A = ^ i> ’{A ,d (M s) ) :R
and we know that
ijj'{A, d{M s)) = ip'{der(A),Ms)
—yIn the following we again frequently uses the ellipsis Ip instead of spelling 
out all the detail of the left premisses.
21. The ~É term has form var{c^
We can find the following derivation:
and we know that
("#; Mss^) =  ip"{var{0^, Mss^)
 y22. The A term has form [A i,..., A*, tiar(xi+i),..., var{xn)]
We have derivation ending in
whence
r ,  A i , ..., An ip"{[Ai, ..., Ai, var{xij^i) , ..., ^;ar(a;n)], Mss*+^) : R  
and we know that
Ip"{[Ax,..., Ai, var{xi+i),..., var{xn)], Mss*+^)
=  0 ''([A i,..., Ai, m r(a;i+i),..., var{xn)], (fo^(Mss*+^))*)
iii)
 »  M s s ‘+ i  : P  \  i------------------------------ (tO ff) j
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23. The ^  term has form [ A i , ..., ap(Ai ,  N ) ,  v a r { x i + i ) , v a r { x n ) ]
The zth deduction ends in
Ai [> Ai \ P  —oPi A'i l>t> A  : P  
Ai, a ;  >  ap{Ai,N)  : Pi
whence
Ai- l» A  : P
( ^ t )
a ;  a  «(JÏ) : p  “ r  « - « " . - ■ ' ■ J  H
A i, ..., Ai, A -,..., An (0(A") :: Mss*)*) ; R
and we know that
(0(A) :: Mss*)*) =  0"([A i,..., ap{Ai, A), Far(xi+i),..., var{xn)], Mss*)
24. The term has form [A%,..., withel{Ai),var{xi^i), ..., var{xn)]
The ith deduction ends in
Ai > Ai : Pi&Q
A i  E> withel{Ai) : Pi
whence
[!P l,...,!Pi-x][Fi)-”)Pn,] r  >  Mss* : R  /« \
[!Pi,..,!Pi_i][Pi& Q ,...,P„]  ^ . y )Ip Ai > Ai : PikQ  r  -------»  (w2f/tÜ(Mss*))* : R
Ai...., An => {withll{Mss')y : P
and we know that
{withll{Mss')y = i p " { [ A i , mf/iel(Ai), tiar(a;i-f-i),..., tior(xn)], Mss*)
25. The ^  term has form [A i,..., withe2{Ai), uar(xi+i),..., var{xn)]
The 2th deduction ends in
Ai > Ai : QhPi
Ai > withe2{Ai) : Pi
whence
[!P i,...,!Pi_i][Pi,...,P„] r   ^  Mss* : P _____  /» \
.  [!P i,.,!P i_i][Q & P i,...,P „] K X.2 )Ip Ai > Ai : QkPi  r  -------»  {withl2{Mss')y : P
Ai...., An => 0**(3 ,^ {withl2{Mss')y : P
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and we know that
{withl2{Mss')Y =  0 " ( [ A i , withe2{Ai), var{x i+i) ,var{xn)] ,  Mss')
26. The term has form [ A i , der(Ai), var{xn)]
The 2th deduction ends in
Ai > Ai :lPi
Ai  >  der{Ai) : Pi
whence
(D)
r  -------»  Mss' : R
t  Ai >  A  :!Pi r (rf(MssO)» : R
A i , A „  ii"ÇÂ, {d{Mss'))' : R  “
and we know that
{d{Mss')y =  0 " ( [ A i , der{Ai), var{xi+i), ...,var{xn)], Mss')
6 .6  Cut Elimination
In this section we discuss cut elimination for SILL. We give the (complicated) cut 
mles for SILL^ *** (SILL with these rules) and then a simple cut elimination argument 
for SILL^“*.
There are ten cut rules for SILL. We show all of these in Figure 6.7. In these rules 
we have some notation for multicuts: (!P)* stands for i occurrences of formula \P 
and (!©)* stands for i occurrences of multiset !0.
In the next section we give reduction rules for the occurrences of cut, before giving 
a cut-elimination procedure and further discussion on cut for SILL and its elimina­
tion.
6.6.1 Cut Reductions
We give reduction rules for the occurrences of the ten cut rules. First, we try to 
clarify some of the notation used.
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r , A  P
r ^ p  A A p  
r , A ^  p
(cuti)
(cuts)
r ^ P  A , P - ^ P  
r , A - ^ p  
r=4- p  A, p=# . p
(cwtg)
(cut4)
r = » p  A ,p - ! ! f ! % j{  
r . A J ü ü % p
■^ ^^ !^ 4>!P A, (!P)' -!4  P
,  , \  1 ][E,P](cuts) r ^ p  A  »  Pr, A, s p
[!©][]
(cutr)
!©][]» ! P  A , ( ! P ) * - ^ P
A, (!0)’ A p
(cutg)
A,(!P)‘Jn>P
A, (!0)‘ p
(cwfio)
Figure 6.7: Cut rules for SILL
(cute)
» ! P  A , ( ! P ) * ^ P  
A, (!0)' => P (cuts)
Consider a promotion, written:
IQi , ..., IQn => P  
 »  IP
{P)
r i , . . . , r „ ‘i ^ » ! P
P i , S i , S f i  =^!P (seh)
The Fi are the context formulae for the decomposition of Si to !Qi. This section of 
proof can then be extracted:
(ax)
Lj A lQ i
Ti, Si =>!Qi (sel)
When this extraction forms part of a reduction, we simply write the conclusion.
We often write [H, P ]. This stands for a list whose elements are those of the multiset 
E and the element P , with P  occurring at an unspecified position in the list. We 
write [H, (IQi , ..., IQn)] for a list of the elements of E with the list [!Qi,..., \Qn] 
occurring as a sublist in some position.
C h a p t e r  6. A  S e q u e n t  C a l c u l u s  f o r  In t u it io n is t ic  L in e a r  L o g ic  163
Now we give the reduction rules.
1. (cuti) Analysis by cases on the left premiss:
(a) (ax)
(ax)
reduces to: 
(b) (-Ox)
reduces to:
(c) (®x)
reduces to:
(d) (7x)
reduces to:
M i )
H i )
V 2 ^ p  a 4 p
Fi => P F g , A — > R f  .
r . , r . , A Î = r «
F,P,T=>P _ ,
V ,S ,T = ^ P  a A p ,  
r , A , p , T = ^ p ,
^  ( /.)  ,  r M p  a A p
r,A-Lp
Vcj
(e) (Or)
r , A - L p
(Or)
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reduces to:
(f) v , s ^ p  r,r=»p
reduces to:
V,S=i-P A-^R,   ^, T,T^P A-^R,   ^,(cuts)  -p A - V  E>  (cuts)
(g) (&£i)
r , A , s ^ R   ^ r , A , r = ^ i î , ^ ,
r  - A  f  \
reduces to:
r , A ^  A
r ^ p  A ^ R
r . A ^ p
(h) (&£j) Similar to above.
(i) {W)
{W)
reduces to:
 ,g  {cuU)r , A - A p
(j) (c)
reduces to:
r,A 
r,\s,\s p
IC \ / p
(cat.)r , A - 4 p
r, !S, !S ^  p  A -A p  , ,^ r,A,!S,!5=t-P
' ISr , A - ^ p
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(k) [D)
r A P  a A p  (^,^5 
r,A A p
reduces to:
r , A  A p  
r , A  A p {D)
2. (cut2 ) Analysis by cases on the right premiss.
(a) (ax) Not possible.
(b) (-Or)
A i , P ^ 5  A2 A P ,  ,çIFr (~°c)r = ^ p  A i ,A2,p ? A p ,
reduces to:
or
r  => P  A i , P = ^ S ' ^   ^ ^r,Ai s Ag Ap , ,
A i ^ P  A2, p A p , , 
r = ^ p  A i ,A2,p ? A p ,
 r , A „ A . î = t *
reduces to:
(c) (®r)
reduces to:
r ^ p  A2 p A p
Ai=t-s r,A2 Ap , ,
  r , A . , A . ? ^ s
r=>p A,p A p , ^,
r . A a t H
r=e>P A,P,S,T=^R r ,A,S,T^R,
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(d) (Ic)
reduces to:
r ^ p  A P — > p  
r , A  A p
r=4>p A , p = t ^ p
(/e)r , A  A p
{cuti)
(e) (Of)
 5 (Of)r ^ P  A , P — )-P_
reduces to:
r,A A p
r , A  A p (Or)
(f) (® c) A , P , g # . P  A ,P ,T = t> P .  , 
r = > p  A , p ^ p ,  .
r , A ^ p
reduces to:
T a > P  A , P , 5 a > P ,   ^ , r = > P  A , P , T = > P  , .(Cwt4) ------   (^cuU)
(g) (&Ci)
r , A , s = ^ p  r , A , r = 4 > p ,  ,
------------------------
A,P A p 
r =t- p A, p A p , 
r , A = Î B
reduces to: r =» p A, p A p , ,, -------------- ; ------------ (c«i2)
r , A  A p
(h) Similar to above.
(i) {W)
A L A R  ( ^ )
r ^ P  A f  t P  
r ,A  A p
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reduces to: r = > P  A ,P = ^ R ,  .
r , A - ^ p
0 ) ( C ) A ,P ,! 5 ,! 5 :^ P  
r,A A p
reduces to: r=»P A,P,!g,!P=»P 
r,A,!P,!S=^P
t . a A p
(k) (P)
r=4-p A,p A p  , ^,-------------- 13----------- “ *2)r,A A p
reduces to: r ^ p  A p A p
— 4 ? - (-D)r,A A p
3. (cuts) Analysis by cases on the left premiss.
(a) (sel)
I\P%P A A  P  ,  ^ , r, A, 5 ^  p
reduces to:
r , A A p ,
r , A , p = 4 - p
(b) (seU)
IQl, !Qn P  
 »  !P
■ • • A n ______________^  IP
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reduces to:
!Ql, \Qn ^  P
r» , &  =>!Qn A, ! Q i , ! Q »  P
: cut^s
Pi, ...j r^ , Aj 5*1,..., Sfi R
(c) (-o%)
<-) - f i M "  '7 '
reduces to:
r , p ^ Q  a ^ A p  
A i = ^ p  r , A 2 , p = » p  , /r )
 r , A „ A 2 ^ p ----------
(d ) (® 7 i)
T 5 f e r 5 ÿ ( ® ’^ ) a A p ^®^
---------------- r „ r 2 , A ^ p ----------------
reduces to:
F2 Q A ,P , Q = > P (cut4)
ri,F 2 , A A> p
(G) (7%) A P  /T \
T (^ - )
A=a P  
reduces to:
A P
(I) (T%) Not possible.
(g) (®%i)
r * # 3  <»«.) <*'>------------ r,A^p------------
reduces to: r = ^ P  A, P = ^ P .  .
— t A A p —
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(h) (®%) Similar to above.
(i) (&%)
 ----------------- l“ ‘">
reduces to:
4. (CW4) Analysis by cases on the right premiss.
(a) (sel)
(set)
reduces to:
or
reduces to:
(b) (seh)
reduces to:
or
r = > P  A ,P ,S = > R ,  .r, A, 5  =^. p ^
M 2) 
M )r,A,p#.p
A A p  , .  
r = ^ p  A , p = ^ p  r, A p
r ^ P
r , A , 5 = f P
r = 4 - p  A , p - ^ ^ p ns-----
 ^ [1[S,P] „
A ^  (sel*)r=»p A,s,p=>p A '7— r,A,H=^p—
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reduces to:
[ ] [s ,p ]r ^ P  A --------
(c)
reduces to:
r, A, H =A P
a , p , s ^ t
V ^ P  A , P = ^ S - o T )  r, A S -oT  ^
V ^ P  A , P , S = ^ T
r . A . p ^ T (-Or )
[cut^
(d) (0%)
r, A S-oT  
Ai; P => 5 Ag => T (®%)
reduces to:
r=>P Ai.Ag,P=>50T , , ,
r , A i , A 2 ^ 5 ® T --------
r=>p Ai,p=>p
r . A i ^ s  A 2 ^ t  .  .----
(e) (7%) Not possible.
(f) (T%)
reduces to:
r ,  Ai,A2 =>5(2)7
r = t - p  A , p = » Tr,A=>T  ^
( T r )
(g) (0 Ri)
r,A=>T 
A,P=>5
r = > p  A , p = 4 > 5 e 7 r T \- (cuti)
reduces to:
r,A=>5©T 
r=>^ p A,p=>5 (cuti)
(® r .)r,A=>5®7
(h) (©72,3) Similar to above.
(i) (&%) A,P=>5 A,P=>T 
r = ^ p  A , p = ) > 5 & r ,  r, A 5&T
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reduces to:
r = > P  A , P = > 5 ,  . r = > P  A , P = > T  , .
r , A = t - s  r ,A=^>T,„  )
r ,  A ^  s&T
). [cuts) Analysis by cases on 
(a) (fo^)
r=>
reduces to:
(b) (-Or*)
=> S k  
the right premiss.
P  A , P  - > P  . .[!#][!g,$] (cuh)r,A » p
■P A , p i ï ü S * ,  , ,
[ m sm  r,A » p  V
[!$][!5,^] (r, A »  R
p  A i , A g , P
[!$][5-^ T,^ ]: -------»  Pr ,  Ai, Ag
reduces to:
r,Ai,Ag »  p
or
reduces to:
r = > P  . . . .
r ,A i ,Ag  --------> p
 a:a_--------- ^[wjis-or,®] ' Ai ,A2,P  --------» R (cuts)
7?
r = ^ p  A 2 , p  » p , rs  (“ *5)m[T,^] ^A i = > 5  r , A g  - > P
[!$][g-oT,Ÿ]r , A i , A g  »  P
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(c) (&ri*)
r ^ P  A,p— ^
[!$][S&T,Ÿ] [ c u t s )r ,A »  R
reduces to:
r=>p A,p » p  , , ,
----------------M M ------------
(&A*)
r , A ' ^ ' p
(d) (&£2*) Similar to above.
(e) (D*)
reduces to:
r ^ P  A , p f ! ü ü # p  A 
----------------r,A » p
[!$][S,^ jr = > p  A , p  » p  , ^ ,
— — i s i t i i i f - —
L A  (p*)
r , A i ! ! ^ p
(f) (P) Not possible.
6. (cute) Analysis by cases on the left premiss,
(a) [sel) Three possibilities:
r
(sel) . IIIS'M
reduces to:
r,5=>p A----- » p  , ^,
r , A , H , s = » p  (
M )r, A, 5,5 => P
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or {ax)
A ' »  p (top)
reduces to:
r , 5 = > P {sel) A - ^ > P
r , A , S , 5 = > P (cute)
r , A ' - ü ^ ^ p {tog)
or
V
r , A - H ! ^ p
r ,A,H,5=>P
-  (Oc)
(se/*)
reduces to:
r ^ p
r , 5 = > p {sel)
r,A,H,5=t>P
r , A , H - L p
(cute)
r,A, p
r, A, !5,5 => P
(b) (se/*) Two possibilities.
) ••«•5 '^Qn P
 »  IP
(P)
r i , . . . , r , ^ i ! ^ > ! P  
r 1; ... 5 r )^ 5l ; ...; Sfi => IP (se/*)
(se/)
A ' ^ P
(D *)
{tog)
(cute)
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reduces to:
[ ][s,P]A  » P  
r ,  5^ =>!Q» A ,  S ,  ! Q i , ! Q n  => P  . 
A,  S ,  ! Q i , r»,  5^ => P
: cutiS
r  1 j . . ., Fyj, J1—1, S\ 5... ) S’il —> Rj
or
!g , \ P ^ R[EMPHl '■ ''
 » ! H
P (P) A' LLÜH!p , ,
 p  [!*][1P,®1
: W
r, ... r '" '^""»!p iri,..’.,r„,5i,...,5„=t.!P A 4!45>!pri,...,r„,A,3,5i,.,.,5„=^ .!i?
reduces to:
!Q i,..., IQn ==> P  /
\ S ' , \ P ^ R .  . .— (cuts)!.m , \Ql, ..., \Qn ^  P
[!H ',(!Q i,.,!Q „)][]—----»  !P
. [ l[2,Sl,...,Sn]r i, . . . ,L n ,A  -------»  !P , X
r i , . . . , r^,A,s ,5 i , . . . ,5»=^!P
(C) (-o%)
A i = > P  A ^  »  P[!$][Q,^ ] ^ (-Or*)
(tog)A i,A ;  »  P
r 4 f ^  Ai.Aj '-LA^ ’ü . .
------------------ r , A i , A 2, H ^ i î ------------------
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reduces to:
{tog)
[ ][2,Q]r , p = > Q  A g  » p
Fj S, Ag, P => R (cute)
F, A i, Ag, H => P (cut4)
(d) (072 .) Not possible.
(e) {In) Not possible.
(f) (Tn) Not possible.
(g) (@%i) Not possible.
(h) (©72.2) Not possible.
(i) (&9 )^
(&£i*)
{tog)
F, A, S => P (cute)
reduces to: m[PM _ A'  ------ »  P (tog)
r ^ p  a - ! L : ^ p  
F, A, H => P
7. (cut?) Analysis by cases on the right premiss.
(a) {ax)
(cute)
reduces to:
!P»  !P ^ ! P
!Q i,..., \Qn =>!P
{ax)
(cut?)
 »  IP
 »  !P
!Q i,..., =>!P (se/*)
(b) (-Or) Not possible.
C h a p t e r  6 . A  S e q u e n t  Ca l c u l u s  f o r  In t u it io n is t ic  L in e a r  L o g ic  176
(c) (0 r)  Not possible.
(d) (Jr) Not possible.
(e) (Or) Not possible.
(f) (©r) Not possible.
(g) (&ri) Not possible.
(h) (&r2) Not possible.
(i) (ly) !Qi,!Q„ =» P , . A, (!P)' =» R  
A,(!P)<Afi \
if t =  0 then this reduces to:
i t t T i ,A, \Qn => R
j weakenings 
A, !Q i,...., \Qn => R
if t /  0 then the reduction is to: 
\Qi, ...\Qn P
(i) (C)
"“ >'!P A,(!P)MP
A ,( ! Q i , . . . ,% y - ! % P
A ,( !@ i, . . . , !Q 7 \% = * P: weakenings A, (!Qi,!Q„)’+1 =s> R
!Qi,!Q„ =» P , . A, (!P)‘+2 =» R
^ " i P  a ,(\p y ^ r I \—  [cutj)A, (!Qi,...,!Q»)'+^=>P 
reduces to:
!Ql, ..., IQn => P  /p \
’ip  a , (!P)‘+2
A, ( ! Q i , ! Q „ ) ’+S ! Q i , ! Q „  R
A, (!Qi)IQre)*) •••; !Qn-i) !0i, •••; ‘Qn-i R  (sel)
A, (!Qi, . . . ,  !Qn)*j -Qlj • • • 5  !Qn-lj !Ql, !Qn-l> ÎQn P
: contractions 
A, ( !Q i, . . . ,% ) '+ i= ^ P
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(k) (D) !Qi,...,!g„=»P
V ' , F  i . O F Y ^ R
if z =  0 the reduction is to:
{cutj)
IQi, ...,\Qn P  A - A - P  . .
A ,!Q i,...,!Q n= ^P
if z /  0 the reduction is to:
\ Q i , \ Q n  => P {P)
A , ( ! P ) ^ A p ,  _; -  (cutg)
!Q i,.. . ,!Q „ = ^ P  A ,( ! Q i , . . . , ! g „ ) * M P
A , ( ! Q i , . . . , ! g n 4 M P  ^
8. (cuts) Analysis by cases on the right premiss.
(a) (sel) Two possibilities
 A , { i e y , s = ^ R ---------
reduces to:
or
reduces to:
 A, (!0)^« =. R --------
LALW A , Q P r - ^ R
A, (!0)*+i R
(b) (sel*) We give two reductions which, when combined, give the desired 
reduction.
!H', (!P)*= =t> R  
A, (!Q i,..., !Q„)‘+t+7H =»!fl
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i f  z 0 then the reduction is to:
(ÎP)^ => R
A, (!Q i,..., !g„)*+^'+7 H =»!P 
if i =  0 the then reduction is to the following:
! 5 ' , W M F  J™
— »  !P
A, (!Qi,
!Qi, \ Q n  = > P  A, 5 , ( ! Q i , \ Q n T \  {PY =>\R ,
A, S, ( ! Q i , (Py~^  =>!P ^
: cutiSA,5,(!Qi,...,!Q y^+;+'' =>!P
By doing the first reduction, eliminating the (cutio)s (they move into 
the minor premisses of the promotion) and then performing the second 
reduction, we get one large reduction, which is the one we really want 
to consider.
(c) (-o%)
reduces to:
— M i e F L s - T ----------------------
[!©][]— * ! P  A, (!P)-, S .
(d) (®r )
A ,(!e ) ',g = t .T  
A, (!0)‘ S ^ T  ^
A i ,A 2,(!0)‘+ M 5 ® T
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reduces to:
[!©][] . [!©][] » ! P  A i, (!P)'  » ! P  A 2 , ( \Py(“ *8)  ; ---/IAXM ^  rr,---- (C«4)Ai, (!0)* => S  Ag, (!0)J => T
(e) (In) Not possible.
(f) (T r )
A i , A 2 , ( ! 0 ) * + M 5 ® T
L l i » ! P  A, (!P)* ^  T—  {cuts)
reduces to:
(g) (®%i)
A, (!©)*-> T 
A, (!©)• T
A (\P)i S
— (cuts)
reduces to:
A, (!©)'=> 5 © 7
[!8 ][]
— » i p
( e . , )A, (ley => 5  © T
(h) (©%) Similar to above.
(i) (&T2.)
----------- A, (!0)' ^  5&T-----------
reduces to:
[!©][] . [!©][] »!P A, (!Py => 5 . .  »!P A, (!Py => T , .(cuts) ---------- :----------------_ ---------  {cuts)A, (ley ^ 5  ' A, (ley => T
A, (10)* => 5&7
9. (cu^g) Analysis by cases on the right premiss.
(a) (arr) Not possible.
(b) (-Or)
A i , ( ! P ) M g  A 2 , (ipy ^  R
{cutg)^ ^ ! P  Ai, A2 , (!P)'+) ^  R
A i ,A2,(!0)‘+ J ^ P
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reduces to:
---------------- ( -O r)
(c) (®r)
reduces to:
(d) (Ic)
reduces to:
(e) (Of)
reduces to:
(f) (®c)
A i , A 2 , ( ! 0 ) W ^ p
a , (!P)‘ ^
A, (!0)> ^  R (cutg)
[!©][ ] » ! P  A , ( ! P ) ' , 5 , T = > P ,
A , o e y , s , T ^ R . .
A, (ley ^  A
A ,( I P ) M P
— >>'PA,(!©)* - L p
- > > 'PA , ( ! 0 ) M P
A, (!0)' - L  R
A , ( ! 0 ) * ^ P
A, (!0)’ -A- R
A , ( ! P y , S ^ P  A,(!P)',T=^P ,
‘" ’‘i» !P  A ^ I P y ^ P  “
A, (!0)' 225  R
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reduces to:
[!©][] . [!©][] » ! P  A , ( ! P ) \ 5 = > P ,  .  » ! P  A , ( ! P ) \ T = > P ,[cuts)  A r r , _  73---------------------- i '^ t^s)A, (!0 )\ 5  => P  " A, (!0 )\ T  => P  ,(®£)A, (!©)' M  R
(g) M l )
reduces to:
A , ( ! P ) - M p  
A . i i p y ^ R  y
[!0][ ] . Ç » ! P  A, (!P)« - A  P  ,  ^ ,------------------- — --------- (cutg)A, (!0)' P 
A, (!0)< A  P
(h) (&£j) Similar to above.
(i) (W)
s m zA, (ÎG)* A  P
[!0 ][ ] »!P A,(!Py=>P. .— (cuts)
reduces to:
A , ( ! 0 ) ' = . P
(i) (C)
reduces to:
A, (!0)' A  P
A , ( ! P ) \ ! P , ! P = ^ P  
J îü i lP  A ,(!P )'J4P ,
 a . ( , 0 ) . A p -----------
I
[10] [ ] . : » ! P  A , ( ! P y , ! 5 J 5 = > P .  . :
- - A : ( ! 0 ) n ^ : ! 7 ^ p — -  I
A,(!0)‘A p I
(k) (D)
A, (!P)’ A P
—>>IP (cuWA, (!©)« A P
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reduces to: [!©][ ] . <?^ > ! P  A . ( ! P ) > A p
A, (!©)■ — » R  
A, (!0)‘ A  R
10. (cu^io) Analysis by cases on the right premiss.
(a) (tog)
A, (!P)^ P
^ ^ » ! P  A, (!P)* P  ,
0 , o e , . = i S *
reduces to:
-!%>!P A, (!P): p , , ,
a , , ! 9 ) . i î î i S p ‘
(b) (-O r*)
A i , ( ! p y = » 5  A g ,{ \p y  Z Z ÿ ,  R
— > ! P  A i ,A 2 ,( !P ) '+ 4 'L L % ''p  [cutio)
reduces to:
(c) (&ri*)
A, (!P):' p
- % > ! P  A ,( !P )* ^ !^ !!^ ^ P p  (cu tio)A, (!0)' ^
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reduces to:
JüLW ,  (cuiio)
A, (!0)^ R
A, ( 'e y  " : ! ! ! % 'p  '
(d) (&r2*) Similar to above.
(e) (D*)
A, (!py R
% ! P  A , ( ! P ) Æ ^ P
reduces to:
A, (!8)' P
(D*)
(cutio)
(cutio)
(f) (P) Not possible.
6.6.2 Weighting Cuts in SILL
In this section we give a weight to simple cut instances (defined in Definition 3.2) 
in SILL. This measure is then used with a cut reduction strategy to prove the (weak) 
cut-elimination theorem.
Definition 6.2 Associated with every formula occurrence in a SILL proof is an 
elimination number. The elimination number of a formula is zero if it has form \P 
and was not introduced by a promotion. Otherwise it has elimination number one.
Definition 6.3 The weight of a simple cut instance in a SILL^^^ derivation is the 
quadruple:
(e, |P |,/î2 ,/ii) I
where
\
-  e is the elimination number of the left cut formula. i
-  |P|  w the size o f the cut formula.
-  /zg is the height o f the right premiss.
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-  hi is the height o f the left premiss.
The quadruple is lexicographically ordered from the left.
Lemma 6.3 The weights defined in Definition 6.3 are well-ordered.
Theorem 6.4 The rules ( c u t i ) , (cutio) admissible in SILL.
P r o o f : W e give a reduction strategy:
-  pick any simple cut instance and reduce
-  recursively reduce any simple cut instances in the result
By induction on the weight of the simple cut instances, and induction on the number 
of simple cut instances, this strategy terminates.
This can easily be seen by inspection. ■
The reason for introducing the elimination number is now obvious. Reductions 
3(b) and 6(b) introduce cuts whose cut formulae can be of greater size than the cut 
being reduced. Inspection of these new cuts reveals that they are easily eliminable 
(consider, for example, the second of the possibilities for reduction 6(a)). All that is 
needed is a measure which captures this. This the elimination number achieves: a 
simple cut whose left premiss has elimination number zero has a form such that the 
cut can easily be eliminated (independently of the elimination of the cuts above it).
6.6.3 More on Cut Elimination
The sequents aie the basic judgement form for SILL. Therefore, elimination of 
(cutf) is of primary interest. Indeed, the other nine cuts result from the attempt to 
algorithmically eliminate the first -  they naturally arise in the reduction of (cutf). 
However, the simple admissibility of (cutf) can be proved without recourse to the 
other cuts and all the complicated work above. We prove the admissibility again:
Theorem 6.5 The following rule is admissible in SILL:
r,A=>p (cut)
PROOF: Given that the premisses are provable in SILL, they are provable in ILL 
(from Theorem 6.1). We know ([Bie94]) that cut is admissible in ILL, hence the 
conclusion is provable in ILL. Again from Theorem 6.1, the conclusion is provable 
in SILL. ■
We could use similar arguments to prove the admissibility of the other cut rules 
described above.
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Cut elimination is of interest for two reasons. Firstly, from a logic programming 
point of view, we are interested in backwards proof search, and a complete cut-free 
system is desirable for this. We have already described a cut-free system and proved 
its completeness, hence from the logic programming perspective the cut-elimination 
theorem is of lesser importance.
Another reason to be interested in a cut-elimination theorem for a system such as 
SILL is that it can be seen as a computation process -  calculating a normal-form 
(cut-free proof) from a program (proof with cuts). This is the motivation for the 
cut reductions given in section 6.6.1 and the cut-elimination theorem as proved 
in Theorem 6.4. The proof given there is that the reduction strategy terminates -  
we have a syntactic algorithm that will produce a normal form. This is akin to 
normalisation of lambda terms as computation as seen in functional programming. 
We would ideally like to prove that the set of reductions given (and the associated 
proof terms not given) strongly normalise, but such a proof is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Indeed, given that normalisation for natural deduction is not confluent, 
we are unsure whether or not cut is strongly admissible. We do not, however, have 
a counter-example.
It was said above that the ten cut rules aiise from the process of algorithmically 
eliminating the ‘basic’ {cut4 ). That this is so is easily seen from the reduction rules. 
Of course, picking the right form for the cut mles is tricky. The rules have to be 
sound with respect to provability in cut-free SILL and for all cases to reduce to valid 
SILL sequents. This necessitates the ‘big step reductions’ which can be seen in, for 
example, 6(a). The decomposition of promotions leads to several other complicated 
reductions, such as 3(b). Finally notice that (cwt7),...,(crzfio) are multicut (or mix) 
rules -  one formula on the left is cut with many formulae on the right. This has led 
to very little complication in the cut-elimination process, but the use of multicuts 
for any purpose at all is unattractive, and using them with a calculus with several 
judgement forms and focused formulae seemed best avoided. However, without the 
use of multicuts, we were unable to find a measure on the size of a cut which would 
always decrease. The situation is similar to that for multiplicative formulations of 
intuitionistic logic (such as G6 in the appendix). Indeed, multicuts were first intro­
duced by Gentzen ([Gen69]) when trying to prove cut-elimination for this calculus 
by similar methods to those we are using here. We know of no treatment of cut- 
elimination for calculi such as G6 which do not use a multicut. However, we know 
of no work showing that the use of the multicut is necessary.
6.7 SILL and Logic Programming
One of the motivations for the development of SILL is the link between ‘permutation- 
free’ calculi and logic programming. Linear logic has been extensively studied in 
relation to logic programming, in particular by Hodas & Miller and Harland & 
Pym. Hodas & Miller have developed two systems for linear logic programming.
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The first of these, Lolli ([HM94]), is based on a fragment of Intuitionistic Linear 
Logic. The second. Forum ([Mil96]), is based on full classical linear logic. Harland 
& Pym’s system, Lygon ([HP94]), is based on a fragment of classical linear logic. 
This section will briefly describe Lolli (the language most closely related to SILL) 
and compare it with SILL.
6.7.1 SILL and Lolli
In [MNPS91], the idea of a uniform proof was introduced. A uniform proof is 
one where the goal formula can be broken up until atomic before the context is 
considered (see Definition 1.1). Hereditary Harrop logic with uniform proofs and 
a backchaining calculus allows goal directed proof search. This can be seen as a 
logical foundation of logic programming. Lolli is the linear logic programming 
language most closely corresponding to SILL. Lolli is a calculus (introduced in 
[HM94]) for the fragment of ILL similar to hereditary Harrop logic as a fragment of 
intuitionistic logic. This fragment is the largest fragment of ILL for which uniform 
proofs are complete with respect to provability. Lolli is a backchaining calculus 
suitable for goal-directed proof search.
In order to avoid problems with the structural rules, the Lolli calculus is formulated 
with contexts split into linear and non-linear parts, like the calculus ILL^ seen in 
Figure 2.2. The calculus is presented with two implications (-o and -4-). -o can 
be thought of as the usual linear implication for formula P~oQ  where P  is not 
banged. -4 can be thought of as linear implication for formulae of the form \P-oQ. 
Therefore, unlike ILL^, there is no mle for moving banged formulae on the left into 
the non-linear context. The usual left rules are replaced by two backchaining rules.
Lolli is a calculus for the following fragment of ILL. We call this fragment HILL. 
Formulae are generated according to the following grammar.
R::=
A I T  I G-ojR \ G ^ R \  R k R  | W .R
G::=
A I T I /  1 R -oG  I -4 G I G kG  | G 0  G | G © G | !G | VV.G | 3V.G
UILL has G formulae as goals. On the left, R formulae and banged R formulae are 
allowed.
Lolli is displayed in Figure 6.8 (with a minor change from [HM94] ~ we have 
given two backchaining rules for the cases where the resource formula is and is not 
in the linear context, whereas Hodas & Miller give one backchaining rule and a 
dereliction rule). All banged formulae on the left are in E and all formulae which 
are not banged are in F.
We need the following definition from [HM94].
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E ; L = > T  
E ; r , j P => Q
(T%)
E ; r = ^ P - o Q
E ; r i = > f  E ; r 2 = > Q  
E ; r i , r 2 = > f  0 Q  
E ; r = > f
S; => /
E, P; r  Q 
E ; T = > P ^ Q  
E ; F ^ P  E ; r = > g
i~Zn)
E; r  => p  0  g (®%l)
E;r=>p&g 
E;L=>g
(kn )
E; r  => p  0  g
E; r => p[y/x]
E; =^!P
(V%)tE; r  => VxP 
E; =A Pi ... E;=>P„ E;Fi
(P)
E;F=>P[^/a;]
E;F=>3æ.P
g i  ••• FÎ;F^ ^  g?n
E; F i , ..., F^, P  A  
E, P ; = a P i  ... E,P;  => 7^ E, P ; F i = > g i
E,P;  F i , F m ,  => A
E, P ;F ^  => g ,
t  y not free in E; F
i  M, m > 0 and< { P i,..., P^}, { g i , ..., Qm}, A >6|| P  ||
Notice that (PGi), (PC 2) can be nullary, providing the leaf nodes for the calculus.
Figure 6.8: Lolli
Definition 6.4 Let P  range over logical formulae built using the connectives T, &, 
-o, -4  and V. Then || P  \\ is the smallest set o f triples o f the form < S, F, g  > 
where E is a set of formulae and F is a multiset o f formulae, such that
1. <  ^ , f , P  > g | |  P  I I
2. if<  E ,F ,5& T  > g || P  II then both < S >e\\ P  || 
( W < E , F , r > e | | p | |
3. if<  E,F,Væ.5 > g || P  || then for all closed 
terms t, < E,F,  5[f/æ] > g || P  ||
4. z/< E, F, 5  -4 T >G|| P  II then < S U {S}, F, T  > e || P  ||
5. if<  E, F, S -o T  > e || P  II then < E, F U {5} ,T  >e\\ P  ||
Proofs in Lolli proceed by applying right rules in order to break up the goal formula 
until it is atomic, then backchaining and repeating the process.
How does Lolli compare with derivations in SILL? Lolli has contexts split into lin­
ear and non-linear parts, and hence no structural rules. SILL does not have this fea­
ture. Therefore a direct comparison of the two systems is not possible -  treatment 
of the structural rules cannot be compared. Instead we show that (over the UILL
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fragment of ILL) every Lolli derivation can be interpreted as a SILL derivation and 
that every SILL derivation can be interpreted as a Lolli derivation. These interpreta­
tions rest on the fact that the premisses of the backchaining rule with backchaining 
formula P  are exactly the minor premisses of the chain of stoup inference ending 
in an axiom that arise from selecting P  as the stoup formula. The axiom itself is 
unnecessary in the backchaining rule. Note we make a slight change to SILL -  we 
restrict axioms to atomic formulae.
Proposition 6.2 Every Lolli derivation can be interpreted as a SILL derivation.
P r o o f :  We take each Lolli inference in turn and interpret it as a series of one or 
more SILL inferences.
Where II is a Lolli proof, we call this interpretation *7(11).
1. The last inference in the Lolli derivation is one of: (T%), (7%), (-o%), (-477.), 
(&7t), (®%i), (@7ta), (VTt), (3-R.)- Then the last inference in SILL is the 
conesponding inference. For example:
E,P;r=>g , X !E,!P,r=>g , .oc IV r  _^i (—°%)E; r  => P  -4 g   ^  ^ is interpreted as !E, F =>!P-og
2. The last inference in Lolli is (0 7 ^). Then
2 ; F i = > P  E;F 2 = >g
E; Fi, F2 => P  0  g
! E , F i = > P  !E, F2 => g
i®n)
is interpreted as
! E , ! E , F i , F 2 = ^ P 0 g: contractions 
! E , F i , F 2 " = > P 0 g
3. The last inference in Lolli is (P). Then
IE => P  .
5 1 4 4  (p)E; =>!P is interpreted as !E =>!P ^
4. The last inference in Lolli is (BCi). Then
E;=>Pi  ... E;=>P^ E ; F i = > g i  ... E\Trn=^Qm  
S ;F i, . . . ,Tm,P  => A
(where < { P i,..., Pn}, { g i , Qm}, A > e || P  ||)
(PCi)
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is interpreted as (noting that an R formula once in the stoup has stoup pre­
misses ending in an axiom or failure)
minor premisses ç  —> A
! S , ! S ,  Fi , — > A , .V\sei)
: contractions 
! E , F i , f ^ ,  P ^  A
where n + m  copies of !E are made and the minor premisses are the interpre­
tations of the premisses of [BCi) (via promotion for the E; => Pi).
5. The last inference in Lolli is {BC2 ). Then
E, P ;= ^ P i ... E,P;=^Pn  E , P ; F i = > ( ^ i  ... E ,P ; Fy» => Qm
E, P; F i , Tm=^ A
(where < { P i , P n } ,  ( Q i , Qm}, A  > e || P  ||) 
is interpreted as
— J  (a%)minor premisses ^ — y A
!S, !P ,...,!s , ! P , r i , . . . , r „ - A ^
!S, ! P , ! S ,  !P, F i , F n i  A  ,
!K, I P , I S ,  IP, IP, T i,..., r „  ^  ’
: contractions 
! E , ! P F i , . : . , F ^ = >  A
where n + m  copies of !E, !P are made and the minor premisses are the 
interpretations of the premisses of {BC2 ) (via promotion for the E; => Pi).
Lemma 6.4 The following rules are admissible in Lolli:
(T^*) {C*)E , A ; r = ^ G  '■ '  S ,A;r=4>G
Lemma 6.5 UILL sequents o f the form  IE, 6* =^\P, where S  is not banged, are 
unprovable.
Proposition 6.3 Every SILL derivation over the XJILL fragment o f ILL can be in­
terpreted as a Lolli derivation.
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Proof: We analyse the cases for the form of sequent. We interpret SELL 
sequent !E, F G as Lolli sequent E; F G.
Where II is a SELL proof, we call this interpretation J(II).
1. The last inference in SELL is one of (T%), (f%), (&:%), (V%),
The Lolli inference is the corresponding inference.
2. The last inference in SILL is (-o%). Two cases:
! E , F , P = > Q  E ; F , P = > Q
!E, F ^   ^ is interpreted as E; F =4^  P -o Q
or
! S , F , ! P = » g  E , P ; F ^ g
!E, F =>!P-oQ  ^ is interpreted as E; F =4^  P  -> Q ^
3. The inference in SILL is (®%). Then
! E i , F i = > P  ! E 2 , F 2 = ^ g  
! S i , % , r i , F 2 = > p ® g
is interpreted as
(% )
iw * )El, E2 ; Fj => P  El, E2 ; F2 => Q , \
E i , E 2 ; F i , F 2 = > P ® g
4. The last inference in SILL is (seh ) . Then we have (because of Lemma 6.5) 
! E ^ P
™ » ! P
{P)
!E =>\P  ^ ’ is interpreted as E; =+\P
5. The last inference in SILL is {sel). Then
minor premisses (p — > A
!Ei, ..., !E,2+m> 1^1 ) • • • 5   ^A y
!Ei, ..., ITin+mj Fi; ..., Fn%; P  =+ A 
(where < { P i,..., P„}, {Q i,..., Qm}, A >g || P  ||)
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is interpreted as (omitting the weakenings that are needed)
E %  5 P I  •  •  •  5  = +  P j i  5  r  1 Q i  . . .  Y j y i - ^ u i  j  Q r
E l , ..., Fi, ...j F^ Tij P  A (PCi)
If the selected formula has a bang as its top formula, then either the next step 
is dereliction, and the case is similar to before with {BC2 ), or the next step is 
weakening or contraction and we get the result by the admissibility of these 
rules in Lolli.
Proposition 6.4 For any Lolli derivationTl, — II, modulo the elimination
of weakenings and contractions.
P r o o f :  Follows from the interpretations given in the preceding propositions. We 
illustrate with the following example:
P  E ; F 2 = » g  / \
E ; F i , F 2 = > P ® g
!E, Fi => P  !E,F2=^Qis interpreted as
! E, !E ,Fi ,F2=:>P®g
: contractions 
!E,Fi,F2 =:> P(g)Q
which is then interpreted as
iw )S , S ; r i = » F  ' S , S ; r 2 ^ Q  ,  -
s , S ; r i , r 2 = » P i 8 > Q  
E ; r i , r 2 = 4 ^ P ® Q   ^ ^
and eliminating the structural rules:
Fi;Fi =» P  E;F2 g
e ; Fi , F2 p  ® g
Propositions 6.2 and 6.3 show that up to the treatment of structural rules SILL and 
Lolli coincide for UILL. Many SILL proofs are interpreted as the same Lolli proof, 
but this is simply because of the greater flexibility in positioning weakening and 
contractions. J'(P(II)) brings all weakenings to axioms and contractions to imme­
diately below context splitting rules. In fact, several SILL proofs are interpreted 
as one Lolli proof due to {seh) in SILL, as each ordering of the formulae selected 
gives a different proof.
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As has been noted several times in this thesis, we might want to consider refor­
mulations of natural deduction, in particular one which has linear and non-linear 
assumptions -  such a natural deduction system might give a good correspondence 
with a split context version of SILL. We would expect such a calculus to match 
Lolli even more closely than SILL matches Lolli. Syntactically, we could easily 
give a split context version of SILL, but this would lack the correspondence with 
semantics that motivates the calculus.
One of the reasons for developing SILL is as a logic programming language based 
on ILL. MJ can be seen as extending the view of logic programming as backwards 
proof search in a backchaining calculus for hereditary Harrop logic to proof search 
over the whole of intuitionistic logic. In doing so, it gives a semantic rationale to the 
calculus used. Lolli is a logic programming language with a backchaining calculus 
for a fragment of ILL. As MJ extends logic programming founded on intuitionistic 
logic, so SILL extends Lolli. SELL contains all the Lolli proofs, and extends the 
calculus to cover the whole of ILL, producing a calculus with a semantic rationale. 
However, proof search in the resulting calculus is no longer goal directed. Whilst 
for MJ this isn’t too problematic, SILL is a very complicated calculus, especially 
because of the unrestricted occurrences of bang. SELL appears to be too complicated 
to be practically used as a logic programming language, and its interest is restricted 
to its theoretical properties of naturally corresponding in a 1-1 with normal natural 
deductions, and hence giving a semantic rationale to Lolli.
6.7.2 SILL and Forum
Forum ([Mil96]) is another linear logic programming language. It is based on full 
classical linear logic and exploits the symmetries of linear logic to give a calcu­
lus for the whole of linear logic whilst avoiding the use of connectives that have 
rules which do not fit well with goal-directedness. The calculus is not given with a 
backchaining rule as the presence of query formulae on the left prevents a calculus 
with this as the only left rule from being complete. The rules are in fact presented 
with single stoup rules, much like those of SILL. If we restrict Forum to its single 
succèdent subsystem, with sequents in the fragment of UELL built from the connec­
tives allowed in Forum, we find a subsystem of Lolli inside Forum. This subsystem 
of Forum then matches SELL in the same way that Lolli matches SILL.
It would be interesting to see what a sequent system matching natural deduction 
for classical linear logic ([Bie96]) would look like and how it would compare with 
Forum. Of course one could argue that we should be interested in proof nets rather 
than natural deduction for classical linear logic, and that we should direct our efforts 
towards finding a sequent system reflecting these. This system might be similar to 
Andreoli’s ([And92]) focusing calculus.
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6.8 SILL and Permutations of Inference Rules
In Chapter 2, the calculus ILLF was presented for ILL. This calculus gives proofs 
for sequents giving only one proof for each equivalence class of proofs equivalent 
up to permutation of inferences (P-equivalent proofs). Calculi such as SILL have 
been described as permutation-free elsewhere in this thesis, and so we compare 
SILL with ILLF. It has already been mentioned that we consider ‘permutation-free’ 
to be a poor description of a calculus such as SILL since many permutations are still 
possible in SILL. These permutations may not be semantically sound with respect 
to normal natural deductions, but this suggests rather that natural deduction is a poor 
proof-theoretic semantics for ILL than that the permutations are not important.
If we restrict formulae to those in the UILL fragment of ILL, we find a calculus 
very similar to Lolli. Apart from issues to do with context management, there is 
only one difference. When focusing on a formula, ILLF as formulated in Figure 
2.1 allows atoms to be returned to the context (by the rule), whereas in Lolli 
the backchaining that this is the end of would not be allowed. Otherwise the calculi 
are the same. We could further restrict the rule so that atoms would not be 
returned the context. This calculus would match Lolli over the UILL fragment of 
ILL.
We could give interpretation of the various systems into each other, much as we did 
with Lolli and SILL. We omit the details of these interpretations, but name them:
-  Lolli into ILLF, /C(n)
-  ILLF into Lolli, £(D)
-  ILLF into SILL, A4 (n)
-  SILL into ILLF, AT(n)
Proposition 6.5 For any Lolli proof 11, £(/C(II)) =  II.
Proof: By putting together the interpretations as in Proposition 6.4. ■  
Proposition 6.6 For any ILLF proof H, K{C{Ii)) = II.
P r o o f :  Similar to Proposition 6.4. ■
Proposition 6.7 For any ILLF proof H, jV(A4(II)) =  II.
P r o o f :  Similar to Proposition 6.4. ■
Interpreting SILL proofs as ILL proofs and then interpreting back again will move 
occurrences of weakening to the axioms and occurrences of contractions to imme­
diately below context splitting mles (as with interpretation in Lolli and back).
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6.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented a calculus, SILL, for Intuitionistic Linear Logic, 
the proofs in which correspond in a 1-1 to the normal natural deductions for ELL. 
We have proved that SILL has this property. We have also given a weak cut- 
elimination theorem for SILL'^^L
We have compared SILL with the linear logic programming language Lolli. We 
have shown that the Lolli can be interpreted in SILL, but that over the fragment of 
ILL for which Lolli is defined, the calculi do not coincide owing to the treatment of 
structural rules.
We have also discussed the formulation of natural deduction for ILL, and have sug­
gested that a more refined notion of normal natural deduction might have more 
attractive properties. A sequent calculus matching this as SILL matches the formu­
lation used in this chapter might correspond more closely to Lolli, and have better 
proof-theoretic properties.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis has been a study of proof search systems for a variety of non-classical 
logics. Proof search has two meanings. Firstly it can mean the search for a single 
proof, a simple yes/no answer to a query. Secondly it can mean the search for all 
answers of a query, the enumeration of all proofs of a sequent. This thesis has 
investigated proof search in both these senses.
-  Chapter 2 was a study of the permutations of inference rules in Intuitionistic 
Linear Logic. A Gentzen calculus for the logic, called ILLF, was presented 
and shown to be sound and complete with respect to provability in ILL. ILLF 
gives only one proof in each P-equivalence class (proofs equivalent up to 
permutations). This calculus can be seen as an efficient calculus for searching 
for a yes/no answer to a query (although as ILL is only semi-decidable, it is 
not guaranteed that a negative answer will be produced). ILLF can also be as 
a calculus for enumerating proofs, and thus as a basis of a logic programming 
language (but without the semantic properties later argued for).
-  Chapter 3 was a study in the application of ‘permutation-free’ techniques to 
an intuitionistic modal logic. Lax Logic. A ‘permutation-free’ calculus is one 
with proofs naturally corresponding in a 1-1 way to the normal natural de­
ductions for that logic. For well behaved fragments of logics, these proofs 
are also the normal forms for sequent proofs up to permutation of inferences. 
The calculus for Lax Logic, called PFLAX, is proved to have the correspon­
dence, hence is sound and complete. PFLAX is a suitable calculus for enu­
merating all proofs. Links with constraint logic programming are discussed. 
Cut-elimination is also studied, and both weak and strong cut-elimination are 
proved for the calculus.
-  In Chapter 4 a method for turning suitable prepositional calculi into decision 
procedures using a history mechanism is given. A history mechanism keeps 
track of which sequents have appeared so far on a branch, and prevents loop­
ing. The mechanism is applied to the 03 and MJ calculi for intuitionistic
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prepositional logic, as well as PFLAX and intuitionistic S4. These calculi are 
intended for delivering yes/no answers to queries.
-  Chapter 5 is a short investigation into the embedding of intuitionistic logic in 
lineal' logic.
-  Chapter 6 applies ‘permutation-free’ techniques to Intuitionistic Linear Logic. 
The resulting calculus, SILL, is proved to be in 1-1 correspondence with nor­
mal natural deductions. A weak cut-elimination theorem is proved. Connec­
tions with linear logic programming languages are discussed. SILL is seen 
to contain the language Lolli. There is also discussion of the formulation of 
natural deduction for ILL and its suitability as a proof-theoretic semantics for 
ILL.
The work in this thesis achieves several things. Firstly, the work in Chapter 2 clari­
fies material already to be found in the literature for single succèdent classical linear 
logic by applying it to two-sided Intuitionistic Linear Logic. How to turn the CLL 
studies into ILL studies is not obvious and it is worth spelling out in detail the calcu­
lus ILLF. Chapter 3 gives a Gentzen sequent calculus for Lax Logic corresponding 
to normal natural deductions. Not only is this calculus attractive because of the 
focusing involved, but it gives a suitable proof search calculus for constraint logic 
programming (if it is accepted that constraint logic programming can be based on 
Lax Logic). Chapter 4 gives a new decision procedure for propositional Lax Logic. 
It also gives a general method for turning calculi into decision procedures, which 
can often be useful. Chapter 5 raises some interesting questions as to what cal­
culi are induced by embedding one logic into another and partially answers these 
questions. Chapter 6 again gives a Gentzen sequent calculus (this time for ELL) 
corresponding to normal natural deductions which can be related to logic program­
ming. This calculus can be seen as giving a proof-theoretic semantics to the linear 
logic programming language Lolli.
There are, however, points where although the work is technically correct and has 
achieved its aims, we are a little disappointed with the outcome. The application of 
the history mechanism to intuitionistic logic in Chapter 4 did not give as efficient 
a theorem prover as had been hoped. It had also been hoped that we could make 
improvements to decision procedures to classical modal logics, but unfortunately 
this did not prove possible. In Chapter 5 we were unable to find an embedding 
of intuitionistic logic into linear logic that induced the whole of MJ (or any other 
attractive sequent calculus). We were disappointed, if not completely surprised, by 
this. Finally, the system SELL for Intuitionistic Linear Logic given in Chapter 6 
seems unattractive. In order to make the system correspond to the normal natural 
deductions, the multistoup is needed (this corresponds to the n minor premisses 
of promotion). There is a large amount of non-determinism in the selection of the 
multistoup -  not only do you have to decide which formulae go into the stoup, 
but in what order they appear in the multistoup. Each ordering of the formulae in 
the multistoup corresponds to a different proof, despite the fact that they appeal'
C h a p t e r  7 . C o n c l u s io n  197
to be the same in many senses. This suggests that it might be good to rework the 
theory with the promotion rule in natural deduction having unordered premisses, 
and therefore SILL with an unordered multistoup. But not only does this involve a 
lot of work to make sense of proof terms, it also makes it hard to see how to make 
the normalisation process in ILL confluent.... A more radical reworking of natural 
deduction might be more successful, starting with Mints’s suggestion for an n -{-1 
premiss tensor elimination rule. SILL is undoubtably too unwieldy for practical 
use, but it does still provide a semantics for, and extension of, Lolli.
7.1 Permutation-free Calculi as a Foundation for Logic 
Programming
Permutation-free calculi are of interest for several reasons. Theoretically it is inter­
esting that the structure of normal natural deductions can be captured in an elegant 
sequent calculus system for a wide range of constructive logics. The cut-elimination 
process for these calculi can also be viewed as a computation procedure. In this the­
sis we have been concentrating on the connections between cut-free permutation- 
free sequent calculi and logic programming viewed as backwards proof search in 
constructive logics. This section gives concluding remarks on this relationship.
It has already been seen that: the backchaining calculus for hereditary Harrop for­
mulae is contained in MJ; that Lolli is contained in SILL; that over the intersection 
of their languages. Forum and SILL coincide.
Logic programming is about the search for proofs. A query is given and the inter­
preter for the logic programming language gives an answer. It can then be asked 
for another answer, and so on until all answers have been given. These answers are 
the different proofs possible in the logic. The question is, which proofs are wanted? 
Proofs which are the same will give the same solution to a query. This is wasteful. 
The uniform proof calculi are syntactically developed devices for giving proofs in 
a reduced search space. It might be better to have a justification for the canonical 
proofs from the proof-theoretic semantics of the logic. Normal natural deductions 
provide a good proof-theoretic semantics to many constructive logics. This sug­
gest that the proofs that are interesting for logic programming are normal natural 
deductions. It is normal natural deductions that are found by ‘permutation-free’ 
calculi, hence it seems that these are the natural calculi to base logic programming 
languages on.
As stated above, over suitable fragments of the logic, the permutation-free calculi 
coincide with the corresponding backchaining calculi. Backchaining calculi are 
defined over fragments where the permutations in the sequent calculus match those 
in natural deductions and which are suitable for goal-directed proof search. That is, 
the ‘nice’ fragments of the logics.
For these fragments the calculi coincide, and although it is useful to have a semantic
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underpinning of the calculi used, no change is suggested for the actual bases of the 
programming languages. They now have a semantic justification. As the fragments 
do not cover the whole of the logic, their power of expression could be extended, 
by extending them to the whole calculus. At this point, goal-directed proof search 
is lost. What the calculi should be is not entirely obvious from a syntactic point of 
view. Some sort of Andreoli-style focusing calculus, such as ILLF, appears to be the 
answer. However, these do not have the proof-theoretic semantics argued for above, 
and so we think that extensions to logic programming should be the extensions of 
the corresponding permutation-free calculi. Of course, losing the goal directedness 
of proof search is a disadvantage from an implementational point of view, whereas 
an Andreoli style calculus would keep this to a greater extent.
Having ai'gued for permutation-free calculi in general as good extensions to logic 
programming languages, we now consider SILL in particular as an extension of 
Lolli. Whereas, for example, normal natural deductions are generally considered to 
be the correct proof-theoretic semantics for intuitionistic logic, it is not so clear that 
they are for ILL. Many natural deductions (hence SILL proofs) that one would intu­
itively want to identify are not identified for ILL. SILL seems to lack determinism 
compared to a calculus such as ILLF. It is possible that a refinement of the notion 
of normal natural deduction for ILL would give a much better proof-theoretic se­
mantics, and the resulting SILL-like calculus would seem a much more suitable 
extension of Lolli.
In conclusion, it is the proof-theoretic semantics of logics that are of primary im­
portance in logic programming. Proof search is search for exactly the proofs given 
by the proof-theoretic semantics. Permutation-free calculi are of interest as they 
seem particularly well suited for the enumeration of normal natural deductions, the 
semantics for many non-classical logics. However, for logics whose proof-theoretic 
semantics is not normal natural deductions, these calculi are less well suited and 
less interesting as the basis of a logic programming language based on the logics.
For these logics we are interested in good ways of enumerating all proofs, whether 
in the logical system itself, or in another more suitable. Hence MJ is a good calculus 
to base a logic programming language on, and SILL less good. A better understand­
ing of the proof-theoretic semantics of ILL might suggest a more suitable calculus |
for extending Lolli. j
7.2 Semantics of ILL
The preceding discussion leads one to question whether or not natural deduction is 
a suitable proof-theoretic semantics for ILL. At first glance it seems to be the obvi­
ous semantics for the logic. ILL can, after all, be seen as a refinement of the usual 
intuitionistic logic. That its semantics should be a refinement of usual semantics for 
intuitionistic logic seems to follow. Indeed, as can be seen, as a calculus, natural 
deduction for ILL seems attractive. It is only when one considers which proofs intu-
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itively seem to be the same that natural deduction seems less well suited. Different 
normal natural deductions appear as though they should be identified. This could 
be fixed by adding more normalisation steps as suggested by Mints. There is also 
the problem of non-confluence of normalisation and its relation to the ordering of 
the premisses of promotion in natural deduction. Some sort of solution might be 
given, but the suggestion is that the proof-theoretic semantics is not normal natural 
deduction.
If normal natural deductions do not provide a good proof-theoretic semantics for 
ELL, then what does? The first thought is that a version of proof nets might provide 
the solution, but we know of no satisfactory treatment of proof nets for ILL. (Treat­
ments include [Lam94], [BCST96], [BCS96], [CS97]). We do think that a study 
of the syntactic system ILLF, along with the categorical semantics for ILL might 
suggest some suitable system, but this is pure speculation.
Finally we should ask whether the problem is that ILL is not a sensible logic? Per­
haps we should consider a larger fragment, or full CLL. However, as syntactically 
ELL is perfectly well defined, we think that ELL is interesting and worthy of study. 
ILL is a proper logic in its own right.
7.3 Future Work
This thesis leaves some immediate questions to be answered, as well as posing 
some more open ended problems. Most of these problems aie subject to ongoing 
investigation by the author.
The most obvious unsolved problems left by this thesis are the questions of strong 
cut-elimination and strong normalisation for SILL. This is complicated and hard 
to formulate properly, and we are unsure whether or not the results hold. Strong 
cut-elimination can hopefully be proved by using a suitable modification of the 
definition of elimination number, and choosing suitable measures to build a weight 
for the cut instance. We would also like to extend the term calculus to cut terms. 
For presentation purposes, this would involve giving different proof terms for the 
cut-free calculus too (showing the internal structure of promotion). Once we have 
this with its extension to the cuts, we would hope that by using the recursive path 
order, strong normalisation could be proved without too much difficulty. We would 
then have a second proof of strong cut-elimination. Of course, if the results do not 
hold, we would like simple counter-examples!
It has been noted in [BdP96] that the introduction and elimination rules for the 
modality in intuitionistic S4 can be formulated in the same way as the introduction 
and elimination rules for promotion used here. With this knowledge, it should be a 
simple task to give a ‘permutation-free’ calculus for IS4.
A study of the relationship between cut-elimination and normalisation for natural 
deduction in ELL (as carried out in [Zuc74], [Pot77] for intuitionistic logic) would
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also be an interesting and a useful study.
In several places in this thesis, the work of Mints on ILL has been mentioned and 
outlined. A more extensive investigation of this, and its development, together with 
a permutation-free calculus for the resulting natural deduction system would be 
another interesting study, one which might be more fruitful and lead to attractive 
results. Trying to built in split linear and non-linear assumptions would be a part 
of this investigation. A study of ILLF and its relationship to the semantics of ILL 
would form another pail of this study.
In Chapter 5 we tried to induce the calculus MJ for intuitionistic logic from an 
embedding of intuitionistic logic into ILL. This was only successful for hereditary 
Harrop logic. We would like the result to hold for the whole of intuitionistic logic. 
Although we are pessimistic of success, we feel the question is worth investigating 
and an understanding of the failure to get the desired result would be useful.
In Chapter 4 we gave a decision procedure for propositional Lax Logic. It was 
said there that a contraction-free (or terminating) calculus for the logic would be 
interesting and useful. Although we are again pessimistic of finding such a calculus 
the investigation would be useful. Again, analysis and proof of the failure might 
also be interesting. The decision procedure, the calculus PFLAX^*®^ has yet to 
be properly implemented, tested and developed. This would be a useful task to 
complete.
Finally, the Scottish history calculi in Chapter 4 could be used to enumerate all 
loop-free proofs for a sequent calculus. Syntactically, this seems like a well-defined 
(and finite) subset of proofs. It would be interesting to see whether or not this 
corresponds to a well defined subset of proofs in the semantics. The author has no 
intuition as to the answer to this question, but if it is a yes, then there is an interesting 
field of development in logic and possibly logic programming to consider.
Appendix A 
Logical Calculi
This appendix contains the logical calculi mentioned, but not presented, in the body 
of this thesis.
A.1 G3
This is not quite the same calculus as in [TS96], but it is exactly G3 as presented by 
Kleene in [Kle52a].
F I ... \ D  ( - ^ )r , _ L = > f
-p P _x D (DcjT , P d Q ^ R  
r,f  => _L /  ^ r, -iP =+ P   ^ \
r = > p  r ^ Q
r = ^ f  AQ (A%)
r , P A Q , . r , P A Q , Q = > R .  . 
r , P A Q = > p   ^ r , P A g = > p
 ^ ^ (V%) (v%)r = ^ p v Q "  r = ^ p v g
r, p V g, p p r, p V g, g => p r,pvg=^p (Vc)
A.2 G4
This is the contraction-free calculus of [Vor58], [Dyc92], [Hud93].
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(aa?) p ^  p (-L)
(D%)
r, A => A P; _L => P
r,p=>g
r = > P D Q
r , A , g = > p  r , P 3  ( T D Q ) = > p
r , A D g , A = > p  r , ( PAT)  D Q ^ p
r , S p Q , T D Q = ^ R  r , T p Q = ^ S D T  p,g=»p ,
r ,  (5 V T) D Q =?- i î  V , { S d T ) d Q = ^ R
r ^ p  r = » Q  r , p , Q ^ ü
V ^ P a Q 7 k )  r , P A Q = > P  7 /:)
^  ^  (V kJ j f + M n  (V kJp v g   ^ r=>pvg
r , p = ^ p  r, g = ^ p
r , p v g = ^ p  
Here, A is atomic. Note that _L is not atomic.
(Vc)
A.3 G6
The multiplicative formulation of intuitionistic logic.
(ua;) p  j p (-^)p = > p  ' ^  r , _L=>p
r  -R (W) (C)r , p = ^ p   ^ r , p = > p  
r , p ^ g  y . Ti =»p  P2,g  = »p  .
r* r* p  /I  —V pr  p  3  g  Pi, P2 , p  D g  p
Pi p  P2 => g  / \ r , p, g  => p  . .
P i , r 2 ^ P A g  r , P A g = > p ^ ^ ^ ^
p => p  /\ , \ F g  /, y \ ^ 1, p  => p  F2 j g  => p  y VIV%J rZ T 'pT T TÏ — p  p . p \ ,  r» p—pvg" F=>pvg '^'" "^/ Fi,F2,pvg=>p
A.4 NJ
We present the natural deduction calculus for propositional intuitionistic logic, first 
in ‘tree-style’, and then in sequent style.
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A.4.1 Trees
[P]
^  (3 l)  (3 ,)P d Q Q
7 x )
[P] [Q]
(VxJ ^  (V%) ^  (VJ
A.4.2 Sequents
{ax) p I i_ p  (-L)r , P h P ' ^  r,j_i-p 
r , P k g  , r h P D Q  r n p  ,(Elj  p I --------  Pe)rI-pDg rh-g
FHP rhg rhPAg rhPAgrhPAg rhP ri-g ^
(Vx,) IV,.)r h P v Q ^ ^ * ^  r i - P v Q  
r h P v Q  r , p i - p  r , Q h P  
r i - p (Va)
A.5 CLL 
A.5.1 Single-sided
CLL: single sided, multiple succèdent calculus for classical linear logic.
= t>r ,P =4*A,P-^
p 7 ^  7":) — ’ ^ r , A  ’
(/) (^) (T)=+1 =^r,_L => r ,  T
r,P r (&)r , A , p ® Q  =t>r,p&Q
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=» r,  F, g  / \ , \ ^  r*, g  , .=^r,p@g^®^  ^ =>r,p®g^®^^
=>?r, IP => r, ?p
^  ^  (T^) (<:)=^r,?p 
A.5.2 Two-sided
CLL^: two-sided, multiple-succedent sequent calculus - including implication.
(& ) (ic)=>/ r, j= ^ A
r= ^  Ar  =4-1, A 7 k) x =j. 7 £ )
(T%) n n ^  A (On)r  :4- T, A '  r ,  0  A
r , p  => g, A  ^  ^ Fi =4^ p, Ai F2 => g, A2  ^ ^
F = > p - o g  Fi,F2,p-cg=>Ai,A2Fi^p,Ai F2 => g ,  A2 / \ F,p,g =» A y X
Fi,F2=i.P®g,Ai,A2 F,P®g=ixA^®^)F=>P,A F=>g,A r,p=>AF => p&g, A F, p&g => A ^F, g AF, p&g => A
f , 0 , A  F,p=4>A r , g = > A '
\ ^ n )  p _  0 x 3 / 1  —k. A .  A -p>9g, A Fi, F2 , p ^ g  Ai, A2
F => p  @ g,  A F => p  @ g,  A
F, P => A F,g=>-A
F , p ® g ^  A (Gz:)
!F=^ P,?A !F,P=>?A!F =>!P, ?A  ^ !F, ?P =>?A
F =4^ P, A y . r, P => A y .F =^ ?P, A F, !P => A
{Wn) A + — X iWc)F=^?P,A ' F,!P=> A
F=>?P,?P,A F, !P,!P^ AF=^ ?P,A F,!P^A ^
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A.6 IS4
Two sided single succèdent calculus for intuitionistic S4.
{ax) p  j V p  (-L)r,p=>p " ^ r,j_^p
r,p => Q  ^ r, p 3 Q => p r,p 3 Q,g => p ^\^TZ)   P ^ jr =>p 3 g  ^ r ,P3g=^p
r = > p  r = > gr p A g (/\%)
r,PAg,p=^Py X r, p Ag,g => p , .
r , P A g = > p  r , P A g = 4 > p
(VkJ (Vk.)r ^ p v g   ^ r = > p v g
r,pvg,p=»p r,pvg,g=^p  
r , p v g = ^ p (Vc)
^  ^  (o ^ ) (Or)□r, A=> op  ^ r, op => p
A.7 S4
This is a single sided (multiple succèdent) sequent calculus.
TT^-lfp {-'-')n ,p ,-n p  n ,-3-ip
n , - F , g  H i f .  _ n ,-,g
n , P 3 g  ^  I
n,p n,g
n , P A g
n,p,g
(A) ( - A )
n ,pvg  
n, OP, p
n, -i(p 3 g)
n, -iP, -ig
n,-(PAg)
n, -iP n, -ign,-i(p V g)
□n2,pni , □II2 , -<OP
n,-nDP,p
(V) ' ( - V )
n, OP tt i-irr_ _^ /sp i~'^ )
□H2,P (O) A - . n o  ( -0 )n i , a n 2 , a p ^  ' n ,-iD P
Appendix B
Benchmark Formulae
This Appendix gives the benchmark formulae used in Chapter 4, The benchmark 
formulae in Figure A.l are from a comparison of propositional intuitionistic theo­
rem provers at the TABLEAUX’98 conference. A description of them can be found 
in [Dyc97]. The formulae in Figures A.2 and A.3 are taken from [How97]. As 
can be seen from the table of results in Table 4.2, the formulae with quantifiers are 
instantiated over finite universes to give propositional formulae.
20 6  j
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1. d e - b ru i  jn_p (n) :LHS(2n +  1) 3RHS(2n -1- 1) 
d e J o ru i  jn_n (n) :LHS(2n) D (p(0)VRHS(2n) V “>p(0))
RHS(m) :=
LHS(M) A£i((p(«) p{i +  1)) DRHS(m)) 
addition modulo m
2. ph_p (n) := left_p(n) D right(n) 
ph_n (n) := left_n(n) D right(n)
left_p(n):=Ag'/(Vj^i occ(z, j)) 
left_n(n):=A7ÿ(Vpi (occ(%, j)  V -i-i occ(i, n))) 
right(n):=Afi^i Vgt=i s(ü , i2, j)
s(l, m, n):=occ(l, n) A occ(m, n)
3. con_p (n) :=((conjs(n)V disjs_p(n)) 3  p{f)) P p{f)  
con_ji (n) :=((conjs(n)V disjs_n(n)) 3  p{f))  3  p{f)
conjs(n):=A”^ iP(i) 
disjs_p(n):=Vf^i(p(î) P p{f))  
disjs_n(n):=(--^p(l) 3  p{f))  V Vg=2 (p(%) 3  p{f))
4. s c h w i c h t _ p  (n )  :=(ant_p(n)3 p(0)) 
s c h w i c h t _ n  (n )  :=(ant_n(?7.)3 p(0))
ant_p(n):=p(n) A Ag=i(p(2) 3  p{i) 3  p{i -  1)) 
ant_n(n):=-i-ip(n) A Af^i{p{i) 3  p{i) 3  p{i — 1))
5. kk_p (n) :=(kk_pp(n, n) 3  p (/))  A (kkr(n, n)3  p{f))  
kk_n (n) :=kk_nn(n, n)
kk_pp(n, 0):=(pr(a, 0)3 p (/)) A ((pr(b, n )3  pr(b, 0)) 3  pr(a, n)) 
kk-pp(n, m):=kk_pp(n, m -  1) A ((pr(b, m -  1) 3  pr(a, m)) 3  pr(a, m  -  1)) 
kkr(n, 0):=((pr(b, n )3  pr(b, 0)) 3  pr(a, n)) A (pr(a, 0) 3  p(f)) 
kkr(n, m):=((pr(b, m  -  1)3 pr(a, m)) 3  pr(a, m — 1)) A kkr(n, m — 1) 
kkjin(n, 0):=(pr(a, 0)3 p(f)) A ((-i-i pr(b, n) 3  pr(b, 0)) 3  pr(a, n)) 
kkjin(n, m):=kk_nn(n, m — 1) A ((-«-' pr(b, m — 1) 3  pr(a, m)) 3  pr(a, m))
6. e q u i v - p  (n )  :=eq_pf(n) eq_b(n)
e q u iv _ n  (n )  :=eq_nf(n) eq_b(n)
eq_pf(l):=p(l)
eq_pf(n):=eq_pf(n — 1) -H- p(n) 
eq_nf(l):=-i-'p(l) 
eq_nf(n):=eq_nf(n — 1) 44- p{n) 
eq_b(l):=p(l)
eq_b(n):=p(n) eq_pb(n — 1)
Figure B .l: Benchmark Formulae
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1. ( (A V B )A (D V E )A (G V P ))  3  ( (A A D )V (A A G )V (D A G )V (B A E )V
(B A P )  V (P A P))
2. ((AVBVC)A(DVPVP)A(GVPVJ)A(%VPVM)) 3  (AAD)V(AAG)V
(AA7F)V(DAG)V(DAPr)v(GAK)V(BAP)V(BAP)V(BAf,)V(EAP)V
(PAZ,)V(PAP)V(CAP)V(CAJ)V(CAM)V(PAJ)V(PAM)V(JAM)
3. ((A V B V G) A (D V E V P)) 3  ((A A B) V (B A P) V (G A P ))
4. (A 3  B) 3  (A 3  G) 3  (A 3  (B A G))
5. (A A -lA) 3  B
6. (A V G) 3  (A 3  B) 3  (B V G)
7. ((((A 3  B) A (B 3  A)) 3  (A A B A G)) A (((B 3  G) A (G 3  B)) 3
(A A B A G ))  A ( ( ( G 3  A) A ( A 3 G ) )  3  (A A BAG)))  3  (A A B A G )
8. ((-,-iP  3  P ) 3  P ) V (-,P  3  -iP ) V (-1-iP 3  -1-P) V (-1-.P 3  P )
9. (((G 3  A) 3  J) 3  D 3  P) 3  (((B 3  B) 3  7) 3  G 3  J) 3  (A 3  B) 3
F  D G D (((G 3  B) 3  I)  3  P )  3  (A 3  G) 3  (((P  3  A) 3  B) 3  / )  3  
P  
10. A 3  B 3  ((A 3  B 3  G) 3  G) 3  (A 3  B 3  G)
11. ((-i-i(-iA V ~'B) 3  (“>A V -iB)) 3  (-i-i(-iA V -iB) V -i(-iA V -iB))) 3
(-i-i(-iA V ->B) V -i(-iA V -iB))
12. B 3  (A 3  (((A A B) 3  Gi) 3  (((A A B) 3  Gg) 3  (((A A B) 3  G3) 3
(((A A B) 3  (B 3  Gi 3  G2 3  Gs 3  B)) 3  (A A B))))))
13. ((A A B V G) 3  (G V (G A P))) 3  (-,A V ((A V B) 3  G))
14. -~i-i((-iA 3  B) 3  (~iA 3  ”iB) 3  A)
15. -.-.(((A 4  ^B) 4  ^G) 4-)" (A 44^  (B 4-^  G)))
16. yx3y\fz{p{x) A q{y) A r(z)) 44 \/z3y\fx{p{x) A q{y) A r(z))
17. 3xi\fyi3x2yy23x2,\fyz{p{xi,yi) A q{x2 , 2/2) A r{xs, 2/3 )) D
yy3^X3\fy23x2'iyi3xi{p{xi,yi) A q(x2 , 3/2) A r{x3,ys))
18. ~i3xVy(mem(y,x) -im em (x,x))
19. -i3xVy(q(y) 3  r(x,y))  A 3xVy(s(y) 3  r(x,y))  3  -nVrr(ç(a;) 3  s(a:))
Figure B.2; Example formulae
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20. yzi\fz2iz3{q{zuZ2,Z3,>zi,Z2,Z3)) 3  3xi3x23x33yi3y23y3{{p{xi) A p{x2) A
p(a:3) 'H' P(m) A p(3/z) A ^(3/3)) A g(a:i, 3:2 , ^3 , 2/1,3/2,3/3))
21. ((3z(p 3  f{x))) A {3xi{f{xi)  3  p))) 3  (3 ^2 ((p 3  f { x 2 )) A (/(X2) 3  p)))
22. {3x{p{x))A iyxi{f{xi) 3  (-^p(a;i)Ar(a;i)))A(Va;2 (p(æ2) 3  (p fe)A /(a ;2 )))A
(V%(p(a;3) D 9 (2:3)) V 3a:4(p(2:4) A ^(xd)))))) 3  3 0 :5 (9 (2:5) Ap(o:5))
23. ((3æ(p(a:)) 44 3 2 :1 (9 (2:1))) A Vo:2Vp((p(o:2) A 9 (p)) 3  (^(2:2) 4-> s{y)))) 3
(V2:3(p(2:3) 3  r(2:3)) 44 V2:4(9(2:4) D 8 (2:4 )))
24. (V2:((/(a:) V 9 (2:)) 3  -1/1(2:)) A \/2:i((9 (2:1) 3  -<2(2:1)) 3  ( / ( 2:i) A/i(2:i)))) 3
V2:2(2(2:2))
25. (-.3 a:(/(2:) A(p(2:) V/i(2:))) A(3 a:i(2(2:i) A /(2:i)) AV2:2 (~i/i(2:2 ) D 7 (2:2)))) D
3 2 :3 (2(2:3) A j (2:3))
26. {\/x{{f{x) A {g{x) V h{x))) 3  2(2:)) A (Vo:i((2(2:1) A h{xi)) 3  j (^i)) A
Vo:2 (A:(2:2) 3  h{x2 )))) 3  \/x3 {{f{x3 ) A A:(2:3)) 3  ^(2:3))
27. -^3y\/x{f{x, y) 44 -^3z{f(x, z) A f {z,  x)))
Figure B.3: Example Formulae
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